TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 004300

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM EAID MOPS XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) Summary. The October 19 transatlantic consultations
on Africa included a variety of big picture themes -- the EU
strategy for Africa, peacekeeping, development, political
Islam and extremism, China in Africa -- as well as discussion
about key political issues in the Great Lakes, Uganda, Sudan,
Horn of Africa, West Africa (including Mauritania) and
Zimbabwe. End Summary.

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Participants
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2. (U) EU participants included: James Bevan, UK Director for
African Affairs (FCO),Anne Schmidt, FCO Pan African Policy
Unit Advisor, and Ruth Bradley-Jones, Second Secretary, UK
PermRep for the British Presidency; Aldo Ajello, EU Special
Envoy for the Great Lakes and Pekka Haavisto, EU Special
Envoy for Sudan; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council
Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers

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Jean-Christophe Belliard, Peter Clausen and Genoveva
Hernandez; Roger Moore, Head of Unit for the Horn and East
(DG DEV),Miriam Brewka and Andreas Fischer-Barnicol, both of
the ACP Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission
(EC); and Georg Lennkh, Special Envoy for Africa for the
incoming Austrian Presidency. USDEL consisted of AF
Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer, John Nay (Director,
AF/Regional and Security Affairs),Michael McKinley (Charge
d,Affaires, USEU),Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor,
USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM).

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EU Strategy for Africa
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3. (U) Bevan opened by presenting a preview of the EU
Strategy for Africa, which will guide Europe's interaction
with Africa over the next ten years. According to Bevan, one
of the most prominent pillars of the strategy will be in the
area of peace and security. Bevan noted that the European
Commission (EC) has already presented a proposal for the
other major pillars of the strategy: democracy and
governance, economic growth (through trade agreements,
infrastructure development and maintenance, etc.),and
developing human capacity (health, education, etc.). The EU
strategy will also work to incorporate all the bilateral
assistance programs and policy initiatives undertaken by the
Member States. Bevan said that the new strategy will help
guide the disbursement of increased funding as Member States
raise the percentage of their budgets dedicated to official
development assistance (ODA) in the coming years. Moore
noted that the EC supports moving away from implementing
specific projects in favor of generalized budget support for
countries that have a track record of accountability and good
governance. He said that budget support would enhance
"African ownership" of the development funds, as well as help
the EU manage increased levels of ODA. According to Bevan,
the EU strategy for Africa will also deal with migration,
including ways to stem the emigration of qualified Africa
professionals, which negatively impacts important sectors in
Africa (such as health care). He said the EU was looking for
ways to manage migration so that it was more beneficial to
both countries of origin and countries of destination, noting
that the largest number of asylum seekers in the EU is from
Africa. A/S Frazer expressed concern over the expedited
deportations of Africans from the EU. Meznar noted that many
of those being interdicted and summarily removed were
Africans from conflict zones that might be legitimate
refugees.
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Great Lakes: DRC is key
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4. (C) Ajello said that the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) was currently stalled because of the
upcoming elections. According to Ajello, ongoing challenges
in the DRC include:

-- Security sector reform: Soldiers were neither arriving
at, nor departing from, the orientation centers; furthermore,
the disarmament ("brassage") centers were empty.
-- Lack of political will: The international community
needed to put pressure on all parties to keep the peace
process moving forward.
-- Corruption in the army: Many "phantoms" were on state
payrolls and distributions of food and salary were erratic.

-- Lack of good governance: Although the current level of
corruption is equivalent to the worst days of the Mobutu
regime, China and Russia do not support a UN-sponsored good
governance mechanism; the DRC,s neighbors also oppose the
idea (as it might set a precedent to be used on them later).


5. (C) Ajello said it was critical for the international
community to develop a package of "carrots and sticks" to
persuade the FDLR to return to Rwanda. He distributed a
proposal that outlined steps that could be taken by Rwanda,
DRC, the international community, MONUC, the World Bank and
the AU. He described the EC,s contribution of 3 million
euros to reintegrate ex-combatants in Rwanda by providing
employment in building infrastructure projects around Kigali.
Ajello highlighted a part of the EU plan that would urge
that the AU find third countries in Africa for resettling
ex-combatants who did not want to return to Rwanda. A/S
Frazer noted that with regard to the FDLR, the days of
"carrots" might be over. It may be time to concentrate on
"sticks".

6. (C) Participants discussed a possible MONUC role in
persuading the FDLR to leave DRC, and how an AU force might
contribute to this goal. Ajello praised the improvements in
MONUC, crediting the Pakistanis and Indians with doing an
excellent job. He said that the nine brigades of Congolese
being trained by MONUC should comprise a frontline "force de
frappe" since they would not be limited by the terms of the
UN peacekeepers' mandate. Ajello noted that while the DRC
had good soldiers, it lacked officers.


