Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BUENOSAIRES264
2005-02-04 22:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY ALBERTO FERNANDEZ

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 000264 

SIPDIS

WHA FOR A/S ROGER NORIEGA, PDAS DERHAM, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR TOM SHANNON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL AR CHAVEZ MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE
PRESIDENCY ALBERTO FERNANDEZ

REF: BUENOS AIRES 00138

Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 000264

SIPDIS

WHA FOR A/S ROGER NORIEGA, PDAS DERHAM, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR TOM SHANNON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL AR CHAVEZ MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE
PRESIDENCY ALBERTO FERNANDEZ

REF: BUENOS AIRES 00138

Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Minister of the Presidency Fernandez told
me that the GoA valued its good relationship with the U.S.
and was grateful for the support of President Bush.
Fernandez pledged that the GoA would cooperate with the U.S.
to make the Summit of the Americas a success. He stressed
that the GoA had tried to distance itself from Chavez and his
anti-U.S. statements, and that Kirchner had told Chavez that
the U.S. had been helpful to Argentina. That said, the GoA
believes governments should not isolate Chavez. I laid out
our concerns about Chavez and urged the GoA to rein him in.
We also discussed Article 98, terrorism legislation, investor
issues, the debt, ICSID claims, and internal politics. End
Summary.


2. (U) Prior to my departing post for Washington, I had
lunch one-on-one with Minister of the Presidency Alberto
Fernandez. Fernandez looked tired, but seemed resigned to
the pressures and demands of working for President Nestor
Kirchner.

Chavez
--------------


3. (SBU) Fernandez repeated what the Foreign Ministry had
told us about the Chavez visit: the Argentines were
uncomfortable with his anti-U.S. rhetoric, had asked him to
refrain from criticizing the U.S. (he had not complied),and
had significantly reduced Kirchner,s participation in the
visit, which included a meeting and a lunch attended by 20
people. The Casa Rosada had purposely released a photograph
of Kirchner looking at his watch while Chavez looked on.
This was meant as a message to the world that the GOA is not
comfortable with Chavez.


4. (C) That said, the GoA believes (as Kirchner told Codel
Dodd reftel) that Chavez should not be isolated. The Chavez
one sees in public is totally different than the private
Chavez, who is more reasonable and less bombastic. It is
better to bring Chavez into the tent than to isolate him,
Fernandez averred. Fernandez said he was convinced that,
with the referendum behind him, Chavez now feels more secure
and sees less of a need to overstep his bounds.



5. (C) I replied that the United States was extremely
concerned about Chavez,s actions. It is evident that Chavez
had turned his anti-U.S. rhetoric up a notch. (Fernandez
agreed.) But what concerned us even more was the measures
Chavez had taken against the Opposition. Fernandez asked
which measures gave us the most concern. I cited three
examples: the media law, prosecution of NGO,s, and the
packing of the Supreme Court by 20 additional justices.
Fernandez winced at the last one, suggesting that he was not
aware of it. I added that President Kirchner had played a
moderating role with Chavez in the past. I noted that
Kirchner had met with the Venezuelan Opposition a number of
times, even when Lula had refused to do so. I hoped that
President Kirchner would continue to work on behalf of
Venezuelan democracy.


6. (C) Fernandez understood our position. He assured me
that Kirchner would continue to urge Chavez not to criticize
us and not to cross the line with the Opposition. That said,
Argentina still believes that it is better to engage Chavez
than to isolate him. Fernandez revealed that during
Kirchner,s lunch with Chavez, the Argentine president made
it very clear that Argentina was grateful for the support it
had received from the United States in the IMF. I asked what
Chavez had said. He only listened, but said nothing, said
Fernandez.

U.S.-Argentine Relations
--------------


7. (SBU) In Fernandez,s opinion, U.S.-Argentine relations
are at a high point. Fernandez repeated the point of
Argentina,s appreciation for U.S. support during the
Kirchner term. I agreed that relations were good, but said
there were a number of problems. We certainly appreciate
Argentina,s cooperation on counter-terrorism; its
cooperation on regional issues like Bolivia and Haiti, and
our dialogue on Venezuela; the generally fair treatment that
U.S. investors receive. I said that our countries are
working together on a plethora of issues, many of which are
not reported in the press. As an example, I cited the recent
DS training of 170 Argentine health and law enforcement
officials on weapons of mass destruction. It had gone
extremely well, yet there seemed to be a reluctance on the
part of some in publicizing our efforts.


8. (C) Fernandez seemed surprised by my assertion. He said
Argentines respected the American people and U.S.
institutions, even if we disagreed on some foreign policy
issues like Iraq. He expressed no objection to publicizing
our joint efforts, especially on such an important issue as
weapons of mass destruction, and particularly after the
recent nightclub fire in which almost 200 people had died.

Summit of the Americas
--------------


9. (SBU) This year will be an important one in our
relations, I noted, culminating in the November Summit of the
Americas in Mar del Plata. We should work to eliminate or at
a minimum substantially reduce bilateral problems. Fernandez
agreed. He said the Summit would go well, and pledged his
cooperation to ensure that our objectives were met.

