A/S FRIED - EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA, JULY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002748

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PARM ZK IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED - EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA, JULY
13, 2004


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason:
1.4(B)(D)


1. (C) Following a luncheon discussion with all 25 EU
Political Directors on transatlantic relations, the EU's
neighborhood policy, and the Middle East (reported septel)
A/S Fried met with the EU "troika" led by UK Political
Director Sawers, Council DG for CFSP Robert Cooper, and
Commission RELEX DDG Karel Kovanda to discuss Guantanamo,
Iran, Uzbekistan, China, the Western Balkans, and Africa.
Key action items to emerge from the discussions include:

-- An EU request for the U.S. to invite the UN's Special
Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo;

-- An EU question on whether the U.S. would be willing to
de-list the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization from our
recent non-proliferation executive order if European
diplomacy with Teheran yields an agreement;

-- A U.S. proposal for closer U.S.-EU consultations on
support for reformers and civil society in Iran;

-- A call for close U.S.-EU coordination of next steps in
Uzbekistan, as both U.S. and some EU member states face the
same dilemma of how to influence Karimov while not
jeopardizing valuable basing rights in that country;

-- A call for informal G-7 coordination regarding Russia's
upcoming G-8 presidency; and

-- The U.S.-EU "Strategic Dialogue" on East Asia should
continue, with more emphasis on economic themes. The EU
wants close coordination with U.S. on the question of
market economy status for China. End Summary.

Guantanamo
--------------


2. (C) Council Director Robert Cooper urged the U.S. to
invite the UN's Special Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo. He
noted that U.S. indications that it would be willing to do
so had been important in gaining EU support to oppose the
Cuban resolution on this issue at the UNHRC. A/S Fried
agreed to look into the issue.

Iran
--------------


3. (C) Sawers said diplomacy with Iran had entered a
"tricky phase" following the elections. It could no longer
be said there was a range of views within Iran's ruling
elite -- all institutions are now in the hands of the
hard-line/radical camp. The EU will judge the new regime
by its actions -- on nuclear issues, regional stability,
support for terrorism, and human rights. He expressed
European appreciation for U.S. support to the EU-3's
diplomatic efforts, and said the EU was on the hook to
present new proposals to the Iranians "sometime this
summer" -- although when exactly was still vague. The
situation was sensitive, but Sawers assured Fried the EU
was still sticking to its red line that Iran not be
permitted to develop any fuel cycle
activities. Sawers said he would consider it a success to
get to the autumn with the current suspension intact. He
noted that this would mark nearly two years in which Iran's
work has been effectively suspended.


4. (C) The EU's strategy is to maintain a position where
Europe sticks by its commitments to the Iranians, so that
any violations will be clearly the fault of the Iranians.
If this happens, Sawers said the EU would initiate an
emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and seek
UNSC referral.


5. (C) A/S Fried agreed that the threat of referral to the
UNSC clearly worried the Iranians. Looking at Iran
strategically, he suggested there was a relationship
between Iran's nuclear timeline and an internal timeline
where domestic pressures for reform and democracy could
build over time. He suggested the U.S. and EU should look
for ways to hasten the reform timeline in Iran, reaching
out to Iranian civil society and bolstering the forces for
change in that country.


6. (C) EU officials agreed with the idea, but wondered
about the appropriate approach. Council Director General
for CFSP Robert Cooper said he was not sure the Iranians
were ready for another revolution, since the last one had
proven such a disaster for the nation. Sawers also said he
saw a certain passivity in the Iranian people, especially
among those who loathe the regime, while those who support
the current regime have sustained their activism. The real
challenge, in his view, was to strengthen those who want
gradual change in Iran without stigmatizing those who
receive the support of the west. The modernizing pressures
of WTO membership was one such approach, he suggested.
Commission DDG Karel Kovanda noted that the eighth round of
the EU's Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations
(taking place the week of July 12) and the EU's periodic
human rights dialogue with Iran (next scheduled for
September) aimed to bolster this segment of Iranian
society. EUR/ERA Director Chase suggested experts hold
U.S.-EU discussions on supporting civil society in Iran.
He suggested this issue be put on the agenda for DRL AA/S
Davies' next discussions with EU officials on human rights.

7. (C) EU officials expressed concerns about the recent
executive order on non-proliferation which specifically
added Iran's Atomic Energy Organization to the list of
sanctioned entities. Sawers noted that if EU diplomacy
succeeded in getting Iranian objective guarantees that
their program would not support a nuclear weapons program,
it is precisely this agency that would be expected to carry
out the activities -- and the agency European entities
would be cooperating with. He suggested it would be useful
if the U.S. could state that a long-term agreement on
peaceful use of nuclear energy with the IAEO would lead to
de-listing that organization from U.S. sanctions.

Uzbekistan
--------------


8. (C) Fried said trends in Uzbekistan were not good.
Karimov has retreated into a Russia/China embrace, and is
trying to use the leverage of our base usage to get the
U.S. and other European nations to back down. The U.S.
does not plan to withdraw from base use in Uzbekistan, but
is beginning prudent planning on possible next steps. He
noted the U.S. has already put in place restrictions on
other military cooperation (bilateral and
via NATO). But he stressed that our basing interests would
not stop us from pursuing our democracy agenda in
Uzbekistan either.


