EGYPT COMFORTABLE WITH "NON-RESULT" OF NPT REVCON;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004172

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PARM PHSA OIIP KNNP KSTC ETTC EG IAEA NPT
SUBJECT: EGYPT COMFORTABLE WITH "NON-RESULT" OF NPT REVCON;
COMMENTS ON PSI AND EXPORT CONTROL

REF: A. CAIRO 2740


B. 03 CAIRO 1620

Classified by Acting DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 1 conversation with a member of
the Egyptian delegation to the NPT Review Conference, Poloff
heard Egypt's view that the RevCon's inability to agree on a
final document was a satisfactory outcome for Egypt. "We did
your work for you" in preventing discussion of intractable
issues, claimed Adel Ibrahim of the MFA Office of Arms
Control and Disarmament. "Failure can be healthy for the
system," suggested Ibrahim, by identifying systemic
improvements to be addressed. Ibrahim said Egypt, by
pursuing its own interests, helped avoid an unproductive
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. He said the U.S.
clearly did not intend to compromise at the RevCon and should
be happy with a "non-result" which did not set its interests
back. Ibrahim also commented on the Proliferation Security
Initiative (see paragraph 9) and export control (paragraph
10),showing greater willingness to work with the U.S. on the
latter. End summary.


2. (C) Poloff reviewed Egyptian views of the NPT RevCon
June 1 with Adel Ibrahim, Director of the MFA Office of Arms
Control and Disarmament and a member of the Egyptian
delegation to New York throughout the May 2005 conference.
Ibrahim was satisfied with the RevCon's inability to agree on
a final document, given the fact that tough issues (including
those of particular interest to Egypt or the U.S.) were
simply not headed towards a resolution at the conference in
any case. "We did your work for you," he said, suggesting
that Egypt's role as a spoiler of sorts drew attention away
from U.S. policies which he said "were not compatible with
international views" and would have gone nowhere if discussed
in depth.


3. (C) "Failure can be healthy for the system," said
Ibrahim, adding that the "result" of the RevCon reflected the
actual situation in the nonproliferation world.
Nonproliferation and disarmament are "under pressure," he
emphasized, and that was reflected in New York. He also
cited NGO participation, noting that the overall tone of the
conference was a "barometer of reality" and sent the message
to the world that "the system" needs to be improved. Country
groupings are in his view "dysfunctional," with one country
being obliged to share the position of others with which it
has few common interests. Iran and Chile share a place in
the NAM, for example, and the U.S. shares a grouping with New
Zealand. A non-outcome at the RevCon identified "loopholes
in the system" and offered the building blocks for potential
improvement, said Ibrahim.


4. (C) Ibrahim claimed that Egypt's vocal role prevented a
direct (and unhelpful) confrontation between Iran and the
U.S. He said Iran was hiding within the NAM group, the U.S.
was "hiding behind" the Western grouping, and the chair did
not permit an open-ended consultation; these factors
contributed to the avoidance of a clash. Some delegations
had accused Egypt of "protecting Iran" by taking the focus
away from an inevitable confrontation between the western
countries and Iran, Ibrahim noted; he rebutted by saying the
RevCon was "by no means heading towards a condemnation of
Iran" in any case, and Egypt was only protecting its own
interests.


5. (C) Noting the tradition of "give and take" at NPT
conferences, Ibrahim said the U.S. was clearly not ready to
"give" this time -- relying instead on "logic and philosophy"
to hold its ground. The U.S. had "nothing tangible" to give
on the Middle East, for example, and the U.S. knew that Egypt
could accept "nothing less than 2000." Additionally, the
U.S. was selectively turning from multilateral solutions and
seeking "plurilateral" mechanisms, said Ibrahim (citing the
Proliferation Security Initiative, Nuclear Suppliers Group,
and reform of the IAEA Board of Governors as examples),and
had goals not conducive to a RevCon consensus in any case.
The combination of these factors made a "non-result"
acceptable to both the U.S. and Egypt, he said; the U.S.
should be happy with an outcome that did not detract from its
interests.


6. (C) Ibrahim added, without elaboration, that he sensed a
certain "coordination" between the U.S. and Egyptian
delegations, given the absence of complaints from the U.S.
side and our mutual interest in avoiding confrontation.
Ibrahim said the U.S. delegation "seemed satisfied" as the
RevCon concluded; U.S. views towards the end of the
conference and made it clear that our long-term goals were
not hindered by the "failure" of the RevCon. Ibrahim said
the U.S. was always "quick to demarche" the GOE when critical
issues were at stake, yet he sensed no urgency from the U.S.
side and therefore felt the GOE could look back on its role
at the RevCon with "no guilty feelings." (He did note,
without expressing any concern, that France had complained to
the Egyptian Foreign Minister about Egypt's role.)

7. (C) Asked who was the engineer of Egypt's approach to
the RevCon, Ibrahim said internal debates within the GOE
delegation were robust and constant. The result of these
"checks and balances" was the ultimate approach which Egypt
displayed at the RevCon. Ibrahim said other delegations
noted the intensity of internal Egyptian discussions.


8. (C) Note: Members of the Egyptian Council for Foreign
Affairs, an NGO which participated in the RevCon, told the
Charge May 31 (septel/NOTAL) that in spite of disagreements,
the NPT dialogue was useful. They recommended a "track two"
approach to keep parties talking even when intractable issues
were not likely to be resolved. End note.


9. (C) Reminded of the second anniversary of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and ongoing U.S.
interest in an Egyptian endorsement, Ibrahim said the
Egyptian Ambassador in Washington had attended the
Secretary's anniversary event the previous day. He lamented,

SIPDIS
however, that the next announced PSI simulation exercise
would be based on the scenario of chemicals shipped from
central Europe to the Middle East. He said Egypt had a
"principled" reason for not signing the Chemical Weapons
Convention (i.e., related to Israel's WMD programs and not
due to any GOE interest in chemical weapons themselves) and
was concerned by the optics of a PSI exercise linking
chemical weapons with the Middle East.


10. (C) Poloff noted that even prior to PSI, the USG sought
consultations with Egypt on export control and border
security (EXBS) programs, yet had seen little headway.
Ibrahim said it might be time to revisit the potential for
such consultations, which in any case could build upon
relationships already established (through Sandia Labs, for
example) and would be consistent with the implementation of
UNSCR 1540. Egypt was also eager to strengthen its national
safeguards system, said Ibrahim. He added that any further
approach on EXBS would be easier for the MFA to coordinate if
the Egyptian Defense Attache in Washington were convinced (by
the USG) of the utility of the program, as the Attache could
prepare the Ministry of Defense to take a more proactive
stance in Cairo. (Comment: Ibrahim's approach, and candid
insights, may help advance the EXBS discussion beyond the
interagency delays noted ref B. End comment.)


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