CUBA: FURTHER CHANGES IN EU POLICY UNLIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002165

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CUBA: FURTHER CHANGES IN EU POLICY UNLIKELY

REF: A. A) STATE 102505

B. B) BRUSSELS 2059

C. C) THE HAGUE 1536

D. D) PARIS 3722

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1/4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a key EU Council official
(protect),the EU will almost certainly continue the
suspension of the June 2003 restrictive measures against Cuba
and seek "constructive" dialogue with the Cuban authorities.
This is the principal message of the draft EU policy
declaration on Cuba that the official showed us. The June 6
meeting of the EU Working Group on Latin America (COLAT) was
dominated by the Spaniards, who effectively fended off Polish
and Czech attempts to take a harder line. We expect the June
7 EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to approve the
draft policy declaration (perhaps with cosmetic changes),and
EU FonMins are likely to give it final approval on June 13.
END SUMMARY.

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DRAFT DECLARATION REAFFIRMS DIALOGUE
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2. (C) On June 6, Poloff delivered REF A demarche to Nicolas
Pascual de la Parte (protect),EU HighRep Javier Solana's
Adviser on Latin America. Pascual showed Poloff the
Luxembourg EU Presidency's draft EU policy declaration on
Cuba. The document reaffirmed the EU Common Position on
Cuba, in force since 1996, and its basic approach of
"constructive engagement" with Cuba. It contained language
condemning detention and harassment of dissidents, and
expressing EU plans to continue increased contacts with the
peaceful opposition. Its basic message, though, was that the
EU would extend its suspension of the June 2003 restrictive
measures against Cuba in the interest of promoting dialogue
with the Cuban authorities. The draft calls for another
review of the suspension by June 2006, but Pascual said that
Germany might push for a review by December 2005.

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SPAIN DOMINATES ON CUBA
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3. (C) Pascual said COLAT discussion of Cuba policy was
dominated by Spain. He said returning to the status quo ante
was impossible -- it was clear the Spaniards would not agree
to re-impose the June 2003 measures. Pascual reported that
the Spanish COLAT representative argued successfully that the
measures had proven contradictory to the EU Common Position
on Cuba, with its emphasis on "constructive engagement" with
the Cuban authorities. A Polish-led push to re-institute the
most controversial of the June 2003 measures, the policy of
inviting dissidents to national day celebrations at EU
Missions in Havana, found little support. Spain asserted
that if dissidents were invited, Cuban government officials
would refuse to attend, thus creating an obstacle to the
dialogue foreseen by the Common Position. When the Czech
COLAT representative proposed that the EU fund the peaceful
opposition, Spain responded that there was no reason to set
such a precedent when the EU does not fund the opposition in
other problematic countries with which it seeks constructive
dialogue, such as China or Iran.

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EU CONSTITUTION VOTES AFFECT DELIBERATIONS
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4. (C) Pascual predicted that the EU Political and Security
Committee (PSC) would on June 7 approve the substance of the
draft policy declaration. In the wake of the French and
Dutch referenda on the EU constitutional treaty, he said, the
EU's foremost concern was to show unity -- to demonstrate
that the EU can reach consensus and make decisions. He said
Germany might push to move the next review of the restrictive
measures' suspension from June 2006, as foreseen in the draft
declaration, to December 2005. He added that the Czechs and
Poles might succeed in getting some tougher language on the
Castro regime in the declaration. All in all, though, the
message coming out of the June 13 EU Foreign Minister's
meeting was likely to be a reaffirmation of constructive
engagement in the interest of maintaining dialogue with the
Cuban regime.


5. (C) COMMENT: The Czechs and Poles do not appear to have
been able to drum up enough support within the EU for a
harder line, while the Spaniards remain determined and
capable in their defense of dialogue with the regime as the
top priority. Germany appears to favor a somewhat tougher
policy, but did not provide the active support that is key to
the Czechs' and Poles' prospects for influencing other member
states. If, as expected, the EU reiterates its pledge to
increase contacts with the peaceful opposition, it would
offer an opportunity for continued U.S.-EU consultation on
how to put those words into action. END COMMENT.
MCKINLEY
.