TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 001734

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR/ERA, PRM/AFR; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS
USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV MOPS PHUM EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) Summary. The April 20 transatlantic consultations on
Africa (COAFR) addressed priorities in the Great Lakes
(ensuring democratic governance, supporting security sector
reform and fostering regional stability),Somalia
(consolidating the peace process),Sudan (Darfur and
North-South); West Africa (Liberia, including funding
issues); and options for highlighting Africa at the upcoming
U.S.-EU Summit. The Luxembourg presidency underscored the
broad range of agreement and multilateral cooperation the
U.S. and EU share with regard to Africa.


2. (C) The U.S. delegation asked the EU to consider more aid
for the Liberian elections and urgent food aid to Darfur.
Both delegations agreed to support the recommendations of the
joint assessment mission regarding AU involvement in Sudan,
and the expansion of that mission. The EU promised to
provide the USG with a list of areas where the EU hopes to
cooperate with ECOWAS, and the U.S. agreed to provide EU
experts with unclassified documents outlining USG
counter-terrorism efforts in Africa. End Summary.

--------------
Participants
--------------


3. (U) EU participants included: Alain de Muyser, Director
for African Affairs (MFA) and Nadia Ernzer, Senior Advisor
for Africa and CIS Affairs (MFA) for the Luxembourg
Presidency; Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the
Great Lakes; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council
Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers Peter

SIPDIS
Clausen, Jesper Tvevad, Genoveva Hernandez, Christian Manahl
and Van Reedt Dortland Ran; Anders Henriksson, Director for
the Horn, East and Southern Africa (DG DEV),Elizabeth Pizon,
Unit Head for Central Africa (DG DEV),Miriam Brewka, ACP
Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission (EC); and
Tim Hitchens, Head of the Africa Department (Equatorial),
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ruth Bradley-Jones,
Permanent Representation, for the incoming UK Presidency.
USDEL consisted of Ambassador Michael Ranneberger (Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF),Donald Heflin (Deputy
Director, AF/Regional and Security Affairs),Patricia Lerner
(Development Counselor, USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar
(Political Officer, USEU/PRM).

--------------
U.S.-EU Summit
--------------


4. (C) Echoing a call by the Belgian Foreign Minister during
President Bush,s February 22 visit to Brussels, De Muyser
said that our cooperative efforts in Africa, particularly as
they relate to development assistance and crisis management,
should be publicized at the June U.S.-EU Summit. A half hour
of brainstorming resulted in a few preliminary ideas to
recommend for consideration by summit organizers. One
suggestion that gained broad support was to highlight the
range of multilateral cooperation the U.S. and EU have
jointly undertaken during the year in Africa, along with a
few proposed areas for future transatlantic efforts.
Examples of what has been accomplished include:
strengthening the AU, consolidating the peace in Sudan and
Liberia, accelerating the return and reintegration of
refugees and IDPs, sponsoring the tripartite agreements in
the Great Lakes and responding to the HIV/AIDs pandemic.
Examples of what might be achieved in the coming year:
preventing the spread of terrorist activities, promoting good
governance in Zimbabwe and developing effective early warning
mechanisms in conflictive areas.

--------------
Great Lakes
--------------


5. (SBU) The Great Lakes region remains the EU's top priority
in Africa. Vervaeke reported that the EU,s High
Representative Javier Solana and Development Commissioner
Louis Michel will visit Kinshasa on April 29 to press forward
its agenda. It will be the first time these two senior EU
officials have undertaken a joint mission.


6. (C) Regarding DRC, Ajello expressed concern over the
status of the draft constitution. He said the current plan
does not contain a sufficient balance of powers to ensure
democratic governance. The planned "winner takes all" system
could be a catalyst for post-election violence since losers
will have no incentive to support the new government. One
group likely to be in this category is the RCD Goma, a
military force with a powerful ally next door. Ajello
recommended the U.S. and EU intervene jointly to assure that
sufficient guarantees are incorporated in the new
constitution to prevent the creation of another autocratic
regime on the continent. He noted that it was unclear at
this point whether the president would be elected by the
Parliament or by popular vote. Ajello said the international
community should not be so focused on holding quick elections
that it ignores flaws in the draft constitution.


