Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BUCHAREST913
2005-04-13 06:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

INITIAL ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO ISAF CAVEATS DEMARCHE

Tags:  PREL MARR AF RO NATO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000913 

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR AF RO NATO
SUBJECT: INITIAL ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO ISAF CAVEATS DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 60862

Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4
B AND D

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000913

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR AF RO NATO
SUBJECT: INITIAL ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO ISAF CAVEATS DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 60862

Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4
B AND D


1. (C) PolMilOff discussed Romanian "national caveats" on
Romanian forces participating in NATO's International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan April 11 with
Mihaela Matei, Director of the MOD's Strategic Affairs
Directorate (Ref). Pursuant to Reftel instructions,
PolMilOff addressed the Romanian caveats providing that
Romanian military police cannot be used for riot control
missions and providing that military police cannot be used
outside their area of responsibility. Matei promised to
share our concerns with senior MOD officials. She also
promised to raise these matters with appropriate MFA
interlocutors, stressing, however, that the MOD will be the
principal decision maker within the GOR on national caveats
issues.


2. (C) Addressing first the "geographical caveat," Matei
insisted that this is not a Romanian caveat, per se, but a
decision of the commander in the area of operations. She
continued that, in any event, "some (Romanian) troops do not
necessarily have the means to operate outside of area."
Turning next to the use of military police for riot control
missions, Matei underscored that "this is an old issue"
linked to "sufficient training and proper weapons." She
opined that using military police for riot control, absent
adequate training and equipment designed for riot control,
could have disastrous consequences. In broader terms, Matei
observed that the Romanian armed forces are institutionally
"very reluctant to do riot control given the events of 1989,"
when some troops used unnecessary deadly force to suppress
demonstrations aimed at the communist-era Romanian
government.
DELARE