EXBS: UPDATED EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM STANDARDS

UNCLAS BRATISLAVA 000215

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON, ACHURCH, JOHN COFFEY
CBP/INA FOR PWARKER, BPICKETT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP ETTC PREL LO
SUBJECT: EXBS: UPDATED EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM STANDARDS
FOR SLOVAKIA

REF: STATE 27927


1. SUMMARY: This cable updates information for
Slovakia's Export Control System Standards, effective
February 28, 2005.


2. Begin "Export Control System Standards - Slovakia -
February 2005".


I. Adequate commitment, legal and regulatory framework,
and governmental structure to regulate transfers of
weapons and weapons-related technology, and to
sufficiently deter violations and punish violators
I.A. Political Commitment

1. Is there a national commitment to export control
development?
Yes.

2. Do policies currently exist to cooperate
internationally on harmonization of export control
policies?
Yes, in adherence to EU policies, laws and
regulations.

3. Is the subject country willing to work within the
international community to address common threats?
Yes.

4. Are there agencies currently involved in developing
control policies?
Yes.
a. What are they?
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Customs
Directorate and the Nuclear Supervision officials.

5. Are there key host-government contacts in the
national commitment area?
Yes.
a. Who are they?

-- Mr. Franticek Babuska, Director, Sensitive
Goods and Trade Management Department - Export
Control Office, Ministry of Economy (02/05)

-- Mr. Miroslav Majernik, Director - Department of
License and Customs Policy, Ministry of Economy
(02/05)

-- Mr. Mikulas Turner, Head International
Department - Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the
Slovak Republic (02/05)

-- Mr. Vojtech Decky, Director - Division for
Drugs and Other Dangerous Materials, Customs
Directorate (02/05)

-- Mr. Vladamir Stasko, Director - Director
General's Office, Customs Directorate (02/05)

-- Mr. Jaroslav Spisiak, 1st Vice President,
Police Presidium, Ministry of Interior (02/05)

-- Mr. Karol Mistrik, Director - Dept of
Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (02/05)

-- Mr. Henrik Markus, Dept of Disarmament and
Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(02/05)

-- Mr. Jaroslav Horvath, Director - Department of
European Integration and Foreign Relations,
Ministry of Interior (02/05)
I.B. Legal Basis and Framework


1. Is there a specific legal basis on which to build or
enhance an export control system? Does it consist of
laws passed by the legislature? Or constitutional
provisions? Or is it based (exclusively or primarily)
on executive authority (i.e., authority of the
president or equivalent official)?
Yes. Both Slovak national laws and regulations
,many of which have been updated recently, and EU
laws and regulations.


2. Does the legal basis authorize control of the
export, re-export and transit of all items on the
multilateral regime lists (see C below)?
Legal basis authorizes controls for import and
export as well as re-export. Control for in-
transit is in Customs code. Customs is now
obliged to check transit of military material and
can stop/return/seize shipments not in accordance
with international commitments.


3. Does the legal basis authorize control of the
export, re-export and transit of items for unilateral
foreign policy reasons, such as human rights and
regional stability?
Yes.

4. Does the legal basis authorize imposition of catch-
all controls (i.e., controls based on the proposed end-
use or end-user rather than just the nature of the
item)?
Yes.

5. Does the legal basis authorize imposition of
controls on activities, such as brokering, finance, and
other services?
Yes. Brokering is inferred under the terminology
"mediator" and outlines the duties of brokers in
import and export.

6. Is there authority to control transfers of technical
data and technical assistance, including intangible
transfers?
Yes.

7. Are there legal authorities to impose criminal
penalties on individuals and legal persons for
violations of export control requirements?
Yes.
a. What are the criminal penalties?
Imprisonment for up to 8 years.

8. Are there legal authorities to impose civil or
administrative penalties for violations?
Yes.
a. What are the civil or administrative penalties?
Monetary fines up to 10 million SKK (or 3 times
the value of the goods if the value is over 10
million SKK) and/or forfeiture of all controlled
items.

9. Are there sufficient executive orders, interagency
agreements, and the like to implement the export
control system?
Yes.
a. What do such orders cover?
EC Regulation 1334/2000 covers the export,
import, re-export, and mediation of all dual-use
goods and technology. Slovak Act 179/1998 covers
the export, import, re-export, and brokering of
military goods and WMD. The Act was amended in
2002 to raise the minimum property a company must
own to be authorized to export (i.e., so fewer
companies can export munitions items),to increase
Customs authority to confiscate in-transit items
that are not in compliance with international
commitments, and to increase GOS controls on
brokers/intermediaries. There are also Customs
and penal codes. The Customs code was amended to
require licenses for refurbishment.