7. (C) A/S Frazer said her view of MONUC was not as favorable
as Ajello's; MONUC had failed -- even with the LRA -- because
it had neither political will nor capacity. She also said
that it did not seem feasible to bring the Congolese troops
up to speed quickly enough to be the key element in
dislodging the FDLR from the DRC, so a combination of MONUC
and AU forces seemed to be the best way forward, and for
which the USG might be willing to financially support a
command and control operation. Ajello said the EC would be
willing to contribute 15 million euros to support an AU peace
mission in the DRC (possibly with Angolan, Ethiopian, and
South African troops) to supplement Congolese and MONUC
forces.


8. (SBU) Bevan stressed that successful elections in the DRC
are critical for all of Africa and asked what the U.S. was
doing to support them. A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. pays
27 percent of MONUC's operating costs and has already spent
over $300 million to support MONUC. (Note. The EU's total
assessment for PKOs such as MONUC is 40 percent. End note.)
USAID also has provided critical assistance in helping the
Congolese Independent Elections Commission organize itself.


9. (C) Bevan raised concern at the EU's perceived exclusion
from the latest round of Tripartite Commission talks. He
stressed the EU's desire to remain engaged in the process,
noting the EU's substantial political clout and financial
assistance. A/S Frazer reviewed the purpose for creating the
Tripartite Commission was to get the three sides (Uganda,
Rwanda, DRC) talking directly with the assistance of a
neutral broker and that the ultimate objective was a direct
dialogue without mediators. She said it was not the USG's
aim to create another talk shop, but also noted that she was
not aware of any U.S. effort to exclude the EU from the
talks.

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Northern Uganda: Dealing with the LRA
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10. (C) Bevan characterized Northern Uganda as a grave
humanitarian problem with broader strategic implications. He
stated, "The ICC indictments have changed the equation
completely" and that they "need to be seen to deliver
justice." Bevan added that the dialogue with the LRA is
dead. He favored pressing Uganda to welcome the LRA's foot
soldiers home and to refrain from using force to deal with
the LRA. A/S Frazer agreed that the ICC indictments are
working in this case. She said that Presidents Museveni and
Kabila should discuss the issue of hot pursuit and that
forces should be able to cross the border with permission.
Bevan was concerned that allowing Ugandan forces to enter DRC
might add to instability there or lead to an unwelcome quest
for mineral resources.

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Sudan: Government of National Unity?
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11. (C) A/S Frazer outlined several strategic issues for
bringing stability to Sudan: the nature and intentions of
the Government of National Unity (GNU),the situation in the
region (e.g. Darfur, Beja),the quality of southern
leadership under Salva Kiir and the role of neighboring
countries. Regarding the GNU, Bevan said that he personally
felt that partition should not be considered inevitable and
that a single Sudan could still exist in ten years. Bevan
said he believes that a true government of national unity
does not currently exist and that the death of John Garang
has probably been more of a setback than initially perceived.
Participants agreed that the SPLM, the regime in Khartoum,
and the rebels in the regions all influence each other and
that the key to stabilizing the country lies in moving the
various entities toward a common agenda. Vervaeke expressed
concern that two separate initiatives were currently being
considered to stabilize Sudan, one by Chad and one by the
U.S.; he urged that any U.S.-led initiative should not
exclude the EU since it has been long been involved in the
peace process and since it is a major donor. A/S Frazer
agreed that a unified initiative is needed and suggested that
the critical players were the AU and France (as France could
influence Chad, and Chad the rebels). A/S Frazer also said
that the international community could consider encouraging
the creation of a shadow government and had no problem to be
seen backing and strengthening the SPLM. She added that a
stronger SPLM could put pressure on the regime to transform
itself.

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Darfur: Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Challenges
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12. (C) Regarding AMIS, Bevan said that the EU favored
consolidating the peacekeeping force at about 5000 before any
further expansion. He added that the EU had agreed October
18 to provide an additional 70 million euros to support AMIS.
Moore noted that increasing the force beyond 5000 could
decrease its competence and that the EC was interested in
seeing AMIS operating "properly and efficiently." Bevan also
highlighted the problem of finding troops to cover a
significant expansion of the force; Vervaeke said South
Africa was not delivering on its current troop commitment.
Haavisto stressed the need to review the AMIS mandate to
include protecting observers and humanitarian workers.
Bevan noted deficiencies in the current command/control
logistics and said that blue hats would probably be necessary
"in due course". Various participants noted that re-hatting
would double the costs of the peace mission and that a proper
transition from AU to UN would require six months
preparation, even if the same forces stayed on. A/S Frazer
expressed satisfaction with AMIS, acknowledging the funding
shortages. She said that the U.S. was still committed to
getting the AMIS force up to the 7000 ceiling level because
"presence matters." Both sides agreed that any transition to
a UN force should underscore the AU,s success in keeping the
peace in Darfur.


