WHAT IF YOU HELD A COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 002536

SIPDIS

NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS/POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: WHAT IF YOU HELD A COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION AND NOBODY SHOWED UP?

REF: A. CAIRO 2516 (NOTAL)


B. CAIRO 2506

C. CAIRO 2254

D. CAIRO 1926

E. CAIRO 1509

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary and Introduction
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1. (C) President Mubarak's late February proposal to amend
Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution will, once parliament
has hammered out the modalities, allow for direct,
competitive presidential elections for the first time in the
country's history. Although no announcement has yet been
made, recent statements make it increasingly clear that
Mubarak will stand for a fifth term this fall. So far, the
President's declared opponents include a prominent (but
domestically controversial) dissident now on an academic
fellowship in Washington, an erratic former MP currently in
Europe (some say for good),and a feminist academic with an
unreconstructed Marxist ideology. It is unlikely that any of
these three will meet the criteria, once they are
established, for legal candidacy. Ayman Nour, the only
declared opponent with a political party organization, a seat
in parliament, and something of a public constituency, would
appear to pose the most serious potential challenge to
Mubarak, but he is scheduled to go on trial for forgery (in a
case he alleges is fabricated by the GOE) in late June. Of
the other opposition parties represented in parliament, none
currently shows any sign of putting forward a candidate, with
one party leader tipped as a potential candidate asserting
that he "refuses to be an extra in a bad movie."


2. (C) Though Mubarak's constitutional move initially
received a warm welcome, skepticism is growing about the
modalities, particularly the formula (yet to be established)
through which candidates will be legally qualified to run.
In sum, prospects appear dim this year for a presidential
election in which multiple and credible candidates compete
with the incumbent on a level playing field. On the other
hand, Mubarak's proposal is a concession of the principle
that a competitive electoral process, rather than either a
rubber-stamp referendum or a military pedigree, is what
confers real legitimacy on a head of state. Thus, respected
observers also believe that this amendment will effectively
end the lock the Egyptian military has held on the presidency
since 1952. Mubarak's move may well set the stage for a more
seriously contested race in the next election (barring
regressive developments in the meantime),and it likely opens
the door to further constitutional amendments that could have
major ramifications for Egypt's system of government. End
summary and introduction.

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The Incumbent Emerging...
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3. (C) President Mubarak has yet to announce his intentions
regarding this fall's presidential elections. The elections,
after the constitutional amendment proposed by Mubarak in
late February (ref E),will be the first competitive, direct
presidential election in Egypt's history. Although the
President is remaining mum on the subject, most observers
fully expect him to stand for a fifth presidential term.
This conviction was buttressed by a March 23 press conference
held by ruling NDP official, presidential son, and presumed
aspiring successor, Gamal Mubarak. In the conference, Gamal
stated clearly that he would not be a presidential candidate
this fall and described opposition rhetoric about
"inheritance of rule" as groundless.


4. (C) Though both Gamal and his father have long sought to
downplay public speculation about the first son's
presidential aspirations, they have also generally avoided
statements which explicitly rule out certain scenarios. In
this context, we interpret Gamal's March 23 statement as the
clearest indicator to date that any plan he may have to
succeed his father will not be initiated before this fall's
elections. In the March 23 conference, Gamal was also
careful to note that his father "had not made any decision"
on his own potential candidacy this fall, though we doubt
Gamal would rule out his own candidacy at this time if there
was any possibility that his father would not run. Moreover,
ruling NDP Secretary-General Safwat Sherif told the Egyptian
media on March 30 that President Mubarak was the party's
choice to run this fall, though a final announcement on the
President's own decision would not be made before May.
Again, it is very unlikely Sherif would make such a statement
without a green light from Mubarak, who in turn would
probably not be taking this tack if he was preparing the
ground for someone else to run.

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Did They Get the Memo?
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5. (C) While the NDP elites have been artfully improvising
their public posture on the presidential election question,
the ruling party worker-bees have also been active, although
they appear to be drawing from the referendum-era playbook:
In the past three weeks, banners have sprung up across Cairo
neighborhoods and heavily trafficked intersections
proclaiming in large print and vivid colors "Yes to Mubarak,
yes, yes, yes!" Although, in Egyptian politics, any time is
a good time for sycophantic expressions of support for the
President, and the election year is underway, the appearance
of these banners might have more to do with the recent
increased activity of the umbrella protest group Kifaya
("enough") (ref A),which has adopted "No to Mubarak; No to
another term," as one of its principal slogans. On the other
hand, one zealous NDP supporter recently launched a
pro-Mubarak website "Mish Kifaya/'Not Enough'" calling on the
President to serve another term.

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And In This Corner...
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6. (C) With one possible exception, none of those who have so
far thrown their hats into the ring as opponents would pose a
credible electoral challenge to Mubarak. The prominent civil
society activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (SEI),though widely
admired abroad, has long been targeted by reactionaries in
the Egyptian media and smeared, with considerable success, as
a greedy and craven "foreign agent." SEI, not long after
announcing his candidacy, made plans to spend the spring
semester on an academic fellowship in Washington. Another
personality who announced his candidacy in late 2004 is
Mohammed Farid Hassanein, an erratic former MP who has made
several abrupt turns in his political ideology, most recently
casting his lot with the liberal reformers and joining the
board of SEI's Ibn Khaldoun Center. Hassanein, who once
exhorted crowds to burn down the U.S. Embassy during an
anti-Iraq war demonstration, has been in Europe for several
months, and according to one of his associates, "is not
coming back." A third declared candidate, the celebrated
feminist author Nawal es-Saadawi, has long been reviled in
the mainstream Egyptian media as a cultural iconoclast and
zealous atheist. Her political views are generally
old-school Marxist. (Note: In the absence of political
party affiliation, it is highly unlikely that any of these
three will qualify for legal candidacy, once the criteria are
established. End note.)


