Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRATISLAVA107
2005-02-07 18:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SLOVAKIA

Tags:  PREL LO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071849Z Feb 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000107 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR FRIED, WILSON, AND HAINES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015
TAGS: PREL LO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SLOVAKIA


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott N.Thayer for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000107

SIPDIS


NSC FOR FRIED, WILSON, AND HAINES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015
TAGS: PREL LO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SLOVAKIA


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott N.Thayer for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary/Introduction: The Slovaks -- government and
public alike -- are euphoric to welcome President Bush
February 23-24 as the first sitting U.S. President ever to
visit Slovakia. The GOS sees the visit as validation of its
ambitious reform program and pro-U.S. policies. The Slovak
people, whose national character tends to view Slovakia and
Slovaks as underdogs, are flattered (and slightly
incredulous) that their capital was chosen as the site for an
important meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin.


2. (C) Slovak self-deprecation aside, there is a good story
to tell here, one which resonates well with the themes of
promoting liberty and transformational diplomacy. Since
1998, Slovakia has gone from being what Madeleine Albright
termed "the black hole of Europe" to the "Tatra Tiger." NATO
and EU membership were the focal points of the Slovak
government and people and the locomotive of reform, and they
engaged in a remarkable sprint (with U.S. and other donor
support) that reached both those goals in the spring of 2004.
That reform experience is now being exported, to Ukraine, to
Belarus, to the Balkans, and to Iraq, again in tandem with
the U.S. and other donors. However, having reached those
goals, the Slovak political leadership has not come to
closure over what it wants to accomplish as a NATO and EU
member; as a result Slovakia is hesitant to speak up in most
NATO and EU meetings.


3. (C) Slovak-American ties date back to the end of the 19th
century, when thousands emigrated to the coal mines and steel
mills of the industrial Northeast. As a result, many Slovaks
have American relatives, albeit distant, and the U.S. is
still viewed as the beacon of hope that never dimmed during
the Communist era. Slovak views are reflexively
transatlantic and receptive to our policy message. The
President should encourage the Slovaks to become
more-outspoken in both NATO and EU fora, in support of their
own and U.S. interests. It would also be a good time to
discuss future requirements for operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and other NATO priorities, and urge Slovakia to step up
its commitments. On the bilateral front, U.S. investment

continues to pour into the country, and our influence is felt
more and more in economic and business spheres. The
President's visit thus affirms the past, and points to the
future. End summary/introduction.

Internal Politics
--------------


3. (C) Prime Minister Dzurinda heads a coalition government
that is far more stable than its precarious parliamentary
status would suggest. (Technically, it has lost its majority
and relies upon independent deputies to implement its
program. Realistically, no one doubts Dzurinda will be able
to complete his four year mandate in 2006 and continue his
reform agenda.) Nevertheless, other parties are acutely
aware that the GOS -- and its policies -- are dominated by a
party (Dzurinda's SDKU) which has only 23 seats in the 150
member Parliament. In public and private meetings, it will
be important to recognize the contributions that all
governing parties and members of parliament have made in
implementing Slovakia's reform program.

Foreign Policy
--------------


4. (C) Dzurinda is instinctively pro-American, and he has
sealed his legacy as the Prime Minister who reintegrated
Slovakia into European and transatlantic structures. NATO
accession in March 2004 and EU accession in May 2004 were the
result of the aggressive foreign policy and internal reform
program during Dzurinda's first (1999-2002) and second
(2002-2006) terms. In March 2004, Dzurinda hosted the
"Bratislava II" conference to encourage other European and
Eurasian countries on their paths to modernization.


5. (C) The GOS has been pursuing an extensive defense reform
program with the aim of creating a smaller, more deployable
military that meets NATO standards. The Dzurinda government
has been steadfast in its military commitments in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Balkans, and maintains peacekeepers in
UN PKO's around the world. Slovakia's deployments to OIF,
OEF, and KFOR underscore its commitment to the war on terror.
Slovakia is contributing roughly 650 troops to military
operations around the world--a number that is high in
relation to the population of the country--and is now
shifting away from (often reimbursable) UN peacekeeping

operations towards NATO-, EU-, and U.S.-led operations. This
is an expensive decision, and both the GOS and Parliament are
wary of negative public reaction that any discussion of an
increase in force commitments could generate. Hence,
although we have been trying to persuade the Slovaks to do
more (such as a PRT in Afghanistan or a sizable contribution
to NTM-1),we have not been successful at the political
level. Coming the day after the February 22 NAC and MNF
force generation conference in Bucharest, the President's
visit is an opportunity to underscore the need for Slovakia
to provide more forces.


