DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13, 2005 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 005544

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2030
TAGS: PREL OVIP KPAL SY LE IS IZ EG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13, 2005 MEETING
WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CHIEF OMAR
SOLIMAN


Classified by Charge Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) July 13, 2005; 12:30 p.m.; Cairo, Egypt.


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
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The Deputy Secretary
Charge Michael Corbin
NEA PDAS Elizabeth Cheney
Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson
ORA Chief
Embassy notetaker

Egypt
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Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Omar
Soliman
EGIS Undersecretary for Intelligence Liaison General Kennawi

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Summary
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3. (C) In a July 13 conversation at the Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS),Deputy Secretary Zoellick
discussed Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Middle East peace
process, and Sudan with EGIS Director Soliman. On Iraq, the
Deputy Secretary offered U.S. condolences on the
assassination of Egypt's ambassador in Iraq and reviewed
impressions from his visit to Iraq several days before,
highlighting concern about Syria,s role, and PM Ja,fari,s
interest in visiting Egypt. Soliman said that Egypt would
send an ambassador back after some time and he described
Egypt,s work with Sunnis in Iraq, aimed at encouraging
support for the political process there. Soliman urged that
the U.S. open a back channel to the Syrians.


4. (C) On the Middle East Peace Process, Soliman labeled
Gaza disengagement Egypt,s first priority and highlighted
the need for it to result in a free Gaza that controls its
own territory. The Deputy Secretary expressed general
support and said Abu Mazen needed to exert more "decisive
control" over his security forces. The Deputy Secretary
cited GOE contributions to the Sudanese peace process and
called upon Egypt to better publicize its role. End Summary.

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Sunni Inclusion in Iraq
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5. (C) Deputy Secretary Zoellick offered his deep sympathy
for the death of Egypt's chief of mission in Baghdad,
Ambassador Ihab Sharif. Soliman said the GOE was astonished
that the kidnappers had killed Sharif without any
communication with Cairo or any indication of their demands.
He said Egypt has extensive ties with Sunni tribes and
families in Iraq and is trying to convince the Sunni to seek
reconciliation and integration, not division. He added that
Ambassador Sharif did not have any instructions to make
contact with insurgents. Soliman did not think Sharif was
even informed about Egypt's various links to Sunni tribes.
He said the envoy's death was a blow to relations with Iraq
and to Egypt's Sunni ties, but that the GOE would continue
working to integrate the Sunni into Iraq's political process.


6. (C) Soliman said the GOE would send another envoy to
Baghdad "after some time" and sought security coordination
with the U.S. and Iraq. Egypt would maintain links with the
Sunni, and EGIS would maintain its station in Iraq, as well
as in Kurdistan. The Deputy Secretary noted that insurgent
attacks on diplomats in Baghdad were intended to undermine
foreign support for the Iraqi government. He noted that
Sunni forces seemed to dismiss the possibility that they
themselves would have the most to lose if they successfully
split society into sectarian factions. The electoral and
constitution drafting processes were giving the Sunni an
appreciation for the opportunity to participate in unified
governance. The Deputy Secretary had met with key Sunnis in
the Constitutional Commission; they were engaged on the
substantive issues, and that demonstrates progress.


7. (C) Encouraging Iraq to complete the constitution
drafting process by August 15 was important, said the Deputy
Secretary. He stated that Prime Minister Ja'fari was

SIPDIS
sensitive about Iraq's relations with Egypt and had expressed
his upset over the murder of Sharif. Ja,fari wanted to come
to Cairo, the Deputy Secretary said, and sought an
invitation. Such a visit would be an opportunity to discuss
Egypt's offers of security training, among other topics, and
a chance for Iraq to show its respect for Egypt's role in the
region. The Deputy Secretary urged the GOE to consider
offering an invitation.


8. (C) Highlighting the need for a three-pronged strategy
to defeat an insurgency that includes political, economic and
security tracks, the Deputy Secretary said he sensed progress
on the ground yet called for further efforts to create a
sense of momentum. This had been visible during his trip to
Hillah, where provincial leaders appreciated external support
and assistance in addressing provincial matters.