Article 98
--------------


10. (C) One lingering irritant in our bilateral relations
was the inability of the U.S. and Argentina to hold joint
military exercises on Argentine soil, I observed. One way to
eliminate this problem was for Argentina and the U.S. to sign
an Article 98 agreement. I recounted how FM Bielsa had
expressed optimism during his recent meeting with Secretary
Powell that our countries could reach an agreement on this
issue. I said we respected Argentina,s decision to join and
be an active participant in the International Criminal Court,
but the ICC charter actually permitted countries to sign
Article 98 agreements. Fernandez had some familiarity with
the issue, but clearly had not been directly involved in it.
He said this would be a difficult issue for the GoA, but
promised to get involved. I said our lawyers had come a long
way in finding language that would be acceptable to both
sides; with some effort, we could find a solution.

Terrorism Legislation, AMIA
--------------


11. (SBU) I urged the GoA to ratify two counter-terrorism
conventions: the 1971 OAS Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism and the 1999 UN Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism Finance. The Senate has ratified both conventions,
but the Chamber of Deputies has not brought them to a vote.
I added that the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Deputy Jorge Arguello, was working on this and
other terrorism issues with the Embassy.


12. (SBU) Fernandez said he was aware of Arguello,s
efforts, and agreed it was important that Argentina ratify
the conventions. He passed on that he had recently met with
Jewish organizations on the next steps of the AMIA case. The
Jewish groups had urged the GoA to continue to pursue leads
in the case until the perpetrators were charged; Fernandez
pledged that the GoA would continue to do so. Fernandez
asked if the ratification of the two conventions would have
an impact on GoA efforts on AMIA. I said I did not think so,
but that we would look into the matter.


Investor Issues
--------------


13. (SBU) I thanked Fernandez for the GoA,s issuing a
contract to Rolls Royce USA to repair the damaged Rolls Royce
engines in the presidential jet, Tango One. I briefed him on
the Container Security Initiative and said we were close on
signing a memorandum of understanding. I also noted progress
on the GoA purchase of three Northrop Grumman TPS 78 radar
upgrades. We also discussed Liberty Media/Hicks Muse,s
difficulties with the Argentine agency COMFER in confirming
their status as shareholders.


14. (SBU) Fernandez said progress had been made in disputes
with foreign companies, but the utility companies, and
particularly the French-owned Aguas Argentinas, were still a
problem. During Kirchner,s trip to France, Fernandez said
that President Chirac had made it clear that the GoF would
not fall on its sword over the issue, saying that it was not
an issue between the two governments. Fernandez said that
Kirchner had sought help from Spanish PM Zapatero in dealing
with Spanish-owned companies. Zapatero understands our point
of view but was not as categorical as Chirac.

Debt
--------------


15. (SBU) Fernandez was optimistic that Argentina would
secure a high participation rate for its debt offer. He
related that during the road show Argentine officials had
ascertained that many foreign creditors were really
Argentines with assets abroad. These Argentines had
presumably moved their money abroad in order to avoid paying
taxes. Therefore, Fernandez continued, these Argentine
creditors are unlikely to call attention to themselves or
their assets. Thus, they are more likely to accept the GoA
offer than to sue the GoA and expose themselves to the
Argentine equivalent of the IRS.

ICSID Claims
--------------


16. (SBU) Fernandez said it was not realistic to expect that
Argentina would pay for any ICSID claims that they would lose
before the World Bank mechanism. It simply could not afford
it. Moreover, to pay companies for losses during the
Argentine economic crisis would put companies in a more
privileged status than ordinary Argentines, who had to
swallow them with no relief. The only way companies could
hope to obtain anything from the GoA was to negotiate. I
explained to Fernandez that once U.S. companies opted for
ICSID arbitration, by law we did not provide normal advocacy.
That said, some U.S. companies were willing to negotiate,
and one company, AES, had recently come to an agreement with
the GoA but often they had trouble identifying an
interlocutor on the GoA side. Fernandez reiterated that the
GoA was always willing to negotiate.

Energy
--------------


17. (SBU) Fernandez was optimistic that the GoA would get
through the coming winter without an energy crisis. We have
secured additional electricity from Brazil and fuel oil from
Venezuela, so we should be all right, he claimed. The GoA
was seeking to lower gas consumption in the country.
(COMMENT: Last winter the GoA was fortunate that it was one
of the mildest winters in memory. If this winter is more
typical, the GoA may face some problems.)

Internal Politics
--------------


18. Fernandez described former President Eduardo Duhalde as
a political animal. Duhalde had recently paid a call on
Fernandez, ostensibly to talk about Lula, Chavez and
Mercosur, but he spent the bulk of the meeting talking about
an internal election in the remote village of La Matanza.
Fernandez opined that by offering to hold a plebiscite,
Buenos Aires Mayor Anibal Ibarra had gained the upper hand in
his battle to remain mayor following the criticism of his
administration after the Cromagnon nightclub fire. (COMMENT:
There may be a bit of wishful thinking on Fernandez, part,
since he is known to be dating Ibarra,s sister, Congress
Deputy Vilma Ibarra. END COMMENT) On the other hand, Buenos
Aires province governor Felipe Sola was a long way from
winning his battle with Duhalde on the budget. The crafty
Duhalde still controlled the Buenos Aires legislature.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) Fernandez is a useful interlocutor for this Embassy,
and will be helpful in the months to come as we prepare for
the Summit. Formerly described as a center-Right politician,
he has hitched his wagon to Kirchner and provides a dose of
Buenos Aires realpolitik to the igloo that has become the
Casa Rosada after the arrival of Kirchner and his penguins.
End Comment.
GUTIERREZ