ROMANIA'S EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000476

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR RS MD RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA'S EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM
BASESCU'S TRIPS TO MOSCOW, LONDON, CHISINAU

REF: BUCHAREST 429

Classified By: Political Section Chief Robert S. Gilchrist for Reasons
1.4 B and D


1. (C) Summary. Romanian President Traian Basescu will
likely seek to focus on solid support in Iraq and the Global
War on Terror, Black Sea Security, and Moldova during his
March 8-9 trip to Washington. He has defined a strong
strategic relationship with the U.S. as the central component
of his new center-right government's emerging foreign policy.
Initial bilateral visits to Moscow, London, and Chisinau
provide an indication of these and other priorities - and
demonstrate that he intends to be actively engaged in the
formulation and articulation of Romania's foreign policy.
Although Washington will not be Basescu's first trip as
president, he clearly views it as the most important. End
Summary.

ROMANIA'S PROACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA
--------------

2. (C) In the two months since his inauguration, center-right
President Traian Basescu has sought to demonstrate a strong
and active international role for Romania and for his
presidency. He has repeatedly asserted the importance of a
close strategic relationship with the U.S. and U.K. ("a
Bucharest-London-Washington axis"). However, this is coupled
with another Romanian foreign policy priority of EU accession
in January 2007. Our GOR contacts have tried to obscure
potential incongruities in those two priorities by flagging
the strategic nature of the first set of relationships and
the largely economic content of the second. (Comment:
Reality is a little more complicated.) The new Government
has also increased focus on Romania's eastern frontier,
seeking more direct engagement in Moldova; and coordination
with the U.S. and NATO for a regional strategy for the Black
Sea (Ref). These themes were evident during Basescu's first
three bilateral visits abroad -- to Chisinau, London, and
Moscow. They will also be raised when Basescu travels to
Washington in March.


3. (C) At the same time, Basescu's direct and highly personal
approach has, in the words of our MFA interlocutors,
"refreshed and revived" Romania's foreign policy on many
levels. Regarding Basescu's recent Moscow trip, FM Ungureanu
told Ambassador Crouch that an initially taciturn President
Putin quickly warmed to Basescu. The latter was reportedly
frank and focused on the future, declining to revisit
historical issues -- such as disappearance of the Romanian
national treasure that came under Bolshevik control in WWI --
that were irritating constants on the bilateral agenda in
recent years. The UK Embassy in Bucharest reports that PM
Blair found Basescu "easy to talk to" and "credible" in his
commitment to fight corruption. Local media remarked that
Basescu's warm reception by Moldovan President Voronin
contrasted sharply with the typically strained meetings
between Voronin and former President Ion Iliescu. Basescu
has stressed his belief privately and publicly that Romania
and Moldova are "two nations, one people."

BASESCU AND PUTIN: MOLDOVA, BLACK SEA, TRADE
--------------

4. (C) FM Ungureanu told assembled NATO and EU Diplomats that
Basescu's February 14-15 trip to Moscow focused on three
central issues -- Moldova and Transnistria, Black Sea
stability and security, and the potential for increased
commerce between the two countries. On Moldova/Transnistria,
Basescu proposed bluntly to Putin an enlargement of the
five-party negotiating format to include Romania. Basescu
told Putin Romania belonged at the table, if only because
Transnistria threatens regional stability and serves as a
haven for organized crime that filters into Romania. The
Romanian government, according to Ungureanu, believes
expansion of the five-party talks would add "energy and
momentum" to the stalled dialogue. On upcoming Moldovan
elections, Basescu underscored to Putin that Romania seeks a
fair process "free of political intervention."


5. (C) Basescu also raised with Putin his vision of Black Sea
regional cooperation, stressing concerns with trafficking of
humans, weapons, narcotics and other contraband in the Black
sea basin. Ungureanu told Ambassador Crouch that Putin
proposed, apparently spontaneously, a "common naval unit"
comprised of vessels under national flags that would work in
coordination against organized crime using the Black Sea for
transiting. The Romanians were non-committal (and GOR
interlocutors have told us separately that the GOR opposes a
"constabulary" expansion of BLACKSEAFOR, preferring a
NATO-led security presence in the Black Sea). Basescu raised
the possibility of a permanent U.S. military basing presence
in Romania, emphasizing that they should not be interpreted
as a sign of hostility to Russia. Putin answered that the
transfer of U.S. bases eastward from Germany has "no
political reason" but has potentially "unpleasant
implications."


6. (C) With regard to commercial relations, Basescu proposed
the possibility of up to six new Romanian Consulates General
throughout Russia to help Romanian firms identify export
opportunities at a local level. Both Basescu and Putin
acknowledged the pronounced trade disequalibrium between the
two countries, with Russian energy flowing to Romania and
"not much" returning to Russia. Ungureanu stressed that
Basescu and Putin met in Moscow for a total of three hours,
both a message that Basescu and Putin had enjoyed a
substantive exchange and a clear hint that the Romanians want
as much time as possible for Basescu's meeting at the White
House.

