Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO7369
2005-09-22 10:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF

Tags:  ECON PGOV PREL EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007369 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2015
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EG
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF
INVESTMENT MOHIELDIN


Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007369

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2015
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EG
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF
INVESTMENT MOHIELDIN


Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador had an introductory meeting with
Egyptian Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieldin on
September 14. The Ambassador noted the positive progress on
reform signaled by the recent presidential election, but
noted concerns about heavy-handedness by the NDP. He
suggested ways the GOE could improve the electoral process in
anticipation of parliamentary elections. Mohieldin said the
NDP was confident about the upcoming elections, and predicted
that the major opposition parties would each win a few seats.
The new composition of the parliament might make continued
economic reform more challenging. Mohieldin added that the
GOE would tackle corruption and make this a major focus,
undertaking various initiatives including passing a new
anti-corruption law. End summary.

--------------
Presidential Election
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador had an introductory meeting with
Egyptian Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieldin on
September 14. The Ambassador told Mohieldin that Washington
had real confidence in the current GOE team and that the U.S.
would like to help advance reform. Secretary Rice had
indicated to the Ambassador after Egypt's recent presidential
election that the U.S. did not want it to be prescriptive or
imply support for a particular party, but rather to support
reform in general. Despite the positive progress signaled by
the election itself, there was some concern over
heavy-handedness by the NDP in the electoral process. The
Ambassador suggested the NDP consult NDI and IRI regarding
improvements that could be made in the electoral process
before the parliamentary elections. One possibility was to
move more polling centers to schools and avoid those which
remained in police stations, as that sent the wrong message.
Such improvements would make it easier for the U.S. to be
more supportive of Egypt's reform efforts. The Ambassador
noted the positive signal sent by the conduct of the security
forces during the election. Mohieldin responded that even

the opposition was appreciative of the security forces'
behavior on election day. The police's impartiality put more
pressure on the NDP to reform, as the party had always
assumed their unqualified backing. He anticipated that
security would be even more impartial during the upcoming
parliamentary election.

--------------
Parliamentary Elections
--------------


3. (C) Mohieldin noted that the NDP had developed its reform
agenda at the party conference in 2002. In the 2000
parliamentary election, the NDP won only 38% of the vote.
Approximately 200 independent candidates won election, and
subsequently joined the NDP. Going into the 2005
parliamentary elections, the NDP was confident and had gotten
a boost from the presidential eleciton. Provincial party
leaders were now identified and linked to the party's central
headquarters. Opposition parties were still weak, but some
strong independents would likely emerge during the campaign.
He estimated that the Wafd party would win 4-5 seats, Tagammu
4-5, Ghad 5-6, depending on the outcome of Ayman Nour's
trial, and that independents allied with the banned Muslim
Brotherhood would retain the number of seats they currently
had (16),or perhaps win a few more. Mohieldin noted that
there was a 60-70% chance that he would run for parliament
himself. He would run if his uncle, a longtime
parliamentarian from the Tagammu party, decided not to run.

--------------
Continuing Reform
--------------


4. (C) Mohieldin said that Egypt needed support from the
U.S. for continued reform. Mubarak had made the political
reform agenda clear: devolution of power to the parliament,
increased transparency through a "FOIA-like" law, and
anti-corruption measures. The economic reform agenda,
however, was not specified during the election campaign and
would be more challenging. While economic reform had been
relatively smooth in the past year, it would likely be more
difficult after the upcoming parliamentary elections. Some
of the reforms on the agenda would be particularly difficult,
including furthering privatization, trade liberalization, and
improving relations with Israel. Those who stood to lose
from the reforms knew they would lose and were very
outspoken. Those who stood to benefit were not necessarily
aware that they would benefit and would simply "thank God in
silence" if the reforms were successful.

5. (C) On the issue of anti-corruption, the Ambassador urged
Mohieldin to be proactive. Mohieldin said that he had
discussed corruption at a conference the previous day.
Responsibility for anti-corruption efforts currently resided
with the Authority for Administrative Control, which had had
some success in prosecuting corruption. The GOE, however,
was considering establishing a new agency that would have
representatives in each ministry. A new anti-corruption law
was also being drafted in parliament, and Mohieldin promised
to share a draft with the USG. A corporate governance guide,
which was part of the GOE-USG financial sector MOU, would
also soon be published.


6. (C) The World Bank was supportive of the GOE's efforts,
as was the International Financial Corporation, which had
given $1 million for a national anti-corruption program.
That program would serve as a model for the entire BMENA
area. NGOs would be incorporated into the program to lend it
credibility, and Mohieldin welcomed possible USAID
assistance. He said the overall aim was to present
corruption as a destructive force and "haram," i.e.,
forbidden by Islam. The NDP had also established a
Secretariat for Values, which policed the party. A Supreme

SIPDIS
Court judge headed the Secretariat, and reported directly to
Mubarak. The Ambassador undertook to raise awareness of
these initiatives among USG policy-makers.


Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo

You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.

JONES