Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO6757
2005-09-01 16:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VERBAL MESSAGE TO THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAL EAID PTER EG IS MEPN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006757 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL EAID PTER EG IS MEPN
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VERBAL MESSAGE TO THE
SECRETARY ON PEACE PROCESS


SIPDIS

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006757

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL EAID PTER EG IS MEPN
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VERBAL MESSAGE TO THE
SECRETARY ON PEACE PROCESS


SIPDIS

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The DCM was convoked to the Foreign Ministry
September 1 by newly arrived MFA Chef du Cabinet, Ambassador
Wafaa Bassim (D equivalent),to receive a verbal message to
the Secretary (text at paragraph three) regarding steps Egypt
believes Washington should take with respect to the Middle
East peace process.


2. (C) The GOE "verbal message" urged the USG and other
Quartet members to pay particular attention to the need for
progress on "interim measures" to ensure that the momentum
resulting from the Israel withdrawal from Gaza is maintained.
Wafaa, who was accompanied by the MFA's new Middle East
Affairs Cabinet staffer responsible for the peace process,
Ezzedine Shukry, suggested that any "setbacks" in the West
Bank, particularly expansion of settlements or continued work
by the Israelis on the security wall, would "feed Hamas
extremism." Wafaa urged additional "confidence building
measures" to help efforts by moderates from both sides. She
suggested that the Quartet should note the significance of
Gaza disengagement, but at the same time emphasize the need
for additional progress on the Roadmap to address final
status issues.


3. (C) The DCM agreed to relay Wafaa's points to Washington,
observed that it was helpful to have this information well in
advance of the Quartet meeting in New York, and noted that
while we agree on the need for additional progress with
Roadmap implementation, it is crucial that Palestinian
control of Gaza succeed. The DCM noted the need for progress
on various secondary issues in Gaza, like disposition of
rubble issue, security, and border crossings. Palestinian
difficulties in Gaza would provide a pretext for those
opposed to peace. Responding, Bassim said that President
Mubarak had sent Intelligence Chief Soliman to Gaza and
Israel for this reason, where Soliman held 42 (sic) meetings
on this topic.


4. (SBU) MFA Verbal Message to the Secretary on Peace

Process:

Begin Text:


The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Northern West Bank is a
historic step in many ways. This is why Egypt has lent it
its support, and continues to do so. The determination and
resolve with which the Israeli government has implemented its
plan demonstrate its ability to face the settlers and their
narrow-minded agenda and to take courageous steps when it
serves the interests of Israel as a state. The Israeli
government deserves praise for this.

What is critically needed now is to take immediate measures
in order to build on the withdrawal, to make it a
stepping-stone towards a sustainable peace process.
Inaction, waiting for elections, would help extremist
elements in both societies to play on entrenched fears, which
could lead to a new round of violence. The Israeli public is
told that its security was undermined and the Palestinians
are told that the Gaza withdrawal was a smoke screen for
further settlement and Barrier construction. Hamas tell them
that Israel withdraws only in response to violence. With the
tight closure in the West Bank, which exacerbates
frustration, the situation can easily slip into another round
of violence. This, in turn, would be presented to the
Israeli public as the ultimate proof of the futility of
peaceful measures, leading to more intransigence and extreme
results in the elections.

Positive action now can prevent this cycle from taking place.
Although a quick resumption of final status talks is the
best way out, we do understand that it is unlikely. However,
between the 'waiting strategy' and the resumption of final
status talks, there is a room for action. A number of
measures can stabilize the situation, create a positive
atmosphere, and allow the partied to navigate safely through
the elections season. This would be the best preparation for
full implementation of the Road Map, including final status
talks, after the elections.

These measures would focus on the two most sensitive areas:
security for Israelis and land for Palestinians. Without a
Palestinian demonstrable action on security, it will be
difficult for the Israeli government to take positive
measures. Without Israeli demonstrable action on settlement
and Barrier construction as well as on prisoners and closure,
it will be difficult for Abu Mazen to take effective measures
to address the chaotic security situation, control armament,
establish PA control over its territory and prevent attacks
against Israelis. Only mutual and simultaneous action can
work. Egypt is already engaged in discussions with both
parties in order to convince them to take simultaneous steps
in these two areas, and your active support is needed. Your
intervention with the parties would assist our effort and
will signal to the parties that the international community
is united in its position.

It is also important that we seize the opportunity of the
next Quartet Principals Meeting in New York to redress the
peace process and put it back on track. Three main tasks
lend themselves for a quick international intervention.
First is the clear support for the completion of the Israeli
withdrawal and the resolution of its consequent issues.
Second is to urge the parties to face their most compelling
obligations now "security and land" and to take effective
measures to rebuild confidence in the negotiation process.
Third, is to re-insert the Israeli withdrawal into the wider
peace process. This could be done through setting a realist
date for the resumption of final status talks. It could also
be supported if the quartet is to spell out the parameters
for final status issues, on which there is consensus in the
international community. This would help frame and focus the
debate, and prepare the parties to address these issues when
negotiations resume. Egypt stands ready to assist in such an
effort, and I am personally looking forward to discuss these
issues with you in New York.

End text.


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