7. (C) During the Ambassador's farewell call on Basescu
February 17, the latter related that it appeared that Putin
was desirous of an improved relationship with Romania,
possibly, he speculated, as a result of recent events in
Ukraine and Georgia. Regarding Moldova/Transnistria, Basescu
confirmed that Putin had not responded explicitly to the
Romanian request for inclusion in the multiparty negotiating
format. Shifting the focus of that part of the discussion,
Putin responded that Transnistria's Smirnov is obstructing
movement of munitions out of depots there. This answer,
according to Basescu, "is a joke."

BASESCU AND BLAIR: IRAQ, EU, AND TRANSATLANTIC TIES
-------------- --------------

8. (C) The British Embassy has told us that HMG made "every
effort possible" to ensure London was Basescu's first
bilateral visit to a Western capital, a gesture they made
with some haste after the Romanians quietly passed word that
a French invitation was already on the table and that they
preferred not to take it up as the first major Western visit
for the new President. This lay in the emerging close
relations between the two governments -- the GOR, even under
the previous center-left government, frequently looked to the
UK as a model of an EU country with strong transatlantic
ties. Basescu has been outspoken in asserting that the UK
will be the "first" among Romania's European allies. The
British DCM noted that HMG views Romania as a future "ally"
among EU countries.


9. (C) Basescu's January 31 meeting with PM Blair focused on
the continuation of Romania's troop presence in Iraq,
UK-Romanian cooperation on the UN Security Council, the
fundamental importance of fighting corruption (which Basescu
has identified as a "national security priority"),and issues
surrounding Romania's EU accession. Basescu pledged to keep
Romanian troops in Iraq "until they are no longer needed."
He also raised repeatedly Romania's strong hope for a
regional approach toward the Black Sea, to include EU and
especially NATO involvement. He told Blair that over the
past 15 years Romania had found that it could "rely most" on
the U.S. and UK among the Western governments to be
"straightforward" and "truly supportive" of Romania's efforts
towards integration with the West. Basescu's new emphasis on
this trilateral relationship, which he has repeatedly
characterized as the "Washington-London-Bucharest axis" was
based as much on common strategic interests as it was on
"common values and a common vision." Blair committed to
examine ways the UK could work with Romania on a Black Sea
regional policy, including within the framework of the
European Security and Defense Policy.

BASESCU AND VORONIN: PULLING MOLDOVA WESTWARD
--------------

10. (C) MFA interlocutors including the FM stressed to post
that Basescu's January 21 visit to Moldova signaled a new
"proactive approach" to Romanian-Moldovan relations, to
include "a more direct role" in breaking the impasse in the
frozen conflict in Transnistria. The GOR is "surprised and
pleased" with what it views as "a positive attitude" by
Voronin, which may be partially driven by Moldova's upcoming
elections but which they also see as indicating a more
fundamental shift in Moldova's foreign policy. GOR officials
affirm that Romania -- and Basescu -- are eager to use this
opening to pull Moldova towards Europe and the West.


11. (C) Ungureanu told Ambassador that Basescu stressed that
Romania offered the "only opportunity" for Moldova to move
closer to the EU. Basescu underscored to Voronin that
"Romania will advocate for Moldova in Brussels." Ungureanu
said Voronin "switched off" when Basescu asserted that
Romania could also advocate for Moldova with NATO. Ungureanu
agreed that this might be a red line Voronin is unable to
cross at present, with Russian troops still in Transnistria.
Basescu pledged to Voronin to share Romania's European
integration experiences through formalized consultations
between GOR and GOM officials. He affirmed Romania's support
for Voronin's proposed draft document on Stability and
Security in Moldova, and said Romania would be in a better
position to advocate for EU agreement to the document after
the finalization of Romania's EU accession agreement in
April. Our MFA interlocutors note that the substance of much
of Romania's Moldova policy tracks largely with that of the
previous government. However, in the same breath they note
that Basescu's level of interest, commitment to encouraging
resolution for the Transnistria frozen conflict, and emerging
good relationship with Voronin indicate Romania seeks to be
much more involved than in previous years.

COMMENT
--------------

12. (C) Presidential advisors have told us Basescu "greatly
looks forward" to his March 9 trip to Washington, given the
central importance he ascribed to strong transatlantic
relations throughout his campaign and in the early days of
his presidency. His staff is working assiduously to try to
diminish potential sore points during the trip. While a
proposed international commission to resolve pending
inter-country adoption cases is still under consideration,
one key presidential expressed hope for an announcement
within the next week of a process to strip extreme
nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor of a prominent award given
by the previous government. In addition, Basescu will no
doubt wish to discuss in Washington the prospects of a
permanent U.S. military basing presence in Romania. The
issue continues to receive broad public attention - and
support. Post will send an update on Romania's EU accession
bid septel. And finally, all interlocutors from the
President on down note that the extradition and Romanian
trial for the Marine Corps Staff Sergeant involved in the
December automobile accident killing a well-known Romanian
musician will be put on the table.


13. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
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