EGYPT'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: UPDATE #5--FINAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 006908

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: UPDATE #5--FINAL
DAYS MARKED BY CONTROVERSY OVER SUPERVISION AND MONITORING
OF THE ELECTION

REF: CAIRO 6710 AND PREVIOUS

Classified by ECPO Minister Counselor Michael Corbin for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The official campaign period for Egypt's first
presidential election, which began on August 17, closed on
September 4. The final few days witnessed a flurry of last
minute campaigning by the leading candidates, as well as a
growing storm of legal controversy. President Mubarak, Ayman
Nour, No'man Gom'a, and the seven other candidates made their
final pitches for votes. More controversially, the Judges
Club decided on September 2 that its members would fulfill
their constitutionally-required supervision of the poll, but
with strong recommendations that the Presidential Election
Commission (PEC) take several remedial actions (related to
domestic monitors, vote counting procedures, and assignments
of judges for election work) to ensure the election's
integrity. In addition, the PEC said that it would refuse to
follow a judicial order to permit access by domestic monitors
to the polling stations--and the law appears to be on its
side. These developments suggest that the outcome of the
September 7 poll will be controversial. No one doubts that
Mubarak will win, but how he will win--particularly if the
judges or the monitors accuse his backers of resorting to
fraud to boost either the turnout or his margin of
victory--continues to be the question that matters the most
as Egyptians go to the polls on September 7. End summary.

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Mubarak's Finale: The Devil You Know
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2. (C) Capping a week that saw him give his first press
interview of the campaign, President Mubarak also gave an
hour-long interview on State TV. Mubarak has managed to
festoon his campaign with many of the trappings of western
democratic campaigning--such as media outreach, stump
speeches, and rallies--while at the same time avoiding the
riskier kinds of events--especially debates or press
conferences--that might compel him to answer any tough
questions.


3. (C) Mubarak closed his campaign on September 4 with a
rally at Cairo's Abdin Square, where he postured as an
inheritor of the tradition of nationalist resistance to
occupation and foreign interference that included milestones
of Egyptian history which took place at Abdin such as the
Urabi Revolt against the British in 1882, the British
occupation in 1942, and the Free Officers revolution of 1952.
In a TV interview on the same day, Mubarak, with the
magnanimity of the presumptive victor, said that he supported
the right of Kifaya and others to demonstrate in the street
and urged any citizens who opposed him to express their
feelings through the ballot box. (Note: Mubarak did not
elaborate on how citizens who have been denied the right to
register to vote by Egypt's restrictive registration
procedures--which closed in January, prior to his February 26
announcement about direct election of the president--should
express their opposition. End note.)


4. (C) Mubarak's lead remains unassailable, in the eyes of
almost all analysts and ordinary Egyptians. He has avoided
gaffes and tough questions, and continues to present a
presidential, if somewhat stolid and familiar, face to the
Egyptian voters. The ordinary Egyptians to whom we have
talked tend to hold one of two views about the president and
the elections.

--Of those who plan to vote, most say they will vote for
Mubarak as "the best of a bad group." These voters say that
Mubarak has served for too long, that his record has been
mixed (at best),and that he is unlikely to deliver on his
campaign promises. They note, however, that he is a known
and proven quantity who has kept Egypt stable and maintained
good relations with other world leaders. The other
contenders, according to this line of thinking, are unknowns
who are too risky to vote for.

--Competing with the "devil-we-know" view of Mubarak is the
other leading school of thought, generally held by ordinary
citizens who are not registered to vote. Evidencing the
political apathy that many analysts say is the result of 50
years of authoritarian rule, these disenfranchised citizens
take a "why bother" attitude to the election. They argue
that politics is a game only accessible to the elite, and is
not something they can hope to influence.

5. (C) One other item of Mubarak miscellany: Throughout
the campaign, presidential son Gamal Mubarak has been
publicly silent, although at the president's rallies, Gamal
has featured among the dignitaries sitting front and center.
Journalists and analysts have ascribed to Gamal a key role in
the campaign, a view that is supported by Gamal's association
with the campaign managers and his key role as head of the
NDP's policies committee. Breaking with the public silence
that has been his custom during the campaign, on September 4
in Port Said, Gamal told a party conference that his father
had a "realistic" platform, and that the election "will prove
to the world that democracy is a fundamental aspect of modern
Egypt."