9. (C) Soliman asked why some quiet areas in Iraq were not
enjoying a more obvious peace dividend -- a better life for
Iraqis in those areas of calm would send a message to others
that nonviolence is the path to prosperity. He said 70% of
Sunnis hated what the insurgents were doing and were willing
to work against them if life showed more signs of
improvement. Soliman said the Sunni needed to be encouraged
to be more in the trenches against the insurgents. The
Deputy Secretary said improving the quality of life is a key
objective. The U.S. was particularly focused on electricity
(second only to security as a priority for Iraqis) and
overcoming the highly centralized system established under
Saddam. In spite of their transitional nature, Iraq's new
ministers were focused on core priorities as well as longer
term issues.

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Syria/Lebanon
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10. (C) The Deputy Secretary said Syria continued to
provide a pathway for insurgents to interfere in Iraq, citing
the number of persons infiltrating from abroad. Syria was
both a conduit and a safe haven for these forces, he noted.
Soliman said Egypt had told Syria to be careful to control
the border with Iraq well before the Iraq conflict began.
"No one listened," and the borders remained too open to
insurgents, according to Soliman.


11. (C) Soliman claimed to have told former Secretary
Powell that the U.S. "must dance with Syria" by extending a
hand of cooperation and praise now and again. The Syrians
would be more helpful if they felt appreciated. He cited
Syria's helpful approach after September 11, 2001.
Bargaining is "the way of the merchants," said Soliman,
recounting that through his 30 years of dealing with the
Syrians he knew that Damascus would never do something for
nothing.


12. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted a "fine line" between the
benefits of praising Syrian efforts and the dangers of
half-efforts from Damascus in return. Key goals for Syria
should be ceasing support for terrorist threatening the peace
process, stopping interference in Lebanon, and keeping the
border with Iraq secure. The merchant mentality also
required pressure, said the Deputy Secretary, and President
Asad needed to clarify in which direction he intended to lead
Syria.


13. (C) Unsavory characters crossing in and out of Syria
come to Egypt too said Soliman, citing his country's interest
in preventing insurgent mobility. Damascus understood very
well the imperative of controlling terrorist factions, said
Soliman, but followed a "mistaken agenda." The U.S. could
help alter that agenda through engagement, he suggested.
Soliman said Asad wanted political change yet faced an old
guard advising him against that. Maintaining the dignity of
a proud nation was key, said Soliman. Egypt pressured Syria
to accept UNSCR 1559 when Asad initially balked, according to
Soliman, yet Damascus did not see sufficient improvement in
relations with the U.S. and Europe in exchange for its
compliance. A high priority in improving relations could be
a coordinated focus on enhanced security on the Iraqi border,
in addition to better cooperation from Palestinian factions.


14. (C) Regarding recent violence in Lebanon, Soliman said
"stupid people" from Palestinian factions or Syrian
intelligence cells might be responsible. President Asad was
not culpable, he emphasized, noting that some regime elements
could take action without the knowledge of Asad. Soliman
described three dimensions of Lebanon's current situation:
Hariri's assassination had integrated society against Syria
and created a viable opposition to pro-Syrian elements;
Hizbollah found itself a significant political power making
alliances with other parties; Lebanon's flagging economy
would not improve without international support and the lack
of an improving economy would prevent any president from
unifying society. Soliman called for rebuilding capable
armed forces and security services that had too long relied
on Syrian expertise, pouring significant funds into the
Lebanese economy, and giving full support to the elected
government. Echoing Soliman on the need to support a new
Lebanon, the Deputy Secretary said consideration was being
given to a Beirut conference in the fall. The Government of
Lebanon also needed a workable "reform approach" to the
economy to overcome debt and banking challenges. Economic
support and help for Lebanon to build its armed forces over
time, supported by a Hizbollah that acts as a responsible
political entity, would work to bolster Lebanon's prospects
for stability.

