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2005-06-30 13:24:00
Embassy Bucharest
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						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 001472 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2030


1. (C) SUMMARY. Department TDY PolOff officially observed
the Romanian-organized Black Sea Border Security Initiative
(BSBSI) tabletop exercise, held at the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in Bucharest from June
22-24. During the exercise, representatives from Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova exchanged information
regarding how their respective nonproliferation
infrastructures would respond to a mock WMD incident as
described in a fictitious scenario, entitled "STYX 2005".
The Romanians propose to follow-up "STYX 2005" with a
real-time exercise in October. All delegations except
Ukraine broadly participated - GOR officials advised PolOff
in on-the-margins discussions that they viewed the Ukrainian
role in BSBSI as problematic. Romania will concentrate its
senior level outreach on Bulgaria, given that the strength of
Sofia's commitment to BSBSI is uncertain. End Summary.



2. (U) The (fictitious) "STYX 2005" scenario involved the
transit of two suspicious vehicles - a truck carrying Cesium
which was conspicuously avoiding border crossings with
radiation detection capabilities, and a boat rumored to carry
nuclear material. Significantly, Interior Ministry official
Dorin Grasu served as overall coordinator, indicating greater
Interior Ministry ownership of BSBSI activities.
Participants in the exercise were divided between a control
group, responsible for governing scenario developments, and a
working group, responsible for formulating governmental
responses to scenario developments. Over the course of the
exercise, the control group posed a total of eight events for
the working groups to develop answers to. While all but one
of the prepared responses were from national governments,
there was a great deal of coordination between different
governments represented in the working groups. On one
occasion the Georgians and Bulgarians delivered a joint

3. (C) The one exception was the Ukrainian representative,
Ivan Zaitsev, Interior Attache of the Ukrainian Embassy to
Romania. In a private meeting with the Romanians prior to
the beginning of the conference, Zaitsev made clear that he
had no mandate from his government to answer questions put to
him by the working group. The Romanians nevertheless granted
him permission to ask questions of other delegations.



4. (U) Following the conclusion of the tabletop exercise,
Romanian MFA nonproliferation chief Dan Neculaescu stated
that the Romanians were proposing a follow-up exercise in
October. In the follow-on exercise, they would run "STYX
2005" as a real-time operation. They proposed that a control
group in Bucharest would govern scenario events and
communicate them via e-mail to capitals, and that capitals
would coordinate interagency responses to return to
Bucharest. After this received preliminary agreement from
the other BSBSI states, the Romanians pledged to forward
further information regarding this concept to the other
states in August. They further proposed that, following the
October exercise, they convene a higher-level policy meeting
to a.) incorporate lessons learned from "STYX 2005" into
their respective governmental standard operating procedures,
b.) evaluate the overall usefulness of "STYX 2005", and c.)
propose future BSBSI activities. Romanian Interior Ministry
official Dorin Grasu added that the purpose of the real-time
operation and "STYX 2005" generally is to promote a new wave
of regional nonproliferation cooperation, and expressed his
hope that BSBSI could be a channel to develop cooperation
between regional crisis centers.

5. (U) Ukrainian Embassy Interior Attache Zaitsev thanked the
Romanians for allowing Ukraine to observe the tabletop
exercise, and noted that, in order to ensure comprehensive
Black Sea representation, Russia and Turkey should be invited
to participate in the October exercise. Zaitsev also stated
that he will write to the Ukrainian MFA, urging Ukraine to
fully participate in October. Bulgarian MFA official Iasen
Tomov agreed that it was useful, and stated that other
regional states could be invited as well - particularly other
Balkan states. Georgian Interior Ministry official Archil
Pavlenishvili stated that joint training under BSBSI would
also be a positive development. Moldovan Interior Ministry
official Victor Nichifor agreed that it was useful, but noted
that, for future conferences, more time should be allotted to
allow the participants to prepare.



6. (C) TDY PolOff met separately with MFA Director General
for Global Issues Stelian Stoian and MFA nonproliferation
chief Dan Neculaescu. (COMMENT: While it has substantially
evolved over its course, BSBSI was originally Stoian's
concept. END COMMENT.) Stoian emphasized to PolOff that he
understands the U.S. desire to maintain a low profile, but
the importance of the U.S.-Romanian partnership needs to be
underscored as well. He also pointed out that, despite USG
urging to depoliticize BSBSI to the extent possible, it is
occurring within a regional context. TDY PolOff responded
that he also agreed that the U.S.-Romanian partnership has
been critical to BSBSI's successes, but the U.S. viewed it as
very important that the regional character of the initiative
be preserved (i.e. it not be seen as directed by the U.S.)
The U.S. provides technical support and assistance, but this
needs to be organized by the region itself. In responding to
Stoian's second point, TDY PolOff stated that he was familiar
with other security issues in the Black Sea region (e.g.
BlackSeaFor, Operation Black Sea Harmony, etc.) but the
crucial difference between those initiatives and BSBSI is
that regional MODs were largely peripheral to BSBSI. There
is, for all intents and purposes, no military component.
Unlike those initiatives, BSBSI is predominantly directed
towards the region's Interior Ministries.

