Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRATISLAVA922
2005-11-18 15:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS CUBAN DISSIDENTS, NOTES SPANISH

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL LO CU 
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181530Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000922 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2020
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL LO CU
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS CUBAN DISSIDENTS, NOTES SPANISH
"IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY" WITH THE CASTRO REGIME


Classified By: CDA a.i. Lawrence R. Silverman for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000922

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2020
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL LO CU
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA SUPPORTS CUBAN DISSIDENTS, NOTES SPANISH
"IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY" WITH THE CASTRO REGIME


Classified By: CDA a.i. Lawrence R. Silverman for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 8 Embassy sponsored
discussion, GOS officials told us that Slovakia is working
hard to promote democracy and "do the right thing" in Cuba.
They outlined efforts being made by Slovak NGOs, members of
parliament, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the
island, and discussed their concerns that the Cuban dissident
movement was "fractured," with activists on the island being
at odds with the activist community in Miami. The Foreign
Policy Advisor to the Slovak Chairman of Parliament told us
that the Chairman -- who visited Cuban dissidents in Miami
during an official visit to the United States in April -- was
concerned with what he sees as Spain's "ideological affinity"
towards Cuba's regime. Our interlocutors, however, demurred
when asked about their opinions of the EU's suspended 2003
sanctions, which will be up for reevaluation in 2006. END
SUMMARY.

SLOVAKIA'S THREE-PRONGED ATTACK ON CASTRO
--------------


2. (C) On November 8, Poloff hosted an informal roundtable
with officials from the MFA's Fifth Territorial (Americas)
Division, the regional office of the International Republican
Institute (IRI),the Office of the Chairman of Parliament,
and the MFA's Human Rights Division. The GOS representatives
highlighted Slovakia's active role in promoting democracy on
the island, noting that there is a "three-pronged attack" on
Castro. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the
activities of its Embassy in Havana in meeting with
dissidents, but noted that the situation in Cuba "is tough,"
and that visiting MFA officials are frequently denied
permission to meet with Cuban officials and are sometimes
denied visas at the last moment. They support the activities
of Bratislava-based NGOs, however, such as IRI and the Pontis
Foundation, both of which are active in bringing dissidents
and activists to Slovakia for meetings and training.
Finally, Chairman of Parliament Pavol Hrusovsky has taken a
personal interest in the issue; the Chairman met with the
dissident community in Miami during his April official visit
to the United States, and has "adopted a dissident"
imprisoned in Cuba, making frequent inquiries as to his
welfare. Tomas Zalesak, the Foreign Policy Advisor to
Hrusovsky, told us that the dissident communities in Havana
and Miami were "fractured" and that divisions among the
different groups was hindering coordination and cooperation.


3. (C) Dusan Kristofik, the Director of the MFA's Americas
Division, told us that Slovakia is "trying to do the right
thing" in Cuba, and that if Europe was graphed onto a
spectrum on the Cuba issue with "Madrid being number 1 and
the Czech Republic being number 25, Slovakia would be 23 or
24." The GOS representatives were open and engaged in a
discussion of the Cuba embargo at our roundtable, noting that
they feel Spain is interested in the financial gains its
hotel chains get from the strong trade relationship. Zalesak
told us that he is concerned with the "ideological affinity"
the Spanish seem to have for Castro's regime.

COMMENT: WAITING FOR JUNE
--------------


4. (C) When asked about the status of the EU's suspended
2003 sanctions (currently scheduled to be re-evaluated in
June 2006),our interlocutors were noncommittal. They seemed
to be taking a "wait and see" approach to the attempt to
affect change in Cuba through economic engagement, despite
what they see as Spanish and Italian opportunism in the
island's economy. More specifically, however, their game of
"wait and see" may have less to do with a strategy of
engagement, and more to do with waiting for "biological
change" to come to Cuba's 79 year old leader.


5. (C) COMMENT, cont'd: Separately, Foreign Policy Advisor
to the Prime Minister Anna Turenicova told us this summer
that she believes the goal of EU "engagement" was not so much
an effort to reach out to Castro as an attempt to keep
communication open with working-level Cuban contacts, who
will likely still be in their positions the morning after
Castro's funeral. Given the problems getting visas and
traveling to Cuba, however, she wondered when EU countries
will realize that this strategy is "just not happening" and
give up.
SILVERMAN


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