EU FOREIGN MINISTERS TO FOCUS ON TURKEY, IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003558

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015
TAGS: PREL HR RS TU IZ IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU FOREIGN MINISTERS TO FOCUS ON TURKEY, IRAN,
WESTERN BALKANS

REF: (A) STATE 177048 (B) BRUSSELS 3534

Classified By: USEU POLOFF VINCENT CARVER FOR REASON 1.4 (B/D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) EU FMs will meet in an extraordinary session the
evening of October 2 to focus on Turkey. On October 3 EU
foreign ministers will hold their scheduled meeting (GAERC)
and will focus on strategy regarding Iran, decide whether
current Croatian cooperation with the ICTY merits a start of
accession negotiations, and consider other issues. ICTY
Prosecutor del Ponte is scheduled to review Croatia with an
EU Task Force October 2. A Commission contact said the GAERC
likely will agree to a Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). END SUMMARY

TURKEY: FMs TO MEET OCT. 2
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2. (C) We presented points (REF A) on the upcoming GAERC to
Council and Commission officials September 26. Judith
Gebestroithner of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's cabinet
confirmed for us September 29 that EU foreign ministers would
meet the evening of October 2 in Luxembourg to try to
finalize the negotiating framework text for Turkish
accession. Gebestroithner stressed that the Commission fully
agreed with the U.S. that not starting talks with Turkey
October 3 would be a strategic mistake. Gebestroithner (an
Austrian),noting Vienna's insistence on reference to
alternatives to full membership, added that member-states do
have to answer to their publics. In any case, she
emphasized, FM Gul's rumored plan not to fly to Luxembourg
until he has seen the final framework text is not helping
Ankara's case.


3. (C) Council representative for North America Margarita
Comamala told us September 27 that Turkey remains the most
controversial issue on the GAERC agenda and that there was
still no guarantee that accession talks would begin October

3. She took our point that promoting Croatian accession
absent full cooperation with the ICTY would send the wrong
signal to Zagreb and Belgrade but cautioned that some
member-states viewed Croatian cooperation as vastly improved.
On other issues, Comamala said there likely would be "no
surprises" at the GAERC and that the EU generally agreed with
our points.

NO "FORMAL LINK" WITH CROATIAN ACCESSION, BUT ...
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4. (C) Stefan Lehne, Director of the Council's Balkans Task
Force, told us September 29 that there is no softening of the
requirement that Croatia must be deemed "fully cooperating"
with the ICTY for accession talks to proceed. According to
Lehne, however, talk of Gotovina's physical presence in The
Hague as a precondition for such talks was beyond the most
hardline view within the EU. Gebestroithner and several
contacts from the Council, Commission and member-states have
told us they believe Austria will finally join consensus on
the negotiating framework, but only after ensuring that
Croatian accession moves ahead, albeit conditionally. Our
contacts unanimously echo the "there is no formal linkage
between Turkey and Croatia" refrain, but even a UKEU contact
stressed that "one must be practical." A member of
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn's cabinet stressed to us that
the EU Croatia Task Force (UK, Austria, Commission and
Council) will meet with ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte in
Luxembourg October 2. If del Ponte notes significant
progress in Croatian cooperation, Austria will push for one
of three options: setting a date for accession to begin,
beginning screening of Croatian legislation for compatibility
with the Acquis, or setting an early date for another Croatia
Task Force review of Zagreb's cooperation.