7. (C) TDY PolOff also noted that, given the apparent
Ukrainian skepticism balanced with Moldovan and Georgian
enthusiasm, Bulgarian support is crucial to the success of
the initiative. While TDY PolOff noted that Romanian efforts
to organize the "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise were quite
good, the prospect of BSBSI success would be greatly enhanced
should the Bulgarians organize a BSBSI activity as well. The
decision by the Bulgarian Interior Ministry to cancel their
participation in the exercise at the last minute raised
questions regarding Bulgarian commitment. (NOTE: The
Bulgarian representative, MFA security official Iasen Tomov,
cited a deluge of last-minute taskings as the reason behind
the Bulgarian cancellations. He also participated
constructively, and to all appearances wholeheartedly, in
conference proceedings. END NOTE.) Stoian agreed in
principle to request Sofia to host a BSBSI activity, and
possibly the evaluation meeting itself. Neculaescu also
agreed to concentrate Romania's diplomatic outreach efforts
to Bulgaria. TDY PolOff also met with Tomov privately, and
asked Bulgaria TO consider organizing a BSBSI activity for
2006, as Bulgaria and Romania are the participant states with
the most advanced nonproliferation infrastructure (i.e.
legal, regulatory, and operational capability). TDY PolOff
said the U.S. is willing to look at assisting if the
Bulgarians provide us with concrete proposals.



8. (C) Neculaescu raised serious doubts regarding the
Ukrainians. In a private meeting with TDY PolOff, Neculaescu
expressed the GOR's assessment that, contrary to President
Yushchenko's apparent political commitment to 'Westernize',
the old-guard in the Ukrainian Civil Service is at best
indifferent to and at worst actively sabotaging BSBSI.
Neculaescu characterized Ukrainian Interior Ministry Attache
as a "liar", and opined that when Zaitsev declared Ukraine
would "100 percent" participate in the tabletop exercise in
the May Preparatory Meeting, he was, in fact, lying.
Neculaescu also expressed skepticism regarding Zaitsev's
pledge to urge the Ukrainian MFA to fully participate in the
October real-time exercise. TDY PolOff commented that it was
curious that Zaitsev was alone in consistently asking the
other delegations what the MOD role would be in conducting
nonproliferation exercise activities, considering Zaitsev is
allegedly the Interior Attache. Neculaescu replied that he
thought it likely that Zaitsev was not who he claimed to be
(i.e. Neculaescu implied Zaitsev is an intelligence officer.)

9. (C) Despite scanty Ukrainian participation in the tabletop
exercise, Neculaescu opined that Zaitsev's call for full
Turkish and Russian participation in the October real-time
operation was in bad faith, and should be viewed as a
solicitation of the Turkish and Russian interest rather than
an interest in extending positive BSBSI cooperation. PolOff
responded that, while he welcomed Turkey and Russia as
observers, it would be best to delay full Turkish and Russian
participation until at least the conclusion and evaluation of
"STYX 2005". Neither Turkey nor Russia had been to the prior
meetings, and organizing the logistics for five countries is
sufficiently challenging for now. TDY PolOff said that, in
principle, he saw no problem with Turkey and Russia becoming
full participants should there be a follow-on BSBSI activity
in 2006. TDY PolOff further commented that it might be
useful having them as silent observers for the October
exercise, in order to provide transparency (i.e. allay any
doubts Turkey and Russia may have that BSBSI has a malign
agenda) and to gauge their willingness to be constructive
vice obstructive BSBSI participants.




10. (C) All-in-all, the BSBSI "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise
was a success. With the exception of Ukraine, the
participant states seemed sincere in their desire to
cooperate with each other in the field of nonproliferation,
and seemed enthused by the conference. While the delegations
could have coordinated their answers during the exercise
itself more, the answers they gave were comprehensive and
well-intentioned. This bodes well for the October real-time
operation. It must be noted that the tabletop exercise was
the dress rehearsal for October's main event - if four out of
five BSBSI states (Ukraine excepted) are genuinely interested
in incorporating the contacts and procedures derived from
October into their national systems, BSBSI can be judged a
success. Given Georgia's and Moldova's unremitting
enthusiasm, the Romanians have to ensure that Bulgaria is a
constructive participant in October. As BSBSI progresses,
the question of whether and how to positively incorporate
Turkey, Russia, and other Balkan states into BSBSI activities
will move increasingly to the forefront.



11. (U) Participant list follows:

Mr. Iasen Tomov, MFA

Mr. Archil Pavlenishvili, Interior Ministry
Mr. Lasha Vashakmadze, Interior Ministry
Mr. Nicolos Iashvili, Georgian Embassy to Romania

Mr. Alexandru Caraman, Intelligence and Security Service
Mr. Igor Gorodetki, Special Intelligence Service
Mr. Victor Nichifor, Interior Ministry

Mr. Dorin Grosu, Interior Ministry
Mr. Dan Neculaescu, MFA
Mr. Florian Baciu, National Commission for Nuclear Activity
Ms. Dana Marca, MFA
Mr. Victor Mircescu, MFA
Mr. Alin Tanase, Interior Ministry
Mr. Lucian Ivan, Interior Ministry
Mr. Cristian Gandei
Ms. Mirela Nenea, Special Intelligence Service
Mr. Nicolae Neferoiu, Foreign Intelligence Service
Mr. Aurel Stancu, National Authority for Border Customs
Ms. Maria Andrei, Nuclear Agency
Mr. Bogdan Dumitriu, Nuclear Agency
Mr. Dragos Tocae, ANCEX
Mr. Roman Ioan Fitera, ANCEX

Mr. Ivan Zaitsev, Ukrainian Embassy to Georgia

UNITED STATES (observer)
Mr. John Conlon, U.S. Dept. of State

12. (U) TDY PolOff has copies of answers given by Georgian,
Romanian, Moldovan, and Bulgarian representatives regarding
the implementation of their national export control
infrastructure. For USG personnel interested in copies of
the "STYX 2005" tabletop exercise documentation, please
contact EUR/PRA:John Conlon, Ph. (202) 647-6746, Fax: (202)
647-6039, E-Mail:conlonj"at"