CUTTING THROUGH THE NATO-EU KNOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 002642

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015
TAGS: PREL NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CUTTING THROUGH THE NATO-EU KNOT

REF: USNATO (04) 1117

Classified By: USEU CDA Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a joint USEU-USNATO message.

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Summary
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2. (C) It remains in the interest of the United States to
continue to lead in NATO while building an ever-stronger
partnership with the EU, notwithstanding recent tensions
between the two organizations. Doing so is the best way to
promote U.S. interests in Europe. Both organizations are
critical to achieving our objectives -- from effectively
waging the global war on terrorism to achieving international
consensus on the democracy agenda. NATO continues to be the
only organization capable of robust military action and
global transatlantic strategic reach. The EU is the locus of
decision-making on much of what Europe will do in the
diplomatic field, and in the past six months this has paid
dividends on a sustained basis for the US on controversial
issues like Iraq, China, the Middle East peace process,
democratic reform in the Arab world, homeland security, and
Iran. The continuing strains between NATO and the EU over
defense and security policy cloud what should be a new era of
cooperation on the international stage as the Europeans
become less timid about the worldwide democracy agenda. The
purpose of this message is to identify the problem, define
the European context, and present a menu of options which can
reinforce the primacy of NATO while exploiting the benefits
of a strategic relationship with the EU in light of current
European ambitions which affect both institutions. End
Summary.

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The Problem
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3. (C) Relations between NATO and the EU have been
characterized by grudging cooperation punctuated by bouts of
suspicions. NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer and EU High
Representative Solana do not get along, and are unlikely to
do so anytime soon, but resistance to closer cooperation by
some EU member states lies at the heart of the problem. In
recent weeks, disagreements over the nature of the NATO-EU
relationship have resulted in failure to agree on a US-EU
summit declaration regarding cooperation in crisis response,
a scuttled NATO-EU Foreign Ministers' dinner, and discord
over the communiqu for the Iraq Conference. Meanwhile,
lingering resentments over negotiations on the handover of
the SFOR mission have spilled over into protracted debate
over assistance to the AU Mission in Darfur.


4. (C) France and a shifting alliance of states (usually
including Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Greece, and Germany)
regularly frustrate USG objectives in NATO whenever these are
seen as a challenge to EU defense and security ambitions.
Even Atlanticist Allies, such as the UK and Netherlands, seem
ambivalent on how to balance their support for NATO and for
European integration and the EU. Thus, France and other
EU-centric NATO Allies speak up in NATO to defend the EU's
interests, but there is no "pro-NATO" block in the EU willing
to consistently defend NATO's. The French clearly see
NATO/EU relations as a zero sum game, and fear that
cooperation between the two organizations comes at the EU's
expense. Their efforts to keep NATO and the EU apart have
been aided by the entry of Malta and Cyprus into the European
Union in 2004, which led Turkey to block meaningful
consultations between the two organizations. In effect, the
EU's own limitations and contradictory ambitions in the
security arena will bedevil work inside NATO for the
foreseeable future.


5. (C) There will be times when we need to resist EU appeals
for cooperation on security and defense matters in order to
protect our equities in NATO. Moreover, we can increase the
range of political issues discussed inside NATO, as we have
seen since the President's visit to Brussels in February. In
the context of the war on terrorism, the conflict in Iraq,
and tensions elsewhere in the globe, our natural tendency is
to gravitate towards an institution that is more hospitable
to US interests and where we have a seat at the table. As
the most recent debates over the extent of the Iraq training
mission have demonstrated, however, and because decisions are
made on the basis of consensus, European cooperation through
NATO cannot be taken for granted. The reality is that the
Europeans are unlikely to agree to transfer the locus of
dialogue on the Middle East or Iran to NATO, and the French
and others will continue to limit cooperation with the United
States inside NATO if doing so is perceived as endangering
the EU's role on these issues or undermining their efforts to
build a credible European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP).
While the French can be seen as ringleaders, they are far
from the only country with an ESDP agenda.


6. (C) Europe, both in the alliance and the EU, continues to
have problems translating its political ambitions into the
military capabilities needed for action. European Defense
Ministers, High Representative Solana, and most recently
European Defense Agency head Nick Whitney continue to make
the eloquent case for larger defense budgets, streamlining,
interoperability, and out-of-area projection. The reality is
defense budgets continue to fall, the European defense
industry looks more to the United States and overseas than
inside the European Union, and the vaunted battle-groups are
little more than boutique variations on the NATO Reaction
Force. Timid proposals, like the peace mission to Aceh, are
not a harbinger of greater things to come at this stage, and
the EU's only military mission launched from a standing start
-- Operation Artemis in the Congo -- was conceived and
implemented by overwhelmingly French troops. That said,
there will continue to be enough Europeans committed to the
development of a parallel military capability to make life
difficult inside NATO, however we choose to interact with the
EU. We can expect a number of member states to continue to
look for operations to support under a EU umbrella as a
mechanism to force the evolution of ESDP.