9. (C) Cooper suggested this was an area for possible
U.S.-EU cooperation, but admitted that there were not many
good options. Some EU member states share the U.S. dilemma
on basing rights, and have therefore been hesitant to adopt
policies currently being considered, including an arms
embargo (with a time limit) or a visa ban. Cooper said he
doubted the EU would be able to agree on these steps at
next week's GAERC, but Sawers said the conclusions would
certainly signal that these options are under
consideration. Cooper noted that Germany, in particular,
was already studying alternatives to its current base
activities in Uzbekistan.

Russia and the G-8
--------------


10. (C) The EU is also placing discussion of Uzbekistan on
the agenda of their consultations with Russia and China.
He wondered whether Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency and
their theme of focusing on the former Soviet states
might be turned to our advantage. Sawers suggested there
was a need for more thorough consultations among the "old
G-7" on how to approach Russia's G-8 presidency. Since
they could not be too obvious in this effort, Sawers
suggested the G-7 countries might use the opportunity of
meetings in New York on the margins of the UNGA.

China
--------------


11. (C) Sawers said the EU was pleased with the results of
the strategic dialogue on East Asia that was launched in
May. It was a good start, he stressed, but could not be
considered a one-off event. Fried agreed, and said he
hoped EAP A/S Hill would be able to brief European
ambassadors in Washington on the results of the Secretary's
recent visit to China.


12. (C) Sawers noted that an EU-China summit was one of the
big meetings on the calendar for the UK presidency. The EU
is currently negotiating a new Trade and Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) with China, and hopes to modernize their
now 25-year old agreement to include issues such as
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation, and to
also discuss issues with China such as energy, climate
change, and market economy status. Kovanda stressed that
market economy status was a key goal for Beijing. He
stressed the importance of remaining on the same page on
this issue with the U.S. and other OECD countries. Cooper
urged the U.S. to keep an eye on the details of the TCA
negotiations, suggesting obliquely that it may touch on
U.S. interests. He also noted that while the arms embargo
issue was not moving, it was also not dead as far as EU
member states were concerned.

Western Balkans
--------------


13. (C) Future EU Presidency country Austria (Mayr-Harting)
took the lead for the EU side on the Balkans. He emphasized
that the status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable, and that
concerted pressure was needed on Serbian and Kosovar
leadership. He suggested there might be merit in more
direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU also
supports the naming of a UN status envoy, but suggested
that he should be assisted by a support team in including a
group from the EU.


14. (C) A/S Fried agreed on the need to keep the pressure
on. The Kosovo Albanians need to be told that they cannot
just continue to wait and find final status dropped in
their laps. They need to earn it through action.
Belgrade, for its part, needs to hear that attempting to
play the nationalist card is a losing game, and not a
viable option. For both sides, Fried stressed that the
prospect of EU integration had to be part of the solution.
Cooper replied that the EU perspective remained viable --
even if people would not shout it from the rooftop after
the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands. Sawers
agreed, but noted that an EU perspective had not had as
much impact on the behavior of states as the EU would have
wanted. He stressed that to get Belgrade to come along,
the EU and NATO had to be in a position to offer them more
once final status negotiations begin.


15. (C) A/S Fried also urged the EU to continue pushing the
Bosnian Serbs on police reform, Karadzic, and to continue
to support Paddy Ashdown's efforts. He also urged the EU
not to "give a pass" to Croatia on Gotovina. Sawers
replied that the conditionality on Croatia is clear and
remains: full cooperation with ICTY is necessary for to
begin negotiations. Mayr-Harting agreed that full
cooperation was needed, while at the same time suggesting
not all countries in the region are equal, and it is clear
that Croatia is far better prepared for EU membership than
the rest of the region. Their progress to membership would
send a signal to the others and strengthen the effect of
the prospect of EU membership on the others.

Sudan/Africa
--------------


16. (C) Sawers noted the challenges in Sudan/Darfur
remained huge. The EU is supporting the AU on the ground,
and NATO's engagement offers a welcome complementarity.
The Abuja talks were off to a good start, and he emphasized
the importance of a success to help bolster the role of the
AU throughout the continent. While Sudan remained a
crucial test case, he said the international community also
needed to put greater emphasis on the success stories in
Africa, such as the overall reduction in the number of
conflicts on the continent, and the recent G-8
commitments. Sawers complained that recent U.S. approaches
urging the EU to do more on aid to Sudan failed to note all
the EU is doing. Chase explained that the U.S. approach
was targeted to the issue of food assistance in Southern
Sudan, and not to the EU's overall effort in the country.
Sawers suggested more needed to be done to correct the
mis-impression that U.S. concerns were broader.


17. (C) Fried raised U.S. concerns about events in
Zimbabwe, urged support for elections in the region, and
also suggested that the EU engage more broadly in the
Community of Democracies to build a useful global network
of democratic countries. Chase also urged EU support for
the UN Democracy Fund.

McKinley

.