EGYPT: UPDATE ON TERRORISM CASES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002596

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2030
TAGS: PTER PHUM ASEC IR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: UPDATE ON TERRORISM CASES

REF: A. A: CAIRO 1978


B. B: 04 CAIRO 8967

C. C: 04 CAIRO 8594

D. D: 04 CAIRO 8195

E. E: 04 CAIRO 7851

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) An emergency court in Cairo convicted and sentenced on
March 28 an Egyptian national and an Iranian diplomat (the
latter in absentia) on charges of involvement in both a 2004
act of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and in conspiring to commit
acts of terrorism in Egypt, including planning an
assassination attempt against President Mubarak. Separately,
on March 30, Egypt's Public Prosecutor announced the
indictment of three Egyptians (two of whom are in custody)
for their involvement in the October 7 terrorist attacks in
and around the Sinai resort of Taba which killed 34. While
the indictments represent progress in the Taba investigation,
the GOE's earlier assertions that it had uncovered the full
extent of the conspiracy remain in doubt, particularly in the
context of the continuing detention of a disputed number of
persons, mainly of Bedouin origin, in the Sinai. End
summary.

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Iranian Destabilization Plot
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2. (U) On March 28, following a brief trial, an emergency
court convened in Cairo convicted and sentenced an Egyptian
national and an Iranian diplomat for planning and conspiring
to commit acts of terrorism (see ref B for more background).
The Egyptian, Mahmoud Eid Mohammed Dabbous, was sentenced to
a total of 35 years in maximum security prison. Dabbous
received 10 years for his role in a May 2004 attack on a
petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia and 25 years for plotting
to assassinate President Mubarak and spying for a foreign
power (Iran).


3. (U) The Iranian, Mohammed Reda Hussein Dawst was convicted
and sentenced (in absentia) to 25 years for espionage.
Prosecutors alleged that Dawst was an operative of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard and had recruited Dabbous to
conduct surveillance and planning for potential terrorist
operations in Egypt aimed at destabilizing the country
including the assassination of President Mubarak.


4. (C) Dabbous's lawyers alleged that their defendant's
confessions had been made under torture and duress, but these
claims were discounted by the judges. The three judge panel
also denied defense motions to call witnesses from Saudi
Arabia.


5. (U) Egyptian diplomats quoted in the Cairo media said that
the case had damaged a tentative thaw between Egypt and Iran,
which severed diplomatic ties in 1979. Also according to
media accounts, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the
head of the Egyptian interests section in Teheran to protest
the GOE's trial and conviction of an Iranian diplomat,
reportedly terming the move "irresponsible."

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Three Taba Suspects Charged
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6. (SBU) Separately, on March 30, Maher Abdel Wahed, Egypt's
public prosecutor, announced to the media that he was
referring to trial three suspects in the October 7, 2004
bombings in and near the resort of Taba, on the Sinai's
border with Israel, which left 34 persons dead. Those
facing trial are Muhammad Gayez Sabah Hussein, Muhammad
Abdallah Raba', and Muhammad Ahmed Saleh Feleifal, who is
still at large. The prosecutor added that three others named
earlier as suspects were being released for insufficient
evidence. As is common in terrorism cases, the three will be
tried in an emergency court, but no trial date has yet been
announced.

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Flaws in the Process
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7. (C) Though the GOE made a point early on of discussing
with the public its investigation in some detail, its
accounts have not been entirely forthcoming. In its official
statement of findings (ref E),the Ministry of Interior
announced on October 25, 2004, that a total of nine suspects
were involved in the planning and execution of the bombings,
five of whom were in custody, two of whom died at the scene,
and two of whom were at large. The Minister of the Interior,
in a private meeting with the Ambassador (ref C),declined to
supplement or add texture to this information.


8. (C) The precision and confidence of the GOE's October 25
account notwithstanding, several indicators raise questions
about the ostensibly definitive findings. First, two
shootouts near Ra's Sidr, on the west coast of the Sinai, one
in late January and one in early February, left dead three
"armed bedouin militants" identified in the media as suspects
in the Taba bombings. Media reports also quoted security
sources as saying they were in pursuit of three other wanted
militants in the area. The three dead in clashes, and the
three still being pursued, makes six wanted militants, four
more than the two the government said were still at large in
October.


9. (C) The government's information-gathering procedures in
the course of its investigation raise further doubt about the
finality of the government's October 25 account, not to
mention serious human rights concerns. New York-based Human
Rights Watch, and the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, HRW's
Egyptian collaborators, have charged that up to 2400 persons
were detained by the GOE for questioning, and HRW charged
that as recently as February, hundreds remained in custody
(ref A). HRW also asserted that many of the detainees were
subject to mistreatment and abuse. (Comment: Tensions
between the GOE and Bedouins are not new but have clearly
been exacerbated in the wake of this investigation. End
comment.)


10. (C) The GOE challenged HRW's figures, but did not
categorically deny either mass arrests or the prolonged
detention of a significant number of persons. A surprisingly
resilient series of weekly demonstrations by female relatives
of detainees continued through March, attracting media
attention and no doubt embarrassing the GOE, which released
several small batches of detainees during the month. While
no one knows exactly how many remain in custody as of early
April, it is difficult to reconcile the GOE's October
assertions - that a total of nine people were involved in the
bombing, and not connected to a wider terror network inside
Egypt - with the significant prolonged detentions.

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Comment
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11. (C) The public nature of the Iranian trial indicates a
GOE desire to send a message to Teheran that a diplomatic
rapprochement is not in the cards. The Taba bombing
indictments indicate a GOE desire to close out the matter,
but as discussed above the facts of the case will make a
convincingly neat wrap-up difficult to achieve. End comment.


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GRAY