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The Context
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7. (C) EU member states are committed to using their
organization to project European leadership in the world. In
European minds, the EU's legitimacy requires a degree of
autonomy on defense and security issues. As long as it does
not damage NATO or duplicate the Alliance's capabilities,
this is not inconsistent with U.S. interests. Furthermore,
the climate surrounding ESDP is shifting in favor of
practical cooperation with NATO. EU enlargement, the French
and Dutch "no's", and the likely change of government in
Germany are creating a more Atlanticist dynamic inside EU
deliberations, with the French less likely to prevail on
openly obstructionist responses to American initiatives in
the security and political arenas. The British Defense
Minister on July 1 set out UK EU Presidency priorities as
directly addressing NATO-EU cooperation, noting "sound
EU-NATO cooperation is an evident condition of using our
limited resources effectively and avoiding wasteful
duplication." The London bombings of July 7 are a reminder
that Europeans must improve security cooperation.


8. (C) Moreover, messy as it was, the debate over Darfur
resulted in French endorsement of an Africa mission for NATO.
Inside the EU, and since the beginning of the year, we are
leveraging EU influence on political, developmental,
economic, and homeland security issues of interest to us as
we have seen on Iran, the China arms embargo, and the
convergence of American and European approaches to biometric
and supply chain security. The European political context
is in flux; the drive towards deeper European integration is
stalled. Talk of the EU as "counterweight" is less prevalent
than it once was, and we have a British EU Presidency
committed to improving NATO-EU cooperation over the next six
months.


9. (C) In this environment, there is a real opportunity for
the United States to tackle the difficulties we face in
making the NATO-EU dynamic work in a manner which would
strengthen NATO and make the EU a partner rather than a
competitor. NATO remains the transatlantic key to any
meaningful effort by Europe and the United States to jointly
address global instability, with the global reach, the
practical experience, and the human depth necessary for most
tasks because of US strategic engagement. The EU,
conversely, has the political and resource muscle to
reinforce our common goals -- to include collective planning
through NATO. The key, given the political dynamics of an
evolving EU containing 19 of NATO's members, is pocketing EU
ambitions to capitalize on EU comparative advantages which
remain largely if not exclusively political, civilian-based,
and financial.


10. (C) We agree with the concept of taking a single,
fully-integrated approach to the two major institutions we
and Europe work through -- NATO and the EU -- but in the
context of combining European comparative advantages with
American ones to greatest effect. Member state views in the
EU and NATO are not monolithic, but membership in both
organizations creates gravitational forces on the 19 that can
complicate decision-making. It is therefore important on
given issues to work with individual member states in
capitals (and with regional blocs) as well as working through
the EU and NATO. Europe is not yet fully capable of being a
global strategic partner (a point conceded by senior EU
officials). Our challenge is to continue to provide
effective collective defense and global reach while the
architecture is evolving to meet new challenges in the
twenty-first century.

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Solutions
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11. (C) The following are a number of thoughts on how we can
build a more effective NATO-EU relationship, and put the
development of ESDP on a path that strengthens a transformed
and truly transatlantic NATO while bringing more European
resources to bear on our global agenda.

-- Committing USG Resources at Crunch Point: As the recent
debate over Darfur clearly demonstrated, US hesitancy to
clearly and quickly commit defined resources to Alliance
projects opens the door to the French to argue ESDP as an
alternative, and to dampen enthusiasm among the majority of
European nations who would prefer to participate in NATO
operations where U.S. involvement is assured. Where visible
U.S. commitment to NATO is lacking, the inclination for
Allies to work via the EU for other political and economic
imperatives becomes more compelling.

-- Break the Cyprus-Malta Deadlock: Signs are that the
Turkish government is re-thinking its position on NAC-PSC
cooperation. It is unclear how far they are willing to go,
but they need continuing encouragement to move along this
positive path. Prior to the 2004 EU expansion, NATO-EU
discussions took place on a number of strategic questions.
Although these were not particularly substantive, reviving
them would allow NATO deliberations and perspectives to
filter back to a wider audience inside the EU.