10. Have decrees, regulations or other normative acts
been promulgated to implement the legal authority?
Yes.

11. Do they fully implement the authorities provided
for?
Yes.
a. If not, which of the authorities in the items
above is not being implemented?
N/A

12. Are there legal safeguards against the improper use
or disclosure of information obtained in the export
control process?
Yes.

13. Are there legal features that routinely interfere
with the implementation of effective export controls
(e.g., rigid privacy or property rights, lack of search
and seizure authority)? Describe them.
Yes. Slovak law requires that all intelligence
data be stored on a government certified system. Only
one system has been certified and agencies can't send
and/or share information.

I.C. Membership or adherence (in terms of policy) to
Nonproliferation regimes and international
nonproliferation norms


1. Wassenaar Arrangement?
Yes.

2. Nuclear Suppliers' Group?
Yes.

3. Missile Technology Control Regime?
No.

4. Australia Group?
Yes.

5. Are there laws/regs/guidelines concerning adherence
to international nonproliferation norms, such as NPT,
CWC, BWC, and UN embargoes?

Yes. Also ratified Chemical Weapons Convention,
and are active in Biological Weapons Convention.

II. Process for controlling items and evaluating
transfer requests

II.A. Control Lists


1. Are there legal authorities to establish and modify
control lists?
Yes.

2. Are the control lists made available to the public?
Yes.

3. Are there agencies/personnel in place who are
responsible for maintaining and regularly updating
control lists?
Yes.

4. Do the control lists conform with multilateral
nonproliferation regime/arrangement control lists?
Yes.
a. Wassenaar Arrangement?
Yes.
b. Nuclear Suppliers' Group?
Yes.
c. MTCR?
Yes. Control lists conform even though Slovakia is
not a signatory to this regime.
d. Australia Group?
Yes.

5. Are the regulations for catch-all controls public?
Yes.
a. Are catch-all controls used effectively?
Catch-all controls are relatively new.
b. Is there sufficint industry outreach to
explain catch-all provisions for all types of
export control regulations?
Industry outreach could probably be enhanced, but
routine meetings ae held by Ministry of Economy
concerning the law and changes.

II.B. Authorization Requirements


1. Is registration of munitions exporters,
manufacturers and brokers required?
Yes.

2. Is there a requirement for registrants to disclose
foreign ownership/control?
Yes.

3. Are the regulations/licensing requirements public?
Yes.

4. Do the license applications require information
sufficient for an informed review and decision?
Yes.
a. Quantity and description of items?
Yes.
b. Intended end-use?
Yes.
c. Valid needs of the end-user?
Yes.
d. Identification of all parties to the
transaction, their address and destination to
include intermediate consignees?
Yes.

5. Are licenses/authorizations required for exports?
Which exports (e.g., "munitions and dual-use items on
the multilateral control lists")?
Yes - both.

6. Are licenses/authorizations required for imports?
Which imports?
Yes - all.

7. Are licenses/authorizations required for
transshipment (involves off-loading of cargo)?
Not under existing law, transshipments are under
control of Customs only.

8. Are licenses/authorizations required for transit (no
off-loading of cargo)?
There is different approach depending on if goods
are considered military material or dual-use:

1/ Military material
According to paragraph 22 of act No. 179/1998 -
Act on military material trading:
Transit up to 7 days - no license required.
Transit above 7 days - an entrepreneur has to
request MoE to issue permission for transit.
According to paragraph 47 of act No. 190/2003 -
Act on weapons and munitions
MoI issues permission for transit of weapons and
munitions.

2/ Dual-use goods
According to Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000
setting up a Community Regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, transit
license is not required. According to section 21
of the Regulation, the license is required only
for transit of some dual-use items, which are
transited with the EU. These dual-use items are
listed in the amendment No. IV. of the Regulation.
a. What authorization is required for transit? For
transshipment?
Customs must approve.

9. Are licenses required for re-export (controlled item
leaves country)?
Yes.

10. Are licenses required for re-transfer (change of
end-use or end-user within country)?
Yes.

11. Is there authority to require end-user certificates
as conditions of license approval?
Yes.

12. Are the requirements for end-user certificates
imposed regularly and effectively?
Yes.

13. Is there legal authority for passing information
regarding bad actors, known violators, etc. to other
cooperative governments?
Yes, but computer security issue severely limits
exchange.

II.C. Screening


1. Are license applications screened to identify
suspected bad actors?
Yes.

2. Is there a database drawing on inter-ministerial
sources of persons/entities who are debarred or
suspected of illicit activity (i.e. watch list)?
Yes, there is a watch list. In addition, we have
provided Slovakia and other Central European
countries with the Tracker System and Risk
Report/Wisconsin Project database.