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Ayman Nour
--------------


6. (C) Nour has continued with his dogged pursuit of the
presidency. Witnesses say that his appearances have often
generated the most excitement and energy of the campaign--in
contrast to the carefully scripted Mubarak events or the
plodding speeches of No'man Gom'a--but it seems more likely
that the enthusiasm results as much from the simple novelty
of the young challenger asserting his fitness for the
presidency. Nour's supporters are relatively young and
technologically savvy and they have done a good job of
responding in high numbers of various internet polls that
have run or are running on the internet, including several
Egyptian and pan-Arab sites. As a result, many of these
polls show Nour running a strong second or even ahead of
Mubarak. (Comment: All the usual caveats about internet
polls--unscientific, self-selecting samples, etc.--must
apply, but we are still intrigued by the Nour campaign's
ability to upstage the Mubarak machine in this one area. End
comment.)


7. (C) Nour experienced a setback to his campaign when the
PEC ruled that his campaign theme song, unveiled in late
August with a professionally produced video, could not be
shown on TV since the song's composer had charged Nour with
copyright infringement. Predictably, Nour charged that the
GOE was singling him out for persecution, while Nour's
critics--especially those who back Mubarak--pointed to the
episode as more evidence of Nour's shady character.


8. (C) Nour's stakes in the September 7 election are
particularly high. If he manages to win the race for second
place, he will gain legitimacy as the leading opposition
figure to Mubarak. Indeed, many analysts are suggesting the
Nour's real goal is the next presidential election in 2011.
In addition, a strong finish by Nour on September 7 would
bolster him ahead of the planned resumption on September 25
of his postponed trial on forgery charges--which Nour and
other GOE critics have argued is driven primarily by the
NDP's political agenda.

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No'man Goma'a: I am not a GOE Puppet
--------------


9. (C) Goma'a's final campaign event, in keeping with the
lack of energy and negativity that has characterized much of
his campaign, was a press conference on September 4 in which
he spent considerable time denying the persistent rumors that
he entered the presidential race only after promises/pressure
from the GOE. (Note: Gom'a's last minute entry into the
race, after hints that he favored a Wafd party boycott of the
poll, has prompted speculation that the GOE would prefer that
Gom'a and the Wafd emerge from the 2005 election season as
Egypt's leading opposition. According to this line of
reasoning, a Wafd-dominated opposition would be relatively
pliable and predictable. By contrast, the Ghad, with Nour's
charisma and commitment to challenge the ruling system, is
seen as more of a threat. End note.)

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The Judges Decide
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10. (C) The Judges Club of Cairo announced on September 2
that its membership had collectively agreed to participate in
supervising the election, but with the caveat that the judges
could not guarantee that the polls would be free, fair, and
transparent unless the PEC undertook at least three major
changes to planned procedures, including:

--admitting domestic monitors to the polling stations;

--allowing the judges in individual polling stations to
release preliminary vote counts not only to the central
collection point in Cairo, but also to the party/candidate
agents in each polling station;

--revising the assignments of judges for the election so as
to place the most senior (and most independent) judges in the
positions of greatest responsibility.


11. (C) Regarding the third point, many judges and
observers agree that the PEC has sought to sideline the most
independent judges, either by appointing them to relatively
junior supervisory jobs or by eliminating their names
altogether from the supervisory lists. In a conversation
with poloff on September 2, however, two senior judges with
close links to the Ministry of Justice's Supreme Judicial
Council argued that the assignments made by the PEC were not
the result of malign PEC intent, but rather were an example
of "typical Egyptian chaos."


12. (C) The Judges' Club decision to participate in
supervising the elections in some ways was a climb down from
their May threat to boycott unless the GOE provided legal and
financial guarantees of independence, which it refused to do.
The GOE was ready to use a cadre of lower level Ministry of
Justice employees, including junior prosecutors and
administrative staff, to serve as electoral supervisors. It
appears that the Judges' Club membership calculated that a
boycott would leave them with little direct information about
the polls, while at the same time allowing the GOE to assert
that its "judges" had effectively supervised the polls. With
their agreement to supervise, but with the caveat that they
cannot vouch for the poll's integrity unless the GOE follows
their three recommendations, the judges have preserved their
central role in determining the integrity of the election.