7. (C) Ajello said that the cost of the elections was
estimated at $430 million, with $110 million of that for
logistics. He said that logistics could be covered by MONUC
if there is agreement in New York to expand the mandate.
Such an agreement would necessarily include payment for the
expansion from assessed contributions. Ranneberger
emphasized U.S. support for a credible election process and
said the U.S. would provide some limited funding. The
proposed UN resolution on election funding has serious
implications for the U.S., given that the U.S. obligation is
28 percent. Ajello stressed that without MONUC, the
elections cannot happen. Vervaeke said that the EU is not
willing to pinpoint a date for elections as too many of the
legislative and logistic details need to be resolved. Given
the current situation, Vervaeke said the EU fears the
elections could slip to the spring of 2006.


8. (C) Another area of concern is the slow pace of the DRC's
security sector reform (SSR),as well as the disarmament,
demobilization, return and reintegration (DDRR) of
ex-combatants. Ranneberger stressed the critical role EU and
Belgian support for SSR and DDRR plays in stabilizing the
region. He said the continuing presence of armed groups and
militias with varying ethnic composition, territory, and
objectives is the principal problem in Eastern Congo and
pointed out the need also to address the problem of disarming
militias in the North and South Kivus. Ajello said that DDRR
is not working well enough and that higher-ranking officers
are not interested in the "orientation centers" being set up.
Vervaeke characterized the SSR as "chaotic" despite the
efforts of the Belgians, South Africans and others, but said
that it was crucial for the transition. Troika participants
indicated that the EU is sending eight EU military advisers
to the DRC as an advisory mission to work closely with MONUC.
They would also like to link up with the U.S.-sponsored
fusion cell.


9. (SBU) Ajello indicated that EU High Representative Javier
Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel would be making an
unprecedented joint mission to the DRC to highlight EU
support of the Great Lakes process and to press on the need
to follow through with security sector reform.


10. (C) The EU is pleased with developments relating to MONUC
and feels that AU peacekeepers will not be necessary if an
integrated Congolese force can help MONUC ensure stability.
Ajello said that in his meeting earlier on April 20 with
President Museveni, the Ugandan leader praised the Pakistani
and Indian brigades for bringing order to the Ituri region.


11. (C) Vervaeke provided some details about the EU police
mission (EUPOL) in Kinshasa to support the political reform
process. He said that roughly 30 experts from a variety of
EU Member States are assisting with the establishment of an
integrated police unit whose mission will be to protect
governmental institutions. Having experts on the ground in
Kinshasa will also provide needed analysis.


12. (C) Ranneberger gave a readout of President Kagame's
recent visit to Washington and said that U.S.-EU cooperation
in the region had been highlighted. Kagame welcomed the
U.S.-facilitated tripartite talks, whose objective is to
develop confidence and coordinated action to reduce the
threat posed by armed groups in eastern Congo. Ranneberger
also noted the recently-announced FDLR-DRC talks brokered by
Sant' Egidio are a positive development. He said that the
U.S. is calling on the Rwandans, as well as the other
parties, to work with the DRC and MONUC to help make the
voluntary repatriation of FDLR forces and their families a
success. Ranneberger said that although the Rwandans were
willing to provide security guarantees, the FDLR would not be
welcomed as a political force.


13. (C) All three components of the EU gave a strong
endorsement for Ambassador Swing to continue in his current
role as special UN envoy. Ajello said that the EU has been
approached by the UNSYG for candidates to replace Swing, but
"changing horses in mid-stream, or more precisely, near the
end" would be counterproductive. Vervaeke said that having
an American in this position was important to keep the U.S.
engaged in the Great Lakes.


14. (C) Ajello gave a relatively positive assessment of the
political situation in Burundi, but cautioned against
allowing elections to be postponed. He said that those in
power had no incentive to hold elections as they probably
would not be returned to government. In the meantime, public
services in Burundi are collapsing, no unpopular decisions
are being taken, and the communities are stressing their
differences instead of their commonalities. Ajello said that
the FNL needed to be integrated into the process and
highlighted the successful intervention of Tanzania. Both
Ajello and Pizon expressed concern about the deteriorating
economic situation in Burundi. Pizon urged the U.S. to
participate in a technical meeting to be held on May 12 to
discuss Burundi's budget situation.

--------------
Liberia/Mano River Basin
--------------


15. (C) Ranneberger noted good cooperation between the U.S.
and the EU in West Africa and stated that we were looking
forward to DAS Woods' May 11 meetings in Brussels. He said
the USG has developed an action plan to press the Liberians
on corruption issues and will share it with the EU before May

11. Furthermore, the USG will also share a
State/AID/Treasury discussion paper on funding issues with
the EU in Washington on April 22. Ranneberger said the U.S.
looks forward to seeing the results of the EU audit and hopes
to develop a consensus on these issues between the USG, the
EU and the IFIs.