3. Are there end-use/end-user verification procedures
in place?
Yes.

4. Are end-use/end-user verification checks conducted
routinely and frequently?
Yes - as needed.

5. Are there pre-license checks?
Yes.

6. Are there post-shipment verifications?
Yes.

7. Is there international cooperation in identifying
and preventing transfers of proliferation concern?
Yes.

II.D. Decision-making


1. Does the country have responsible transfer policies?
Yes.

2. Are there decision-making criteria for approving
transfers?
Yes.

3. Are these criteria reflected in written guidelines,
standards and procedures?
Yes.

4. Are there policies with respect to specific
countries, country groups, and areas of conflict?
Yes. EU and UN policies are utilized.

5. Are these guidelines comparable to policy/practice
under U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer policy and dual-
use export policy?
Yes.

6. Are there adequate referral mechanisms, including
case-tracking and the forwarding of cases to other
agencies for review before disposition?
Yes. The GOS uses the Tracker system. In
addition, there is a working group that includes
intelligence representative. This working group,
with all relevant agencies, makes recommendation
to the committee, which meets once a month.

7. Are policy and national security concerns given
sufficient weight in decision making (e.g., compared to
economic factors)?
Yes. Foreign Affairs has what amounts to veto
power in the committee.

8. Are the licensing process and verification
procedures being enforced?
Yes.

9. Do agencies involved in license processing have the
ability to deny license applications and to escalate
decisions to national-level authorities?
License approval is based on the consensus of all
agencies involved in the application
review/approval process. Dissenters can escalate
decisions to the national-level authorities. MOE
and MFA have ability to deny license applications.

10. Are there clear authorities to deny a license,
specifically for foreign policy and national security
reasons?
Yes.

11. Are there regulations providing for suspension and
revocation of export licenses/authorizations?
Yes.

12. Do licensing officials have access to the
(intelligence) information necessary to make informed
decisions during license processing?
Yes. Intelligence representative is a member of
the working group that reviews every application.

II.E. Training


1. Are licensing officials adequately trained,
including technical expertise, to review
license/authorization requests?
Basically, yes. However, further training would
reinforce best practices.

III. An enforcement mechanism that provides authority
for trained enforcement officers to investigate and
prevent illegal export

III.A. Effective enforcement


1. Are there law enforcement officials with clear lines
of authority responsible for conducting investigations,
making arrests, and prosecuting cases under the export
control laws and regulations?
Yes. Only police investigative reports can be used
in prosecution. Customs has authority to
investigate but their investigative reports can
not be used in prosecution.

2. Are there legal authorities to enforce trade in
controlled items at all borders (land, sea, air) for
outbound, inbound, and in-transit cargo?
Yes. Customs and the Border Police have authority.

3. Do export control enforcement officials possess
authority to search, detain and seize products? With a
warrant? Without a warrant?
Yes. Without a warrant.

4. Are there limitations imposed on export enforcement
officials that hinder the effectiveness of their work?
What are they?
Computer Security certification requirement
severely limits sending and sharing intelligence
data.

5. Are inspectors adequately trained to identify
controlled items?
Yes.

6. Are inspectors adequately trained in customs
inspection techniques and procedures?
Yes.

7. Does the consignee have to be present during a
search of goods?
No.

8. Are customs and law enforcement officials held
liable for damage occurring during a search?
No.

9. Does a frontline inspector have the authority to
conduct a search on his own, or does he/she need
approval from a supervisor. If yes, at what level?
Authority exists with frontline inspector.

10. Is corruption a problem within customs/law
enforcement organizations?
Over the past few years Slovakia has taken
significant action to reduce corruption. Although
there are still isolated cases, it is not nearly
as widespread as it once was.

11. Are there sufficient personnel devoted to export
enforcement, including at the borders? Are they
properly trained?
Numbers are sufficient but there is need for
additional training.

12. Is there sufficient, functioning equipment and
other resources devoted to interdicting unauthorized
transfers of controlled items?
No. EXBS Advisors preparing equipment requests.

13. Are there regulations published on customs/border
control procedures and requirements?
Yes.


14. Are there standard operating procedures at all
border locations?
Yes.

15. Are there actual checks being made at national
borders, transit points and ports?
Yes. All exports of strategic and dual-use goods
and technology are inspected by Customs at the
border station prior to export.

16. Are there effective transshipment controls at
national borders, transit points and ports?
Yes.

17. What investigative activities are being carried
out?
a. Undercover operations?
Yes.
b. Stings?
Yes.
c. Paid informants?
Unknown.
d. Electronic surveillance?
Yes.

