Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRUSSELS555
2005-02-08 14:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU-CUBA: BACK TO FULL "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT?"

Tags:  PREL PHUM EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000555 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU-CUBA: BACK TO FULL "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT?"

REF: A. A) PRAGUE 174

B. B) USEU TODAY 02/01/05

C. C) STATE 4900

D. D) 04 BRUSSELS 4080

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000555

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU-CUBA: BACK TO FULL "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT?"

REF: A. A) PRAGUE 174

B. B) USEU TODAY 02/01/05

C. C) STATE 4900

D. D) 04 BRUSSELS 4080

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU's January 31 decision to suspend its
June 2003 restrictive measures (ref B) against Cuba should
"increase EU engagement with the Cuban opposition" according
to EU HighRep Javier Solana's Adviser on Latin America
(protect). It is difficult to see how that will actually
play out, however, since he confirmed that all EU members
would stop inviting dissidents to national day celebrations
in Havana, while other plans for engaging the opposition were
only &political recommendations8 to EU member states that
are not &legally binding.8 Unless the small minority of
member states that favor a tough stance toward Cuba --
principally the Czechs (ref A) and Poles -- prevail, this
latest EU move may prove to be a de facto return to a full
policy of "constructive engagement" that will not result in
noticeably increased EU engagement with the opposition. Even
though Castro publicly ridiculed the EU,s new measures, the
EU has chosen to ignore what they dismiss as typical Castro
posturing. The U.S. can still influence the EU offering ideas
on contacts with dissidents and urging like-minded EU states
to put teeth in the six-month review. END SUMMARY.

--------------
EU: MEASURES SUSPENDED "TO HELP DISSIDENTS"
--------------


2. (C) In a February 3 meeting with Poloff, Nicolas Pascual
de la Parte (protect),Chief of the Latin America Task Force
in EU HighRep Javier Solana's Policy Unit, and Dusan Chrenek
(protect),Policy Unit Desk Officer, argued that the
temporary suspension of the EU restrictive measures against
Cuba approved by EU FonMins on January 31 was "not in order
to appease Castro, but to increase EU engagement with Cuban
dissidents." Pascual said inviting dissidents to national
day celebrations in EU embassies in Havana was a symbolic,
but not substantive, engagement with Cuban dissidents. This
symbolic move, he said, had not borne fruit; it had resulted

only in the Castro regime,s freezing of diplomatic contacts
with the EU, thereby decreasing the EU,s influence and
making it more difficult to engage both Cuban officials and
dissidents substantively. Temporarily suspending the
measures, Pascual said, demanded a greater commitment from
Castro than from the EU: in order for the six-month
suspension to become permanent, Castro would have to make
progress toward human rights and democratic reform and not
stand in the way of an EU push for greater engagement with
dissidents, families of political prisoners, and civil
society actors such as the Catholic church.

--------------
ALL EU MEMBERS TO HALT DISSIDENT INVITATIONS
--------------


3. (C) Pascual confirmed that language on halting invitations
for dissidents was not mentioned in the January 31 GAERC
conclusions in order to satisfy &a member state,8 the Czech
Republic, that was uncomfortable about suspending the
measures and objected particularly to snubbing the
dissidents. Chrenek said, &that,s the way we do it in the
EU; give a little here, get a little there, and everybody,s
happy.8 When we asked whether member states therefore had
the implicit freedom to invite dissidents, however, Pascual
said that &all the June 2003 measures have been suspended,
including that one, and all member states have agreed their
embassies will act along those lines.8

--------------
PLAN TO ENGAGE OPPOSITION NOT BINDING
--------------


4. (C) Pascual said that there were specific recommendations
on engaging the opposition in Cuba, although they had not
been included in the EU FonMins, GAERC conclusions. He said
a separate document of recommendations from EU Heads of
Mission (HOMs) in Havana had been approved by both the EU
Latin America Working Group (COLAT) and the EU Political and
Security Committee (PSC). The plan had not been released
outside of the EU, said Pascual, because publicizing it would
forewarn Castro and thus render it ineffectual. When asked
whether EU FonMins had also approved the plan, Pascual said
the plan was not part of the package the FonMins had been
asked to consider: it represented &a political
recommendation8 to member states, but was not &legally
binding.8

--------------
RECOMMENDATIONS EXIST ON ENGAGING DISSIDENTS
--------------


5. (C) Pascual outlined some of the recommendations in the
HOMs, plan for engaging the opposition: EU embassy Political
Counselors in Havana would meet once a month with dissident
leaders; EU HOMs should meet regularly (once or twice per
each six-month EU presidency) with dissidents and relatives
of political prisoners; the EU Human Rights Working Group in
Havana should meet once per EU presidency; and EU embassies
should allow civil society and dissidents access, within the
embassies, to the internet, press from outside of Cuba, and
other literature which is unavailable on the island. In view
of these recommendations, Pascual opined that the biggest
question raised by the suspension of the restrictive measures
was not how much the EU had given in to Castro, but whether
Castro would &swallow getting a rhetorical victory in
exchange for allowing the EU the substantive victory of
greater access to dissidents.8 Regarding Castro,s February
1 defiant remarks on the EU move (&What are they going to
forgive us for(.We don,t need Europe(8),Pascual said he
did not give much weight to Castro,s posturing.

--------------
REVIEW OF SUSPENSION PRO FORMA?
--------------


6. (C) The GAERC decision included a call to review the
temporary suspension, promising action "before July." Pascual
asserted that this review would not be pro forma. He could
not give any specifics, however, on what Castro would have to
do in the next six months in order for the suspension to be
continued beyond July. He also admitted that six months was
a short time by EU standards, and that the argument would
likely be made that Castro should be given more time to
implement reforms or release political prisoners before
re-instituting the restrictive measures.



7. (C) COMMENT: Pascual,s attempts to justify the
suspension of the measures by contrasting the &mere
symbolism8 of inviting dissidents to national days with the
&substantive8 opportunities now opened up to engage
dissidents while re-engaging with the Cuban authorities were
typical of the reasoning we have heard throughout the
previous months, deliberations on EU Cuba policy. Now that
the measures have been suspended, the EU appears to have only
a vague idea of the way forward: the HOMs, recommendations
that we know of are constructive (some of them resemble
suggestions USG officials have made to them earlier * see
refs C-D),but they are only recommendations, not legally
binding, and not, unlike the suspension itself, approved by
EU FonMins. There is little indication that EU member states
will be able to agree on any specific benchmarks for Cuban
behavior (release of political prisoners, for example) that
would put teeth in the planned six-month review of the
suspensions. Unless the small minority of member states that
favor a tough stance toward Cuba -- principally the Czechs
and Poles -- prevail, this latest EU move may prove to be a
de facto return to a full policy of "constructive engagement"
that will not result in noticeably increased EU engagement
with the opposition. The U.S. can still influence this
process by offering ideas on contacts with dissidents and
urging like-minded EU states to put teeth in the six-month
review. END COMMENT.

SCHNABEL
.