Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRUSSELS4203
2005-11-29 13:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

ESDP: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FORCE REQUIREMENT

Tags:  MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004203 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: ESDP: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FORCE REQUIREMENT
CATALOGUE

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4202 B. BRUSSELS 3747

Classified By: USEU Political Military officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004203

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: ESDP: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FORCE REQUIREMENT
CATALOGUE

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4202 B. BRUSSELS 3747

Classified By: USEU Political Military officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) A major European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
deliverable for the current UK Presidency was the
Requirements Catalogue 2005 that was approved by the European
Council on November 21. The catalogue lists military
capabilities needed to execute the European Security Strategy
and the Headline Goal 2010. The NATO Consultation, Command,
and Control Agency (NC3A) has assisted the EU with computer
modeling to derive the force requirements, which will be sent
to EU nations by year's end, and they will use the catalogue
as a guide for pledging capabilities and assets against the
requirements. Member State Feedback on the requirements
catalogue will be used to create a follow-on "force
catalogue" in 2006 listing all forces, assets and
capabilities pledged to the EU, and a "progress catalogue" in
2007 identifying shortfalls between requirements and pledges.
This more detailed force planning may result in an increased
requirement for airlift, and a realization that the EU may
not be able to launch concurrent operations simultaneously
due to lift shortfalls. EU planning may instead require a
"break" between two high intensity operations due to
sustainment issues. End Summary

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EU's Headline Goal 2010
--------------


2. (U) In June 2004 the EU Council endorsed the Headline Goal
(HG) 2010, and posted ambitious new targets for European
Security and Defense. The HG 2010 reflects the aims of the
European Security Strategy (ESS),builds upon the previous
Headline Goal (2003),and lists several milestones for the EU
to attain in its attempt to "share in the responsibility for
global security." HG 2010 also outlines a roadmap for
generating the military capabilities required to execute the
ESS. A key deliverable for that process is the Requirements
Catalogue 2005.

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Requirements Catalogue: Place Your Bids
--------------


3. (C) The just approved Requirements Catalogue incorporates

results of an initial catalogue which was the product of
technical work performed during the iterative process between
the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) completed in May 2005. The final
Requirements Catalogue is a detailed list of total
requirements. It includes an overall EU force number as well
as a lengthy list of capabilities, assets, and forces
required to execute the ESS and to lend substance to ESDP.
The final catalogue, a UK Presidency deliverable, is
scheduled for release by the end of 2005. Once that
catalogue is released, the EU will launch a bidding process
where nations will pledge capabilities against the listed
requirements. A Headline Goal Questionnaire, adapted from
and compatible with NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (as
part of the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements),will be sent to
nations asking them to list the forces and capabilities they
possess. Nations' pledges will be used to create a "Force
Catalogue" in 2006, which will detail national forces
available for EU-led crisis management operations. The force
catalogue will be followed up with a "Progress Catalogue" in
2007 identifying shortfalls between requirements and pledges.

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Key Elements of the Requirements Catalogue
--------------


4. (U) The primary elements of the catalogue are; strategic
planning hypotheses, five illustrative scenarios and a list
of the capabilities required to meet the HG 2010 goals. The
EU has developed five ESDP mission scenarios based on the ESS
including; separation of parties by force (SOPF),
stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third
countries (SR),conflict prevention (CP),evacuation
operations (EO) and assistance to humanitarian operations
(HA). EU planners also developed a set of variables that may
have an impact on the EU's ability to launch and sustain
operations including; distance from Brussels to the theater
of operations, reaction time required for member states'
forces, mission duration, force rotation and the EU's
capacity to sustain several operations simultaneously.


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Not (Un)Like NATO's Force Planning Process
--------------


5. (U) The EU's attempt to develop a Force Requirement
Catalogue is not unlike the early stages of NATO's
well-established Force Planning Process (FPP). In the early
stages of NATO's FPP, NATO's Consultation, Command, and
Control Agency (NC3A) conducts a similar type of
computer-assisted operational analysis, drawing on Military
Tasks (MT) and representative Planning Scenarios (PS) which
act as capability drivers. The end result of the NC3A work
is the derivation of the Alliance's Minimum Military
Requirement (MRR) based on the Level of Ambition (LoA) as
stated in the Ministerial Guidance (MG). Thus, NATO's MRR is
roughly equivalent to the EU's Requirements Catalogue. The
two institutions sharply diverge, however, in what happens
next. As outlined above, in the EU's current process, the
derivation of the Force Catalogue followed by a strictly
voluntary "bidding process" is the end-state. In NATO's FPP,
the development of the MMR is merely the initial step in a
ten-year process that seeks to challenge Allies to fulfill
the MRR by producing the capabilities identified in it. A
cursory comparison between the EU's process and the more
detailed, interactive NATO FPP suggests that the EU's passive
and voluntary system based upon bidding against a
Requirements Catalogue may not be successful in "driving"
Member States to produce the necessary capabilities. The
European Defense Agency (EDA) is trying to introduce greater
competition into the European Defense Equipment market and
rationalize the demand side in hopes of inducing the industry
to produce the needed capabilities. (See reftels for more
details.)


--------------
NC3A To The Rescue
--------------


6. (C) The initial limited version of the requirements
catalogue was produced during the Luxembourg Presidency. The
EU tasked the European Defense Agency to contract the NATO
Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A) to produce a
computer-assisted analysis to "verify" and expand upon the
previous findings. (NC3A also provided such support for the
initial Headline Goal requirements work in 2000.) NC3A's
detailed work has provided the EU a more precise, detailed
rendering of requirements for the final Catalogue.

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Planning Assumptions
--------------


7. (C) The EU Military Staff created a set of strategic
planning assumptions to assist in uncovering the total
capability and force requirement. Planning assumptions
include an operational ESDP range from 4,000-15,000
kilometers from Brussels. Fifteen thousand km may seem like a
stretch for the airlift-poor EU, but in reality the EU would
embark on these missions only for "Evacuation Operations" and
"Assistance to Humanitarian Operations" scenarios on a
limited scale. To put these significant operational ranges
into context, the distance from Brussels to South Africa is
9,200KM and to Perth, Australia, it is 14,200KM. Clearly
airlift will be the long pole in the tent for either
scenario, since the rapid response requirements negate use of
sealift.


8. (C) For the higher intensity scenarios such as separation
of parties by force, the EU's Achilles heel appears to be
"reaction time," which may require at least 60 days before
the EU can have troops on the ground operating at an "initial
capacity". The EU level of ambition also seeks to carry out
"two concurrent operations", but in practice, "concurrent"
will likely mean separating the start of each operation by at
least two months to allow time for the strategic lift to
reset.

-------------- --------------
Impact on EU Strategy and Capability Requirements
-------------- --------------


9. (C) One of the unintended consequences of this more
detailed, computer assisted modeling by NC3A compared to the
EU's previous assumptions, mostly based on the previous
Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue 2002, is that preliminary
figures for this year's catalogue will represent increases in
total force requirements. Especially striking is the jump in
the requirement for airlift, and the resulting increase in
the EU airlift shortfall. This change is also due to the
significant increase in the EU's level of ambition and
corresponding airlift requirements for "Evacuation
Operations."


10. (C) The EU is also looking at decreasing the time
required for a decision to launch rapid response operations,
which would enable military authorities to shift loads to
sealift assets, and ease the reliance on airframes. Because
of sustainment difficulties, it is also likely the approved
catalogue will include a warning that the EU will require one
year between each "separation of parties by force" operation
and six months between "conflict prevention" missions.

McKinley
.