18. Are the penalties being enforced with actual
prosecution?
None in the recent past.

19. Have they conducted any criminal investigations?
What were their outcomes?
Yes. Outcomes are unknown.

20. Are there sufficient civil and administrative
penalties for export control violations?
Yes.

21. Are criminal penalties used for export control
violations?
Yes.

22. Are there customs assistance agreements with U.S.
and other multilateral regime partners?
Yes.

23. Are there extradition treaties with these partners?
Unknown.

24. Does customs have sufficient equipment to detect
WMD and related items? Sufficient training?
No. Portal monitors along Ukraine border are
"gamma" only. More Radiation Detection Pagers and
other equipment, such as RIIDs and x-ray
equipment, is necessary.

25. Are there procedures in place to ensure proper
handling of detected WMD materials?
Yes.
a. What are they (e.g. seizure, proper storage)?
Identification, Analysis, Seizure, Evidence
Storage. The Ministry of Health has a significant
role. Current policy would return highly
radioactive materials across the border.

IV. Procedures for the coordination and exchange of
information

IV.A. Interagency coordination and exchange of
information concerning export (transfer) control
procedures,
involved parties, and export (transfer) control
violations


1. Provisions for gathering information on controlled
trade
a. Is the information being gathered effectively?
Yes.
b. Is the information being analyzed with the
intent to affect policy?
Yes. However, they are hindered because of the
existing privacy laws.
c. Are there adequate personnel and other
resources devoted to gathering information on
controlled trade?
Yes.

2. Are there mechanisms for timely and discreet
information exchange among concerned agencies and
governments?
No. Computer database privacy laws seriously
restrict the ability to accomplish this.

3. Do the interdiction officials exchange information
with the investigatory and prosecutory authorities and
vice versa?
Yes. Customs investigators turn information over
to Police who prepare case for the prosecutor.

4. Is there an adequate role for intelligence agencies?
Yes.

5. Is the intelligence community providing the
necessary information?
Only during licensing review process at working
group level.


6. Do border control officials have good working
relations with their neighboring counterparts, at
border crossings?
Relations are strained at the Ukraine border.
Although they meet regularly, there is still a
lack of trust.

IV.B. Industry, public, and Government Cooperation
(both licensing and law enforcement)


1. Provisions for sharing information with industry and
the public on export control policy.
a. Is the information being shared?
Yes.
b. Do the authorities inform industries of export
licensing/authorization requirements?
Yes.

2. Does an industry out-reach program exist?
Yes. Through periodic meetings organized through
auspices of Chamber of Commerce.
a. Are there meetings, conferences, and symposiums
being held?
Yes.
b. What means of dissemination exist for the
distribution of educational materials to industry?
Outreach programs.

3. Does industry have an opportunity to appeal
license/authorization decisions?
Basically, yes, the right of a license review by
the court is allowed.

4. Do authorities induce companies to adopt internal
compliance programs?
No.

5. Is the government committed to protection of
proprietary information of businesses that comply with
the law?
Yes.

6. Are there authorities and procedures for industry to
make voluntary disclosures?
No.

IV.C. Bilateral Cooperation


1. Does subject country exchange policy, license
decision, law enforcement and intelligence information
with the U.S. on a bilateral basis as needed and
periodically?
Yes.

2. Is subject country willing to establish arrangements
to do so?
Yes.

3. Will the law enforcement authorities work cases with
foreign law enforcement authorities?
Yes.


V. Program Administration and system Automation

V.A. Infrastructure


1. Are there sufficient infrastructure, administrative
capabilities, facilities, equipment (automation,
communications, and data-processing systems)?
Yes.
a. Is the equipment, including software, up-to-
date?
Yes. Over the passed few years Customs has
implemented an automated commercial data system
(ASYCUDA),an automated transit system (NCTS) and
TARIC. MOE uses the Tracker System to assist with
export licensing decisions.

2. Are there agencies/personnel responsible for this
component of the export control system?
Yes.

3. Are they adequately trained; including trained to
use automation equipment?
Yes.

4. Are there enough licensing officers to process
license applications in a timely fashion?
Yes.

V.B. Administrative Structure


1. Are there procedures to govern the filing,
receiving, forwarding and tracking of cases and support
information?
Yes.

2. Do mechanisms exist for interagency and
international exchange of classified information?
Yes. However, varied computer systems severely
limits exchange of information between agencies.


3. Is training available for information handlers?
Yes.

4. Is there a projected timetable and, cost for
development and implementation of the administrative
structure, if not in place already?
Already in place.

Clearance:
NP/ECC:
DOC/BIS/NEC:
DHS/CBP:
EXBS Regional Program Advisor: Larry Adkins
DOE/SLD:

End Export Control System Standards

Questions regarding this report can be directed to
Larry Adkins, EXBS Senior Advisor, at AmEmbassy
Bratislava at telephone no.: 421-2-5922-3375, fax: 421-
2-5922-3497 or through email at adkinslh@state.gov.

THAYER


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