16. (C) Regarding rehabilitation and reintegration,
Ranneberger mentioned the USG's additional contribution of
$15 million to the Trust Fund and thanked the EU for matching
funds, while noting that there was still a $6 million funding
gap. Turning to elections, Ranneberger stated that they must
take place as scheduled October 11 and asked that the EC
consider contributing more than their currently-planned $1
million in election support.


17. (C) Ranneberger concluded by asking the EU what they
thought about Charles Taylor. How big a threat is he? What,
if anything, should be done about turning him over to the
Special Court? De Muyser said that he had been in Liberia
last month and thought several main clusters needed to be
addressed, including Charles Taylor. The Troika indicated
that the EU would likely support actions to intensify
pressure on Taylor, including perhaps through a UNSC
resolution giving UNMIL arrest authority should Taylor appear
in Liberia. Regarding elections, de Muyser agreed that there
must be no delays. He also expressed EU concern about
accelerating IDP returns and reintegration. On corruption
and audits, De Muyser said pressure on Bryant was needed.


18. (C) Turning to the Mano River Basin, De Muyser noted that
the EU was worried about a Togo-like situation developing in
other countries. Hitchens stated that West Africa is seen as
an area of problems, but noted that the Sierra Leone PKO is
winding up at the end of 2005 and urged that we consider
other bright spots in the sub-region. Ranneberger noted that
ECOWAS is a bright spot, that he was somewhat encouraged by
the efforts of the AU in Cote d,Ivoire, but that the Togo
elections may not go well. On Guinea, Ranneberger noted
there was some potential for peaceful change centered on a
group of young technocrats in the government and the prime
minister, but that a key question was where the military
stood. He suggested that support for ECOWAS might be cited
in the U.S.-EU Summit communique. Ranneberger reviewed USG
support to ECOWAS; De Muyser said that the EU was working
with ECOWAS on a list of areas where they could cooperate,
which they would share with the U.S.

19. (C) Vervaeke said that the EU was planning early warning
exercises with Guinea-Bissau and Guinea scenarios and
suggested that they might share methodologies and approaches
with the U.S. He also asked about the next SRSG for Liberia,
and Ranneberger replied that names were being vetted.

--------------
Somalia
--------------


20. (C) Henriksson and De Muyser welcomed U.S. re-engagement
in Somalia, but urged a more proactive approach. Henriksson
noted that the EC had remained in Somalia through the 1990,s
when other major donors had left and that it had "heavily
invested" in the country as the largest donor.


21. (C) Hitchens underscored EU belief that a peace-support
mission is necessary to consolidate the peace process in
Somalia and requested clarification of the U.S. view on IGAD.
Ranneberger said that the U.S. opposes the involvement of
frontline states and would only support a mission if the
conditions were right. He said that although there were no
specific criteria, we are looking at various benchmarks.
Most importantly, the transitional government needed to
demonstrate relative stability and reach out to various
groups within Somalia in order to pave the way for relocation
to Mogadishu. Other obstacles to the IGAD plan, Ranneberger
noted, included costs and fears of over-extending the AU and
regional organizations in peace operations. He asked whether
there was unanimity among IGAD members for the operation
(suggesting some IGAD countries privately did not support the
plan). Ranneberger said that Konare was lukewarm, at best,
to the IGAD plan. Henriksson acknowledged this plan was not
a popular idea in Addis. However, he said it was an EU
priority, that certain Member States were extremely
interested, and that it was the best hope for peace in
Somalia.


22. (C) Hitchens noted that the EU was clearly more positive
on IGAD involvement in Somalia than the U.S. Ranneberger
emphasized that the U.S. has consistently supported IGAD
efforts to promote Somali reconciliation and wants to see the
Transitional Government succeed. To summarize the
differences, Hitchens characterized the EU approach as "yes,
but..." and the U.S. approach as "no, unless...". He
cautioned against U.S. pronouncements that seemed to indicate
that absolutely no external forces could be involved, noting
that only Islamic extremists in Somalia held those views.
While acknowledging that the U.S. statement had put pressure
on the Ethiopians to step back, Hitchens suggested that it
had also interrupted the internal dialogue. Henriksson said
that a way had to be found to keep Ethiopia involved in the
process without sending Ethiopian troops into Somalia.
Manahl proposed decentralizing the AU involvement by setting
up a military planning unit in Nairobi for a support mission.
He noted that Somalis were only likely to hand weapons over
to external forces in a disarmament initiative.