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State Council Administrative Court Rushes In
--------------


13. (C) On September 3, the State Council Administrative
Court issued several notable rulings in election-related
lawsuits. In the first decision, the Court disqualified
opposition candidate Wahid al-Uqsuri on the grounds that his
leadership of the Egypt Arab Socialist Party was contested.
The PEC immediately announced that Uqsuri, who has the odd
distinction of being both a socialist and a successful
businessman, remained eligible. The PEC affirmed its control
of all matters pertaining to the presidential election
eligibility and conduct, and announced that it would
disregard the Administrative Court's ruling.


14. (C) More significantly, the Court ruled in favor of the
NGO coalitions who had sued the PEC to admit domestic
monitors to the polling stations. The PEC's announcement
that only judges, voters, poll workers, and candidate agents
would be allowed to enter the polling stations prompted the
domestic civil society groups who hope to monitor the
election (including several funded by USAID) to sue the PEC
to gain access. The PEC responded to the decision by
insisting that it would disregard the court order.

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Where the Higher Courts Will Fear to Tread?
--------------


15. (C) The PEC does seem to have the letter of the law on
its side. The law governing presidential elections clearly
states that with the exception of criminal acts "in flagrante
delicto," the PEC is immune from review and challenge and
indeed is the sole authority for determining any appeals
against its own decision (Article 36 of Law 174/2005).
(Comment: The creation of an imperial PEC, which is
completely independent on paper, but widely believed to
answer to the highest powers of the presidency, is likely to
remain a major point of contention. End comment.)

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Kifaya: The Mice Plan to Roar Some More
--------------


16. (C) In a September 4 press conference, Kifaya leaders
announced that they would continue their struggle against the
dominance of President Mubarak and his family, and that they,
along with other opposition groups, would form a "unified
list" of opposition candidates to run against the NDP in the
coming parliamentary elections. Kifaya also plans to form a
shadow government and parliament, and to increase its
demonstrations and other activities to spread its message to
all governorates in Egypt. Kifaya has also announced a major
demonstration in Tahrir Square to start at noon on election
day. The security forces, which demonstrated notable
restraint in the last Kifaya demonstration in late August,
are unlikely to allow the Tahrir demonstration to become a
magnet for protestors. This event will receive considerable
scrutiny since there are elements in Kifaya that would
welcome a clash with the security forces.
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Comment: It Ain't Gonna Be Over Even When the Big Man Wins
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Negad El Borai (protect),a lawyer and leader of
one of the domestic monitoring coalitions, argued that
regardless of how Mubarak wins this election, he will emerge
as a weaker president. If the GOE resorts to ballot rigging
and other illegitimate means to win the election, the truth
will get out, and thereby weaken Mubarak in his final term.
Alternatively, if Mubarak and the regime take a chance on a
free and fair process, the likely low turnout for Mubarak,
and the emergence of an opposition with some electoral
legitimacy will set the stage for future democratic progress.


18. (C) In addition, the conflict between the
judges--embodied by the pro-Government Mamdouh Marai who
presides over the PEC and the independent-minded Zakaria
Abdel Aziz of the Cairo Judges Club--about the supervision
and monitoring of the presidential election will almost
certainly spill over into the debate about the conduct of the
coming parliamentary elections. The high stakes of the
parliamentary elections may mean that the judges' battle is
only beginning. In his public remarks on September 2,
Zakaria Abdel Aziz invoked the specter of a Ukraine-style
showdown between the GOE and outraged protestors. Other GOE
critics, including Kifaya, would like nothing less than to
orchestrate in Tahrir Square a popular rejection of the
election result. We see no evidence to suggest that such an
initiative will gain significant support, but we are also
confident that Egypt's emboldened opposition will try to
capitalize on any appearance of electoral impropriety as they
continue their struggle for democracy. End comment.


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