MOVING FORWARD WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
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5. (C) Heather Grabbe of Commissioner Rehn's office
confirmed to us that the GAERC likely would approve a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) for SaM.
According to Grabbe, no formal decision has yet been made,
but most FMs want to provide Belgrade a tangible and positive
development before they begin to make difficult choices
regarding Kosovo. Both Grabbe and Gebestroithner said FMs
will wait for Kai Eide's report, now expected around October
17, before reviewing Kosovo in detail. Lehne said that SaM
is clearly "several rungs" below Croatia on the ladder, and
that it would be counter-productive to preclude the opening
of SAA negotiations until Mladic is transferred to The Hague.
He insisted that the negotiations will make no real progress
until the issue is resolved, but argued that the continued
prospect of a "European perspective" was an important tool in
gaining Belgrade's cooperation in the Kosovo status process.
Eventually, Lehne said, the same benchmark may need to be
applied to Serbia -- that is, full cooperation rather than
demanding Mladic's presence in The Hague as a pre-condition.
He noted there had been some improvement in SaM's cooperation
with the ICTY, but it was still far from acceptable. Lehne
urged calm, claiming that there is no daylight between the
U.S. and the EU on ICTY cooperation. He acknowledged,
however, that the horse-trading over Turkey's accession
negotiations could have unpredictable results.
BOSNIAN POLICE REFORM
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6. (C) Lehne said that there was no "Plan B" for bringing
about police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stressed that
Paddy Ashdown has the EU's full support for his efforts to
implement police reform and said he saw no likelihood of
easing the EU push for such reform. Pressure on the RS
authorities would, in fact, increase in the coming week, he
added. The SAA process for Bosnia-Herzogovina would be
postponed, and the transition from OHR to an EUHR who would
exercise fewer Bonn powers may be delayed, Lehne added.

IRAN: CONTINUE TO SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
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7. (C) The EU-3 will review their efforts, including at the
IAEA, to convince Iran to cooperate with the international
community and abandon uranium enrichment. Gebestroithner
said the GAERC likely would issue a statement regarding the
seriousness of Iran's continued intransigence. She noted
that the EU would also raise this with Putin at the EU-Russia
Summit in London October 4, but added that the EU was under
no illusions that it would persuade Putin to engage on Iran
at the UNSC.

MEPP: NEED TO PRAISE ISRAEL'S SUCCESSFUL WITHDRAWAL
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8. (C) Gebestroithner stressed that the GAERC's statement on
the MEPP will be positive and balanced: The EU will
congratulate Israel on its successful and largely peaceful
withdrawal from Gaza, note the PA's efforts to combat
violence, and call on both sides to do more in reviving the
road map. She added that the Commission is urgently trying
to free up funds already committed to assist Wolfensohn's
efforts in Gaza.

RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
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9. (C) According to Gebestroithner, the GAERC will spend
more time talking about Russia's neighbors than about Russia
itself. The EU has already decided to focus on
implementation of existing agreements when it holds a summit
with Putin in London October 4 (REF B). Expectations for the
summit are low, she added, with Poland and a few other
member-states still resisting easing visa requirements for
some categories of Russians. Gebestroithner noted Russia's
agreement to discuss its neighbors with the EU as a "step
forward," but added that the Commission expected Putin to
defend the actions of leaders like Lukashenko as
"understandable under the circumstances." Turning to
Uzbekistan, Gebestroithner said the GAERC's conclusions are
set; the EU will take a tough line on Andijon but will not
terminate the EU's PCA with Tashkent as that is the "only
structure we have for dialogue" with the Uzbek Government.
The EU will announce an arms embargo, a visa ban on GOU
officials linked to the Andijon repression, a suspension of
some assistance programs, and will encourage members to
"support invoking" mechanisms, such as the OSCE's Moscow
mechanism, that could lead to an independent investigation of
the Andijon events.


10. (C) The EU will support market economy status for
Ukraine, Gebestroithner said, but will announce this only at
the EU-Ukraine Summit in Kiev December 1. The GAERC will
express support for the new Ukrainian Government, but not too
many FMs are very optimistic about its chances to press for
reform, she stressed.
COMMENT
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11. (C) The October 2's FM pre-GAERC focus will be Turkey.
Austria's position and a heated European Parliament (EP)
debate on Turkish accession and its September 28 vote that,
inter alia, Ankara "recognize the Armenian genocide" as a
prerequisite for accession have dominated informal
discussions on Turkey this week. Despite these obstacles,
most of our contacts believe Austria will relent at the last
minute (but only if del Ponte's findings on Croatian
cooperation give the EU enough ambiguity to reach a
compromise deal on Croatian accession) and the GAERC will be
followed by a ceremony marking the start of Turkey's
accession negotiations.
MCKINLEY
.