23. (C) Hitchens said Ugandan cooperation with the AU might
be a possible formula for a support mission. (Note. Later
in the day, Javier Solana met with President Museveni.
According to a press release, Museveni "reconfirmed Uganda's
intention to provide troops for a peace-support operation in
Somalia under the auspices of IGAD. Mr. Solana underlined
the EU's readiness to consider support for an African
peace-support mission that has the consent of the
Transitional Government and Parliament of Somalia and is
welcomed by the Somali public." End Note.)


24. (C) Regarding the transitional government, Manahl agreed
with Ranneberger that imposing it on the Somali people would
not work. He also agreed that the split between the
President and Parliament needed to be addressed. Hitchens
said that if the transitional government stayed much longer
in Kenya the peace process would be jeopardized. Henriksson
suggested a "two phase rocket" with relocation into Somalia
first and then later on to Mogadishu.


25. (SBU) Ranneberger proposed that U.S. experts hold a video
teleconference with EU experts to review the situation on
Somalia with a view to exploring any differences of
perspective and ensuring closer coordination. The Troika
team agreed. (Note. The teleconference took place on May

2. End Note.)

--------------
Sudan
--------------


26. (C) Ranneberger noted excellent cooperation between the
U.S., EU and Member States and said that the U.S. wants to
use the opportunity provided by the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) to leverage positive movement in Darfur. He
said the CPA was always seen as applying to the whole
country, that it links Taha and Garang in partnership. Since
violence in Darfur can destroy the peace process, the CPA and
Darfur are interrelated. Ranneberger reviewed the results of
the Deputy Secretary's participation at the Oslo donors'
conference and visit to Sudan. He said the Deputy Secretary
stressed to VP Taha and SPLM Chairman Garang the
interrelationship. Furthermore, he urged both to move
forward with implementation of the CPA, particularly by
completing the constitutional revision process. The Deputy
Secretary laid out specific steps that the GOS should take on

SIPDIS
Darfur and urged Garang to be helpful with the Darfur rebels.


27. (C) Ranneberger said that he thought that the deadlines
could be met to have the Government of National Unity in
place by the end of the pre-interim period on July 9. There
has been some positive movement on Darfur -- violence has
significantly diminished, as a result of pressure by U.S. and
EU, and the presence of the AU. Both sides agreed on the
need to continue reaching out to get Garang energized and
work the AU piece. Ranneberger reported on his recent trip
to Darfur and said that he had visited six or seven AU bases.
He came away impressed by the commanders and the sense that
the AU is a strong presence, doing an effective job. He said
USG supports an expansion of the AU force and is planning to
dedicate $50 to 60 million to this purpose.


28. (C) Ranneberger added that the AU-sponsored political
talks are important and that NGOs will work with the rebels
to prepare them for negotiations. However, he stressed that
there are real problems on the humanitarian side. The WFP
will be cutting back rations within weeks. Work needs to be
done to bring the NDA, the Egyptians, and Eritrea in.


29. (U) Lerner gave an update on the Darfur food pipeline and
noted the WFP announced it would have to cut back to
half-rations in May due to a break in the pipeline. She
observed that the USG has given $234 million in food aid and
asked for more robust EU assistance. (Note. On April 21,
WFP advised it had received assurances for the EC to proceed
with pre-financing against expected CY-2005 contributions in
order to avoid having to go to half-rations. End Note.)


30. (C) De Muyser said that he thought the Pronk report was
pessimistic and that he appreciated the U.S. stance on UNSC

1593. Manahl said that he also thought the AU force was
good, should be expanded, and should receive additional EU
support. He said the shortcomings of AU organization, as
identified in the joint assessment mission report, need to be
addressed. According to Manahl, EU military experts believe
the efficiency of the mission will be decreased if
shortcomings are not addressed. He also emphasized the need
to address root causes of the conflict and that tribal
reconciliation should be addressed by a third party,
preferably the AU. Manahl was less optimistic than the USG
that the CPA can provide the framework to address Darfur in
practice.


31. (C) Henrikkson said that he thought the problems of the
South are as much from a lack of capacity as from a lack of
political will. "Is there a South-South dialogue?" he asked.
The oil fields are controlled by non-SPLM forces, there are
transparency and governance issues, and the EU is concerned
by what they see. Henrikkson said he would like to dialogue
with USAID. He also asked how the U.S. saw the consequences
of the ICC on peace prospects in Darfur and for views on the
CPA implementation. How do we see adjusting policy-sharing
aspects of the CPA to include Darfur, the East, etc.?