7. (C) The one Egyptian politician who has both declared his
intent to run and could conceivably pose at least a partial
electoral threat to Mubarak is Ayman Nour. Nour, 40, has
been an MP for 10 years and leads the generally progressive
and liberal Ghad Party, legally licensed in the fall of 2004.
A fierce critic of the Mubarak regime and a strong proponent
of sweeping political reform, Nour is as ambitious and
aggressive as any politician in Egypt and has demonstrated
strong media skills and sharp political instincts. Nour and
his supporters believe it is for these reasons that he became
the target of a criminal forgery investigation and was jailed
for six weeks. Nour, with five codefendants he alleges
framed him on behalf of the government, is scheduled to stand
trial beginning June 28. This trial, which could last for
months, will likely deprive Nour and his party of much of the
time and energy they would need to make a significant
electoral showing this fall. With characteristic bravado,
Nour has vowed to "put the government on trial with me," and
predicted to us that the trial would increase his public
support.


8. (C) Comment: It is currently very difficult to quantify
Nour's public support. An (unscientific) Cairo University
survey last summer found that Nour was Egypt's "most popular
MP," a finding which reportedly got the poll's organizer into
trouble with his superiors and infuriated parliament speaker
Fathy Surour. In discussions with us, Nour appears to
believe that he has tangible popularity on the Egyptian
street, though this may be based on his appearances in his
own constituency of Bab Sharyea, a lower middle class
neighborhood in central Cairo. Our own sense is that public
support in for Nour is neither particularly broad nor deep,
though his name recognition has increased sharply since his
arrest and he does not appear to have been seriously tainted,
so far, by media insinuations that he is a puppet of
outsiders. (See refs B, C, and D for more on the Nour case.)
End comment.


9. (C) Conspicuously absent from the presidential fray to
date have been the leaders of the Egypt's other political
parties. Neither the nationalist/liberal Wafd, the leftist
Tagammu', nor the Nasserists, whom, with the Ghad, are the
only opposition parties represented in parliament, have yet
shown any indication that they intend to compete in the
presidential race, although each has long included
competitive presidential elections on its list of demands.
Interestingly, President Mubarak told CODEL Pelosi in late
March that he was "begging" for someone to run. Embassy
contacts have told us that the GOE is putting pressure on
Rif'at Said, head of the leftist Tagammu' party, to run,
though Said has repeatedly denied interest in running and
recently told a European diplomat he would "refuse to be an
extra in a bad movie."
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Devil in the Details
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10. (C) A key to the competitiveness of this fall's
presidential elections will be the criteria eventually set
for prospective candidates to qualify to run. There appears,
so far, to be no consensus on a formula for qualification -
the parliament is apparently concentrating on a system
modeled on France, in which candidates must secure a
percentage of endorsements from elected officials at the
local, provincial, and national levels. It is also widely
anticipated that, for this year only, a "grandfather clause"
will operate in which each party represented in parliament
may nominate a presidential candidate, without an endorsement
process. (Note: As discussed above, of the four opposition
parties represented in parliament, only one, Ayman Nour's
Ghad Party, has so far indicated an intent to compete. It is
likely that whatever criteria are finally established will
exclude independents, particularly from the Islamist trend,
from competition. Parliament is expected to finalize the
modalities for the amendment in May. The proposal will then
be put to a public referendum, some time this summer, and
will thereafter be ratified as law. End note.)


11. (C) Though Mubarak's reform proposal was initially
greeted warmly by a broad spectrum of political forces,
elation has in the past month given way to skepticism, as
many observers, particularly in the opposition press, predict
that the bar will be set too high for candidates to qualify.
One proposal currently being considered by parliament would
require candidates to secure endorsements from 20 percent of
elected officials at local, provincial, and national levels.
For an opposition candidate, this would translate into
securing literally thousands of endorsements from a pool of
elected officials almost uniformly affiliated with the NDP.

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A Democratic Legacy (?)
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12. (C) Despite all of the justified skepticism and caveats,
there is no doubt that Mubarak's February proposed amendment
constitutes a potential landmark in modern Egypt's political
history. (See ref D for an overview and analysis of recent
political reform steps in Egypt.) Though Mubarak, and before
him Sadat and Nasser, long contended that the occasional
referendums, which always yielded 90-plus percent votes in
favor of reelection, conferred real legitimacy on the head of
state, the President, in calling for direct, competitive
elections has now conceded this point. Other observers
believe the most significant outcome of the amendment will be
to sharply reduce, if not eliminate, the military factor in
presidential selection. By establishing direct elections,
the military, which has supplied each of Egypt's three
republican presidents, will no longer confer legitimacy.
Moreover, uniformed military personnel can neither run for
office, nor even vote (unless they resign),and will
necessarily play a less influential political role in the
face of direct elections.


13. (C) Beyond conceding the principle of direct, competitive
elections, Mubarak's proposed amendment also shatters the
taboo of constitutional reform, another opposition demand
previously rejected by the ruling party. With the precedent
of amending one article set, proponents of amending other
articles will probably gain significant momentum. If
constitutional reform proponents have their way, presidential
powers could be curtailed and term limits imposed. Finally,
even though as of late March there seems little prospect for
a serious presidential competition this year, the amendment,
barring regressive steps in the coming years, may well set
the stage for a more robustly contested race the next time
around. Should this scenario come to pass, Mubarak appears
to be betting, history may remember him as a leader who ruled
as an autocrat but left a democratic legacy.


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GRAY