-- Revive Berlin Plus Consultations: The Berlin Plus
documents, which established the consultation mechanisms,
also set out the possibility of a review of procedures in the
light of changed circumstances. Events have shown that there
are contingencies that Berlin Plus did not envisage, such as
Darfur, where NATO and the EU were asked to carry out
missions in the same crisis zone in order to assist a third
organization. As we work through the logjam on NATO-PSC
dialogue, we can also pursue parallel lanes for consultation
and confidence building. The Secretaries-General of the two
organizations should meet monthly on an informal basis, with
more frequent contacts between their top advisors.
Staff-to-staff discussions and lower-level intergovernmental
contacts (e.g. PCG-PMG) also need to be regularized, as
should cross-briefings by senior officials to each
organization. Lessons learned from Althea could be a starting
point.

-- Creating the Conditions for Our Own Success: NATO Reform,
the Comprehensive Political Guidance and NRF-driven
transformation are a result of our analysis of how things can
work better at NATO. Success in these areas supports
long-standing USG objectives. A similar analysis needs to
underpin our efforts to deal with ESDP and with allies who
find themselves bridging both organizations. For example,
NATO's joint and combined exercise program, setting NATO
standards and certification by NATO, and NATO strategic and
operational education all give NATO a distinct advantage over
ESDP in terms of producing usable forces. We should work to
ensure these areas in particular remain NATO-only core
competencies.

-- Political Legitimization: Informal meetings of Foreign
Ministers are possible, given a political commitment,
notwithstanding our recent negative experiences. Proposing
two or three a year on the margins of already scheduled
Council or NATO ministerial sessions would not be difficult.
Formalizing a decision to institutionalize this kind of
consultation does require direct political discussions at the
most senior levels -- EU Presidency, Solana, de Hoop
Scheffer, and targeted Allies who would be amenable to moving
in this direction. The EU has long relied on ministerials to
make difficult decisions or to have strategic discussions,
and a joint forum is the one place where the not entirely
overlapping memberships of the two organizations could meet.

-- Intelligence Sharing: A common assessment of the
challenges we all face will help us determine possible common
approaches. Such a discussion would facilitate the
consideration of which institution is best suited to support
US interests, with the conclusion more often than not likely
to be NATO. A more active exchange of analytical viewpoints
with both NATO and the EU would contribute to that common
assessment. The EU SITCEN fusion cell produces analytical
intelligence for the highest echelons of the EU, and its
director has traveled to Washington seeking a broader
information exchange. In the absence of a strong
relationship, the US analytical view is conspicuously absent
from the debate.

-- Strategic Dialogue: The Europeans are receptive to
strategic dialogues. The China Arms Embargo, North Korea,
and Iran in particular, are examples of the Europeans
aligning and sometimes subordinating their agenda to the
broader needs of the transatlantic relationship. Beginning a
strategic dialogue on security (beyond the semi-annual PSC
troika) through informal but regular and comprehensive
meetings would be an important first step in working through
the lingering suspicions on both sides. We should have a
full conversation without pre-judging outcomes. The first
goal of this dialogue must be agreement on the nature of the
challenges we face. When the time comes to see what is on
offer, the EU in ESDP is more likely to offer what it can
rather than seek to challenge or block NATO's response or
deployment of assets.

-- Working with ESDP: If we want to expand engagement with
our European allies at NATO, we need to partially address
their security ambitions within the EU as well. All 25 EU
member states to a greater or lesser degree believe in ESDP
in principle, although there are clear debates about its
acceptable scope. Prime Minister Blair restated the
importance of this recently. A willingness to accept -- or
even encourage -- EU action in some areas without invoking
NATO's "right of first refusal" would permit a fuller
discussion of possible responses to crises without leaving
the impression the US wants to push ESDP ambitions aside at
every stage. In fact, ESDP is unlikely to challenge: only
three of the 9 ESDP missions to date have been military in
nature. The others have been police and rule of law. By
making clear we, unlike the French, do not view EU-NATO
relations as a zero-sum game -- even on the limited occasions
the EU tries a security operation -- we build the necessary
confidence to expand our security dialogue and cooperation
inside NATO. On matters of defense, security, and foreign
policy, the EU Council is increasingly the smoke-filled back
room where decisions are made. Given the inherent weaknesses
in ESDP we have outlined, we can strengthen pro-NATO players
inside the EU by more creatively working with the pressures
they face bridging the organizations. Given the progress we
are making on strategic and political goals, we have much to
gain on defense and security cooperation.

McKinley
.