32. (C) Ranneberger replied that we agree with the
recommendations of the joint assessment mission. He said
that in his follow-up visit to Addis he had pushed Konare and
Djinnit on implementation, including the establishment of a
planning cell in Khartoum. Ranneberger noted that the
Secretary signaled strong support for the AU when she met

SIPDIS
with Konare on April 15. In response to EU questions, he
reviewed the status of South-South dialogue and steps the
U.S. is taking to encourage inclusiveness in the
implementation of the CPA.


33. (C) Ranneberger noted that the involvement of the ICC
does not preclude credible accountability mechanisms by the
GOS. The AU could be helpful in this regard. He said the
U.S. is also pushing Darfur rebels to stop the violence and
to participate in political talks, noting that they are also
subject to accountability.


34. (C) Ranneberger asked if the EU could announce soon a
pledge to support AU expansion. Henrikkson replied that the
EU has not yet receiveed a request from the AU for additional
assistance. The EU would have to make sure that it is an
operation they feel confident in. He asked that the U.S.
push the AU on implementation of the joint assessment
recommendations. Henrikkson thought the AU will issue a
formal request just after its Peace and Security Council
meets at the end of April. EU planners are ready to go to
Addis, but it depends on cooperation from the AU. He sees
them facing two challenges: stabilizing the security
situation and creating conditions for safe and sustainable
return of IDPs and refugees.

--------------
African Union
--------------


35. (C) Ranneberger noted that the AU is a very important
institution, which the two sides had covered throughout the
day. He added that while much of the focus is on the AU's
conflict mitigation role, we should not lose sight of NEPAD,
peer review, and all other AU programs. Ranneberger said
that he was impressed by the EU's assistance figures for the
AU. The U.S. is looking at establishing a modest fund for
capacity and institution building, in addition to increases
in ACOTA and GPOI funding for peacekeeping training efforts.
The PDAS also reported on Chairman Konare's recent successful
visit to Washington.


36. (C) De Muyser agreed that the June U.S.-EU summit
declaration must mention the AU. The EU had extensive talks
with the AU at last week's ministerial. They seek a
strategic partnership with Africa, with the AU being their
main, but not only, interlocutor. The EU will provide a
non-paper to the USG. A Commission official noted the EU,s
support for the African Peace Facility, saying that the EU
has "put their bet" on the AU.

--------------
Counter-Terrorism
--------------


37. (C) Ranneberger reviewed U.S. efforts on
counter-terrorism, noting that Africa presents an opportunity
to deal decisively with an incipient terrorist threat in some
areas while preventing the region from becoming an operating
platform for terrorists. He said there is a North African
element that affects the Sahel, including GSPC, as well as an
East African aspect that affects Somalia and Eastern Kenya.
Ranneberger said the U.S. is keeping an eye on Nigeria, as is
al-Qaeda. Cooperation across the continent is quite good,
a success story, including Sudan. The PDAS outlined the
holistic nature of EACTI and TSCTI, and he and Heflin
provided some funding numbers.


38. (C) Ranneberger also noted that there is a worldwide
Muslim outreach effort, with substantial funding. De Muyser
said that CT is one of the EU,s 2005 priorities, and asked
how we can achieve US-EU cooperation in Africa CT. Van Reedt
Dortland said that the EU has only started to cooperate with
Africa in terms of counterterrorism with Kenya being their
venue for their first initiatives. He saw value in
cooperating with the USG. Heflin promised to provide him
with unclassified papers on USG CT efforts in Africa.

--------------
Closing and Comment
--------------


39. (C) De Muyser noted that the previous transatlantic
consultations on Africa focused on country-specific issues,
whereas the April 20 meeting concentrated on broader-based
discussion, which he saw as positive. Ranneberger said the
discussions had been very constructive, and he emphasized
that both sides should follow-up on the action items
identified in the talks.


40. (C) The emergence of Somalia as an issue of concern for
the EU is one we will have to follow closely. Furthermore,
the EU's nuances on expanding the AU mission in Darfur need
to be closely monitored in order to keep the transatlantic
cooperation in the region on track. The EU also seems to
have taken a cue from our style of passing the tin cup by
encouraging the U.S. to provide more generous funding for
elections in the DRC.

(PDAS Ranneberger has cleared this cable.)

Khartoum minimize considered.

MCKINLEY
.