13. (C) Lerner urged donors to follow through with pledging
commitments, particularly since humanitarian agencies are
already predicting a failed harvest. She also asked for EC
help in getting an update on disbursements of Oslo pledges.
Moore stated that the EC was ahead of schedule in disbursing
its Oslo commitments, but he expects problems in meeting
humanitarian needs in 2006 once the EC stops using its
development funds for humanitarian work. To illustrate, he
said that in recent years over 180 million euros given for
humanitarian work in Darfur had come from the European
Development Fund.

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Ethiopia: Elections and Boundaries
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14. (C) Bevan said that the U.S. and EU worked well in
handling a volatile situation in Ethiopia following the
elections. He said the EU's congratulatory message to Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi was sober in tone and urged him to
respect the democratic process and called on Meles to allow
the opposition to take their seats in Parliament and
participate in the machinery of government, as well as to
establish an independent inquiry into the electoral violence.
A/S Frazer agreed with the message, but noted that the
opposition also had a responsibility to realize they were in
the minority.


15. (C) Bevan also explained that the EU Council rejected
Gomes, call to end development aid to Ethiopia due to the
election problems because the country was impoverished, as
well as for strategic reasons. He stressed that all EU aid
is conditioned on good governance; although Ethiopia did not
have to achieve European standards, it was required to comply
with basic democratic principles. A/S Frazer said that the
U.S. would give careful consideration to the EU's assessment
as to whether Ethiopia had met the governance criteria of the
international community. Belliard added that in the EU's
view, Meles had been weakened, not strengthened, by the
election, so it would be more difficult than ever for him to
resolve differences with Eritrea. A/S Frazer said that while
the U.S. stood by the need to implement the decision, there
had been a subtle change regarding implementation, with the
U.S. stressing the need for Addis Ababa and Asmara to
communicate well to guarantee the process. She said the U.S.
was considering sponsoring a dialogue between the two
parties.

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Somalia: Renewed U.S. Interest
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16. (C) A/S Frazer said that at her initiative the U.S. is
taking a "whole new look" at Somalia as it might be the time
for more active engagement. Bevan welcomed renewed U.S.
involvement in the Somali peace process. Both Belliard and
Moore underscored the increasingly prominent role of the
Islamists in Somalia. They did not discount the possibility
that Islamists could provide a more positive and unifying
role in the country (without being hijacked by Al Qaeda or
jihadist elements).

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West Africa: Democracy and Coups
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17. (C) A/S Frazer praised the way elections in Liberia had
been conducted, highlighting the "tremendous leadership" of
SRSG Alan Doss and the work of the UN. She said that it was
inspiring to see the participation of the Liberian people in
the process and that UNMIL had responded appropriately to any
signs of unrest. However, A/S Frazer said that the
international community needed to stay engaged through the
second phase of the election, as well as the reform of the
security sector and economic recovery of the country. A/S
Frazer noted that the UK had played the same role in Sierra
Leone and France in Cote d'Ivoire. Regarding Cote d'Ivoire,
Bevan said that the upcoming elections would not solve all
the country's problems. He noted that the "Gbagbo regime was
over" but that no new leaders had been identified. A/S
Frazer expressed concern over developments in Guinea, saying
that unless steps were taken, the military might step in as
they had done in TOGO. She noted that the U.S. was reaching
out to political parties in Guinea and that DOD had
established outreach with the Guinean military. She also
said that the AU and ECOWAS were reviewing Guinea,s
constitution. Vervaeke said that the EU shared these
concerns and that it had identified Guinea (along with
Guinea-Bissau) for an "early warning and action" exercise.


18. (C) A/S Frazer identified responses to the coup in
Mauritania as an area of possible policy divergence between
the EU and U.S. and said that a common approach was needed.
Bevan noted that although there were no "good coups" some
were less bad than others and that the coup in Mauritania had
popular support. A/S Frazer replied that although the
populace had welcomed virtually every coup in Africa, because
the deposed regimes were corrupt or dictatorial, the U.S.
found offensive the Mauritania's current structure placing a
"military council" above the cabinet. She said that the
military leaders needed to show genuine signs of
transitioning to democracy within a year, and dispelled any
notion that the U.S. would ignore the lack of democracy in
Mauritania due to any Mauritanian self-perception that it was
crucial to the fight against international terrorism. A/S
Frazer criticized the AU for lacking a coherent policy with
regard to Mauritania.

