NEXT STEPS ON DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007045

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

Classified by DCM Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: After absorbing Washington's clear message
on reform, Gamal Mubarak's NDP clique, allied with ministers
and advisors, was given unprecedented power over the conduct
of the election. The positives of September 7 -- sidelining
of the NDP "old guard" and the security forces -- were a
direct result of the reformers' influence. The upcoming
parliamentary elections pose a greater challenge,
particularly given the weakness of the opposition parties and
the lack of time. While pressing now for international
observers, we should support the vocal constituency of
democracy activists by expanding our support for their
home-grown monitoring efforts. NDI and IRI are now
well-established here and we recommend they send expanded
assessment teams for the parliamentary polls. We should
receive at high levels Egyptian reformers visiting Washington
to support their efforts. We should also consider a
high-level U.S. visit to Cairo before the parliamentary
elections take place. End summary.


2. (S) The September 7 election brought fundamental changes
to democracy in Egypt. Serious flaws remain, but the
restrained conduct of the security forces and the
transparency epitomized by Ayman Nour's second place finish,
show that Mubarak received the unambiguous high level
messages from Washington (both private and public) that
things must change. Pressing our advantage will entail using
the wide range of openings and tools provided by September 7.
Septel contains detailed recommendations on how to engage
resources such as NDI and IRI and openings such as that
provided by the access (late, but now irreversible) afforded
to domestic monitors. At a strategic level, we need to
exploit the new openness that Mubarak underlined in an
address following an NDP meeting after the victory when he
said "let us expose ourselves to the outside world with an
innovative mind."


3. (S) The economic reformers, who have consolidated their
power around Mubarak, achieved new prominence in this
election. Minister of Trade Rashid Rashid, Investment
Minister Mahmoud Mohieldin, and Finance Minister Youssef
Boutros Ghali joined Gamal Mubarak and key members of his NDP
clique -- such as steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz and political
scientist Mohamed Kamal -- to run every aspect of the
election. Their success was reflected by the total
sidelining of the NDP's old guard in managing the president's
campaign and the fact that the security forces were kept on
such a tight leash throughout. Since the outcome was never
in doubt, the amount of effort and expense spent on the way
"candidate Mubarak" was portrayed reflects the reformers'
stamp on this new aspect of Egyptian politics. The Mubarak
campaign, which led by example, and ensured, at least on TV,
improved media access for the candidates, was a creation of
the reformers. We now need to get them to apply the same
energy to improving the conduct of the parliamentary
elections. Continued support for the reformers as they
embark on this task is essential.


4. (S) Realistically, however, we face a far tougher
challenge in the parliamentary elections. We lose the
advantage of the novelty of the presidential election and
return to familiar ground for manipulation by the NDP party
apparatus. Individual NDP party hacks will not easily
relinquish the power they have built up over decades --
especially when their livelihoods are at stake. The old
guard and security apparatus (likely with Mubarak's support)
will do everything possible to block Muslim Brotherhood
members running as independents from gaining seats. Finally,
the political parties arrayed against the NDP are in sad
shape. The Wafd, the only party with a national presence,
saw the myth that it leads the opposition soundly debunked on
September 7. Ayman Nour's Ghad party is too new to have
established itself throughout Egypt and it is unclear that it
can field competitive candidates -- let alone cross the 23
seat threshold needed to secure a spot in the 2011
presidential election race.


5. (S) We may face our greatest criticism now from Egypt's
democracy activists who are lined up against Mubarak. In a
sense, the half-way passable performance by Mubarak is the
worst of all possible worlds for them. They fear Mubarak may
have made just enough concessions to accommodate the West,
while maintaining his pre-eminent position. Frustrations
will mount, as will a lack of clear direction, given the
paucity of political choice. The urge to incite the security
forces may strengthen--particularly in the "Kifaya" movement
as it retools its message. However, we must not fuel the
opposition activists' ever-present suspicion that the USG
will waver in its support for their full democratic rights
because of Mubarak's conduct of the presidential polls. The
most effective way to address the errors in the conduct of
the election may be provided by the emboldened domestic
observers' movement, with the possibility this time that
international observers can join them. Our support
(including financial support) will be critical as the
monitors build on the precedent established in the September
7 polls and prepare for the parliamentary elections. We will
back the activists through the difficult days ahead through
direct advocacy, public diplomacy and organizational
activities that emphasize their positive role on the process.



6. (S) NDI and IRI are now firmly established in Egypt and
through a variety of programs can continue to influence the
situation here. In the near term we see two tracks. The
first should be to press the GOE to allow full international
monitoring for the parliamentary elections. The second,
building on the September 7 precedent, should be to provide
funding and encouragement to IRI and NDI to send larger-scale
assessment teams to monitor the parliamentary elections. The
EU needs to be moved from the sidelines into a more active
role. Now that we have the precedent of foreign assessment
teams operating in Egypt without credentials, the EU should
send teams for the November and December balloting.


7. (S) Mubarak's focus on prosperity and job creation in the
campaign suggests there will be more reformers in his new
Cabinet. Minister of Trade Rashid has launched a full-court
press on the FTA. Public support for his efforts will
strengthen the reform ministers as the "old guard" reassesses
its position in the wake of September 7. The last redoubt of
the latter group is the back room politics of electoral
districts, party lists, and Shura (advisory) council seats.
The old guard's strongest card is the
sovereignty/interference argument that they deploy against
statements from Washington on how Egypt should run its
democracy. We can counter this tactic with a carefully
calibrated balance of public support and private pressure.
Specifically, we should continue to support members of the
Gamal Mubarak reform group when they come to Washington
through high-level meetings throughout the Administration and
public statements in support of their role in Egyptian
society. Privately, we need to continue to underscore to
senior GOE officials that the U.S. and the broader
international community will be paying very close attention
to the transparency of the parliamentary elections process.
We also propose, now that the September 7 elections have
passed without major upset, that a senior visitor, such as
Deputy Secretary Zoellick, consider visiting Cairo before the
Parliamentary campaigns begin in late October to reinforce
this message.


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