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Middle East Peace
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15. (C) Soliman said Egypt's top priority in the Middle
East peace process was Gaza disengagement. Egypt wanted to
help the GOI make disengagement real and did not want Israel
out of Gaza but still wielding control there. The IDF did
not want to vacate the Philadelphi strip, he lamented, and
was making it difficult for Prime Minister Sharon. He said
Egypt was ready to alleviate pressure on the border with the
dispatch of more capable border guards, but did not sense IDF
flexibility in vacating the other side (Philadelphi strip).


16. (C) Clearly unhappy with the status of negotiations on
the text of a protocol for dispatching border guards -- a
protocol which he claimed was not needed -- Soliman said the
GOI had rebuffed suggestions that Egypt might better control
the entire border with Israel with military border guard
units. He said the GOE and GOI continued to exchange texts
(two of which he showed to the Deputy Secretary) and had
essentially agreed on the substance, but the Israelis were
haggling as if to prevent the agreement. Israel continued to
insist on positing Egypt as primarily responsible for
smuggling. He said he would call PM Sharon on July 17 to say
that both militaries needed to be ordered to reach a workable
agreement. Sharon, he insisted, wanted a deal soon, as did
Mubarak.


17. (C) Soliman pointed out the unacceptability of moving
the crossing between Egypt and Gaza from Rafah to a point at
which travelers would have to transit Israel. That move
would put customs control in Israeli hands, he emphasized,
and was inconsistent with Palestinian control over ports and
land crossings in a free Gaza. Travel between the West Bank
and Gaza was also important, although Soliman said that
strict Israeli control over marshaling points and train cars
carrying Palestinian passengers between the two areas would
create difficulties; people will not feel free and life will
not improve.


18. (C) Palestinian security battalions also needed
armaments and ammunition to do their job, said Soliman.
Israel's refusal to permit appropriate equipment, and its
suggestion that the PA gather its armaments from Hamas,
indicated that Israel did not seek a cooperative effort at
Gaza security. Israeli sensitivity towards security is
destroying everything, he stated, adding that disengagement
requires some risk. Keeping the IDF in the Philadelphi strip
would also be "a disaster," according to Soliman.


19. (C) If disengagement did not progress well, Soliman
said the GOI might not be in a position to offer additional
withdrawals in 2006, but every effort should be made to keep
momentum moving towards more changes the following year. He
called for a conference on refugee issues in 2006 to give
people hope.


20. (C) The Deputy Secretary agreed that long term momentum
was important, but that a successful initial withdrawal was
also key. He said Abu Mazen needed to exert more control
over his security forces and the Syrians needed to give some
thought to their role as well. The Deputy Secretary cited
the value of the Wolfensohn and Ward missions to "bring
people together." Until Abu Mazen takes "decisive control,"
said the Deputy Secretary, Israel would take a tough stance
on security. The Deputy Secretary said the USG would see
what it could do with regards to the border guard deployment
issue, as well as in addressing barriers and issues
associated with customs and airports.

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Sudan
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21. (C) The Deputy Secretary commented favorably on GOE
contributions to the peace process in Sudan and called for
ongoing engagement to combine implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with progress on Darfur. He
said the Abuja process was critical to show that the benefits
of the North-South agreement could be replicated in other
areas. Soliman agreed that the U.S. and Egypt must work
together towards a stable Sudan, a country whose neighbors
did not all work to enhance its stability. He cited Eritrea
as a wild card. Soliman emphasized that signing agreements
was much easier than implementing them, and the need for
Sudan's neighbors to stay engaged.


22. (C) The Deputy Secretary suggested that Egypt be more
active in touting its efforts in Sudan to the U.S. Congress.
Egypt's engagement overcame a sense of division between the
Arab world and Africa, he noted, and was indicative of
Egypt's important regional role.


23. (U) This message has been cleared by D.


24. (U) Khartoum minimize considered.


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CORBIN