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Zimbabwe
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19. (C) Bevan stated that the situation in Zimbabwe was going
from bad to worse but that Mugabe's regime was not on the
verge of collapse. He said that the EU continued maintaining
its sanctions, condemning abuses, and urging SADC engagement,
and noted a shift in U.S. policy to reengage with SADC after
suspending the dialogue over Zimbabwe. Bevan said he
believed it was premature for the EU to appoint a special
envoy to dialogue with Mugabe; he also noted that the track
records of special envoys to Africa were not particularly
good. A/S Frazer said that South Africa was baffled by
Mugabe's behavior, and that the international community
needed to push for involvement of the UNSC, and particularly
to work with China on its reservations, even if African
countries were not on board. Bevan indicated that EU
sanction renewal would be considered February 22. (Note: We
do not believe all EU Member States are necessarily on board
with maintaining sanctions. End note.)

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China's Growing Presence in Africa
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20. (C) The EU suggested that the results of China's activism
throughout the continent are largely negative for Africa.
The Chinese undermine good governance and transparency, fuel
conflicts through weapons sales, strip away natural resources
with little regard for the environment, and block consensus
in the UNSC for dealing with problematic regimes.
Development projects are aimed at gaining popular support
rather than strengthening the economy. Both sides agreed
that moving China's engagement with Africa towards a pattern
similar to Africa's current relationship with the West and
certain Asian countries (e.g., Japan, India) was better than
trying to block China,s relations with Africa, which could
not succeed in any case. A/S Frazer said she hoped to meet
soon with Chinese authorities to discuss some of these issues
and to seek areas of mutual interest and cooperation.
McKinley suggested the EU might also like to put relations
with Africa on the agenda of the next EU-China summit.

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Political Islam,s Impact


21. (C) Bevan said that the EU was grappling with political
Islam in general, particularly since it posed a threat to
European values such as the rights of women and free speech.
He noted that EU Member States have increasingly large Muslim
communities and that governments need to be careful to not
define Islam as the problem. Rather, the problem is the
perversion of Islam's values. Bevan argued that most
Africans did not support shifting from secular to Islamist
political systems, but that traditionally moderate and
integrated societies, like Nigeria, were being threatened by
funding from Saudi-based Wahabi fundamentalist and militant
Pakistani preachers. He also noted the worrying growth of
"jihadism", particularly in the Horn of Africa. McKinley
added that the work of Islamic development agencies on the
ground in many African countries provided order and a
supra-structure that was proving popular; he noted that many
Africans were embracing a more fundamentalist version of
Islam. Lerner linked the discussion back to the EU Strategy
for Africa, noting the emphasis on infrastructure and growth
in that context. She stressed the importance of investments
in secular education, as well as stimulating the private
sector to create jobs for young people. A/S Frazer reviewed
the objectives of the East African Counter-Terrorism
Initiative, as well as a similar program planned to address
the use of ungoverned spaces in the Sahel. Vervaeke briefly
mentioned three Council initiatives to support
counter-terrorism efforts in Algeria, Kenya, and Morocco,
including the strengthening of border controls.

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Comment
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22. (C) The troika meeting underscored the overall alignment
of U.S. and EU objectives in Africa, and EU interlocutors
appreciated the open and candid talks with the new Assistant
Secretary and welcomed possible enhanced U.S. engagement in

SIPDIS
certain areas like Somalia. Some important differences were
clear, however, including:

-- EU concern at being included in various policy dialogues
spearheaded by the U.S. (e.g., Tripartite Commission in the
Great Lakes, and possible new dialogues between
Eritrea/Ethiopia and among key Sudan players);
-- U.S. aim of expanding AMIS vs. EU goal of consolidating
the existing force;
-- softer EU response to Mauritania coup;
-- EU willingness to continue a "carrot and stick" approach
to the FDLR, rather than discontinuing the carrot as no
longer appropriate;
-- somewhat differing assessments of MONUC;
-- continued EU lobbying for U.S. funding for the DRC
elections; and,
-- EU favoring budget support to stimulate development.


23. (C) Although the UK made Africa a hallmark of its twin G8
and EU Presidencies in 2005, generating much attention and
discussion, we do not expect this to carry over to the
Austrian Presidency next year. In fact, the participation of
the Austrian official was the weakest yet for an incoming
Presidency, and no mention was made of a focus or date for
the next Africa troika meeting.

(A/S Frazer has cleared this message.)

McKinley
.