Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO6447
2005-08-22 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

CODEL HOEKSTRA'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL EG IS IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006447 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL EG IS IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL HOEKSTRA'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN


Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006447

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL EG IS IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL HOEKSTRA'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN


Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In an August 20 meeting at the Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS),Congressman Hoekstra,
Congresswoman Wilson, Congressman Shadegg, and Charge
discussed Gaza withdrawal, terrorism in the Sinai, Iraq, and
Iran. On Gaza, Soliman stressed the need to prevent Gaza
from becoming a prison. On Iraq, Soliman urged the U.S. to
focus on quelling violence and improving the lives of Iraqis
rather than rushing to hold elections. Finally, Soliman
urged the USG to engage with Iran. End summary.

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CODEL Hoekstra's meeting at EGIS
--------------


2. (C) Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),Chairman of the HPSCI,
accompanied by Heather Wilson (R-NM),John Shadegg (R-AZ),
HPSCI staff members Michael Meermans, Chris Donesa, Michael
Ennis, and Jamal Ware met EGIS Director Soliman at EGIS
Headquarters in Cairo on August 21 for over 90 minutes. The
CODEL was accompanied by CDA Jones, ORA Deputy Graiss and
poloff as Embassy notetaker.

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Gaza Withdrawal
--------------


3. (C) Soliman said that Gaza withdrawal presents both
challenges and opportunities for the region. Withdrawal is
significant, Soliman noted, because it is the first time the
GOI unilaterally decided to withdraw from the occupied
territories, because it will give hope to Palestinians, and
because it could potentially minimize the capabilities and
popular appeal of radical Palestinian organizations. He
added that because Egyptians are agitated by the ongoing
deaths of Palestinians, ensuring a peaceful withdrawal is
also important to Egypt's internal security. To that end,
Soliman advised that the GOE will continue to support the
Palestinians after withdrawal by training their security
services and maintaining an Egyptian presence with new
Palestinian battalions in Gaza to diffuse tension among
factions.


4. (C) As for the future, Soliman warned that Gaza must not
become a prison. Gazans should have access to sea/air ports,
efficient land border crossings, and links with the West Bank

for work, trade, and study. Without this openness, Gaza will
not be attractive for investment and may become a "Gazastan"
rather than the "Gazapore" the GOE wants it to become.
Soliman said that when he shared this objective with PM
Sharon in a recent meeting, Sharon responded that he plans to
design a fast train link between Gaza and the West Bank. The
potential for further Israeli withdrawal, from the
Philadelphi strip in particular, will depend on making the
GOI feel secure. Soliman said that the GOE aims to build
this sense of security by using professional border guards
(and not police officers) to secure the border and stop the
smuggling through border tunnels. Congressman Hoekstra
thanked Soliman for the positive role the GOE and EGIS is
playing in Gaza.

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Sinai Terrorist Incidents
--------------


5. (C) Linking the Palestinian situation to the terrorist
incidents in Sinai in October 2004 and July 2005, Soliman
expressed optimism that withdrawal would weaken the "small"
Jihadi groups based in Sinai that support Palestinian
extremists. Soliman said that these groups easily recruited
locals sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and directed
their terrorist acts against Israeli tourists because they
found it difficult to cross into Israel. According to
Soliman, the GOE arrested many, but not all, of the Jihadis
and local sympathizers following the October 2004 attacks in
Taba. He speculated that those not arrested launched the
July 23 bombings in Sharm el Sheikh to avenge the arrested.
Soliman shared that the GOE has a plan to "rid Sinai" of the
remaining Jihadis, and noted that a more positive outlook
among Palestinians following a smooth Gaza withdrawal, will
help in this plan by reducing Jihadi appeal among Sinai
locals.

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Iraq
--------------


6. (C) The priorities for Iraq, Soliman explained, should
include keeping it united, stopping terrorism, and improving
the lives of Iraqis. Regarding the need for a united Iraq,
Soliman expressed concern that the Kurds may be hoping to
gain "privileges" from the new constitution and flagged the
division that granting such privileges would cause among the
factions.


7. (C) Soliman stressed that ending the violence should
take precedence over the USG's political goal of finalizing a
constitution and pressing for speedy elections. He offered
two suggestions on how to stop terrorism. First, he urged
the USG to consider (and offered to assist with) opening a
back channel to Sunni insurgents, who he alleged are the
well-trained ex-soldiers responsible for approximately 70
percent of the violence. Although he denied knowing the
insurgents' demands, Soliman said they may want the release
of prisoners or a delay in the constitutional drafting
process. If the requests raised by the Sunnis are
unreasonable, the U.S. can simply reject them, Soliman said.
On the other hand, he argued, the dialogue may lead to an
understanding between the Coalition and the Sunnis that would
convince the Sunnis to stop their violence. Soliman
clarified that he had raised, and the U.S. had rejected, the
back channel proposal on numerous occasions in the past.


8. (C) A second approach to stopping the violence, Soliman
argued, would require the Coalition to control Iraq's
borders, which he described as a "disaster." He offered that
any arrested foreign terror suspect will admit that that he
entered Iraq through its open borders. If, however, the
Jihadis from Saudi, Kuwait, and Syria see that it is hard to
cross, they will stop trying, Soliman argued. Soliman
predicted that until the Coalition breaks the cycle of
violence, the Iraqi people will not focus on the constitution
or elections and will blame the Coalition, not the insurgents
for the violence.


9. (C) Bolstering development programs to improve the lives
of Iraqis, Soliman pressed, must be a priority because it is
critical to improving the Coalition's image and to creating
an environment in which Iraqis can think about their future
and their government and not just their security. He
suggested that water, electricity, and road projects should
proceed immediately in peaceful areas such as Basra to show
the Iraqis that their lives are better and to encourage them
to support the Coalition.


10. (C) Congressman Hoekstra, Congressman Shadegg, and
Congresswoman Wilson all pressed Soliman to use his influence
to persuade the Sunnis to participate in the constitutional
drafting process and elections. So doing, Wilson noted, will
promote stability and quell the violence. Regarding the need
for development projects, Congressman Shadegg agreed that it
would be impossible to "win" without first improving the
lives of Iraqis. In response to the request for further GOE
support, Soliman said "not now," citing the need to stop the
violence before engaging further. He also declined to commit
to encouraging Sunni participation in the government under
present circumstances, explaining that the Iraqi people are
not interested in the political process because they are not
yet secure.

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Iran
--------------


11. (C) In response to Congresswoman Wilson's request that
Soliman share his thoughts on Iran, Soliman stressed that he
has always advised the USG to "dance with" Iran. Forcing
Iran into a corner, he cautioned, will harm the entire region
because Iran will react by becoming more radical. Soliman
explained that engagement, by contrast, may allow Iran to
make a deal that would let it escape from its currently bad
situation. He added that a dialogue with a known source of
terrorism and funding for terrorists would also be useful.


12. (U) The Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable.


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JONES