6. (C) Slovakia often agrees with U.S. foreign policy
objectives, but is rarely an outspoken actor in international
institutions. With an upcoming term on the UN Security
Council (2006-2007),and full-fledged membership in both NATO
and the EU, our challenge is encouraging the Slovaks to play
a more active role in formulating policies in these
organizations. The GOS sees its niche in policy toward the
Balkans and its Eastern neighbors (Ukraine, Belarus, and
Moldova). It has been and can be very helpful both through
formal government channels and through NGO activities helping
to build civil society.

Economy and Investment
--------------


7. (C) Slovakia has been called an investors' paradise and it
is now poised to become a regional economic power, especially
in the automotive industry. Reforms have made Slovakia an
economic success story and captured the attention of
policymakers and businesspeople around the world. Cumulative
foreign direct investment has quintupled in the past five
years and American companies are the third largest investors.
U.S. Steel's Kosice operation is the largest economic force
in Slovakia and the well-regarded company won the Department
of State's 2003 Award for Corporate Excellence. The U.S. has
a disproportionately large and positive presence in
economically depressed eastern Slovakia. As the standard of
living increases (Bratislava is above the EU average, though
the rest of the country lags well behind),there will be a
bigger market for U.S. trade as well. Our very strong
economic ties will help balance EU influence and provide a
sturdy framework for our overall relationship for many years
to come.


8. (C) Corruption continues to be a problem throughout
Slovakia, and the broad immunity from conflict of interest
and financial disclosure laws which MPs and judges enjoy
continues to be criticized by watchdog groups. Nevertheless,
economic growth and increased western investment have brought
with them higher business standards. Parliament passed a law
creating a special prosecutor's office and court system for
corruption cases, and there have been several
highly-publicized arrests of past and current government
officials on corruption charges. Both anecdotally and in
measures such as the Transparency International index, the
overall level of corruption appears to have diminished over
the last several years.

Public Opinion
--------------


9. (C) Slovak citizens generally view the U.S. favorably;
they remember American support for freedom in Central Europe,
and many Slovaks have family ties to the U.S. Nonetheless,
public opinion does not keep pace with the government on
issues like Iraq, where only 21 percent of the population
favored the deployment of Slovak troops. However, public
opposition has not been strongly voiced, and there were no
large-scale anti-Iraq war demonstrations. Support for NATO
membership has recovered to 58% after a low two years ago of
35%. Three-fourths of Slovak citizens are critical of the
President's treatment of international politics. Compared to
other Europeans, fewer Slovaks think their country should
take an active part in world affairs.

Visas
--------------


10. (C) The visa issue is one of the greatest irritants in
terms of public opnion. Slovak citizens strongly believe
they should be given visa-free travel to the United States
because Slovakia has proven to be such a staunch ally and is
now a member of both NATO and the EU. In October 2004 the
embassy and the GOS set up a bilateral working group on
consular issues; it will next meet on February 11. We have
already adopted many best practices recommendations from CA
in order to streamline the visa application process. While

GOS officials recognize they must temper expectations and
acknowledge that Slovak behavior (overstays and fraud)
contribute to the situation, they continue to press for
Slovakia's eventual admission to the Visa Waiver Program.

Roma and Other Minorities
--------------


11. (C) Slovakia's transition to a diverse, multicultural
society is not complete. The GOS has made efforts to improve
the lives of its Roma population living in poverty, but
progress has been slow and a comprehensive solution will
likely require the EU to take a major role. Anti-Semitism
and xenophobia still persist in certain elements of Slovak
society, although repudiated by mainstream politicians. The
President's inaugural address emphasized that a nation cannot
export freedom if it tolerates racism at home, and it is a
point that is as relevant in Slovakia as in the U.S.

Extradition
--------------


12. (C) In late December 2004 we presented to the GOS the
draft text of a new bilateral extradition treaty. Slovakia
amended its laws to permit extradition of its nationals to EU
member states pursuant to the European Arrest Warrant, and we
are asking the GOS to expand that commitment and agree to
extradite nationals to the U.S. Several other EU member
states have agreed to this. Crime is international;
prosecution should not be hindered by outmoded obstacles such
as nationality. To date the GOS has not responded whether
they would agree to extradite nationals to the U.S. A direct
appeal from the President on this point could have tremendous
influence on the decision.

Export Controls/Arms Sales
--------------


13. (C) Slovakia's past (during previous regimes) as a
supplier of arms and other goods to less-desirable regimes
means old habits have not completely gone away. GOS export
controls are now much stronger, and we are regularly
consulted in advance of questionable sales. Still, interest
persists in trade with Libya, Belarus, Iran, and other
countries of concern. It would be useful to thank the GOS
for consulting with us and to reiterate our concerns about
putting commerce ahead of security or human rights.
THAYER


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