Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA94
2005-01-10 16:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

MERCOSUL: CRITICISM GROWS BUT GOB POLICY SHIFT

Tags:  ECIN ETRD PREL ECON BR 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000094 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/EOLSON
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN ETRD PREL ECON BR
SUBJECT: MERCOSUL: CRITICISM GROWS BUT GOB POLICY SHIFT
UNLIKELY

REF: A) 04 BRASILIA 2885, B) 04 SAO PAULO 1659, C) BRASILIA
91, D) 04 NEW DELHI 6407

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000094

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/EOLSON
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN ETRD PREL ECON BR
SUBJECT: MERCOSUL: CRITICISM GROWS BUT GOB POLICY SHIFT
UNLIKELY

REF: A) 04 BRASILIA 2885, B) 04 SAO PAULO 1659, C) BRASILIA
91, D) 04 NEW DELHI 6407


1. (U) This cable reflects input from Consulates General
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Mission invites comment from
other posts in the region regarding issues raised herein.


2. (SBU) Summary and Introduction. The Brazilian private
sector has recently stepped up criticism of GoB trade
policy, in particular the government's emphasis on
expanding relations with developing (as opposed to
developed) countries. Failure of the December 17 Mercosul
summit to significantly advance the bloc's program toward
achieving a customs union, the relative insignificance of
Mercosul trade for Brazil, and frustration over Argentine
restrictions on Brazilian exports have caused some in the
private sector to propose that the bloc devolve into a free
trade area, liberating its members to pursue independent
foreign trade policies. Despite this increasing
assertiveness by the private sector on trade matters, and
in particular on Mercosul, unless President Lula personally
changes course it is highly unlikely that the GOB will
abandon or dramatically curtail Mercosul integration
because of industry concerns. Despite its apparent lack of
substance, support for regional integration runs deep
within the President's PT party and the Foreign Ministry.
Foreign Minister Amorim played a prominent role in
Mercosul's formation while serving in the same position
during Itamar Franco's presidency and sees it as a key
building block for the larger ideal of a united South
America (led, presumably, by Brazil). And while President
Lula is certainly aware of the industry's complaints, so
far he has consistently supported Amorim's vision. End
Summary and Introduction.

Plethora of Private Sector Complaints
--------------


3. (SBU) Mid-way through the Lula administration, the
Brazilian private sector has stepped up its criticism of
GoB trade policy. The more strident complaints have been
touched off by a series of government actions and
"failures" that reflect a widening breach between private

sector and government interests. The list of GoB
misconduct includes: the suspension in FTAA negotiations;
the failure to conclude free trade negotiations with the EU
in October; the granting of "market economy status" to
China in November (ref a and b),and the GoB's conciliatory
stance toward Argentina as it imposes restrictions on a
host of Brazilian exports. In reacting to these events, the
business community, as well as a number of respected
analysts, has accused the GoB of subordinating tangible
commercial interests to outdated ideological biases based
on North-South conflict and to unrelated geopolitical
objectives.


4. (SBU) Basically, the GoB is under attack for its
emphasis on relations with other developing countries and
the perception that these ties are being pursued at the
expense of relations with Brazil's major markets, i.e., the
United States and the EU, which together receive nearly 50
percent of Brazil's exports. Given the lackluster results
of the recent Mercosul Summit (ref c),criticism more
recently has centered on what is perceived as the GoB's
desire to preserve Mercosul at seemingly whatever cost.

Excessive Focus on Mercosul?
--------------

5. (U) Mercosul detractors point to the bloc's decreased
importance to Brazil as a trading partner and the minimal
economic pay-off likely to result from Mercosul's
"successful" trade initiatives to date. Following the 1994
Protocol of Ouro Preto, Brazil's trade with its Mercosul
partners grew rapidly, from $10.5 billion in 1994 to $18.5
billion in 1997, with exports and imports in relative
balance. But after leveling off in 1998, Brazil's trade
with Mercosul members declined following Brazil's currency
devaluation in 1999 and Argentina's subsequent financial
crisis, reaching a low of $8.9 billion in 2002. In 2003,
Brazilian exports to the bloc started to rebound, growing
95 percent from the low 2002 level. Although a further 59
percent growth in exports and 12 percent growth in imports
from January through November 2004 have lifted two-way
trade to around $15 billion, it still remains well below
the peak trade level recorded in 1997. Furthermore,
despite recent growth in Brazil-Mercosul trade, the bloc's
relative importance as a trading partner has declined.
Trade with Mercosul members accounted for 13.7 percent of
Brazil's trade in 1994, dropping to 9.6 percent a decade
later.


6. (U) Nor are the bloc's newly inked trade deals with
India, the Southern Africa Customs Union, and with the
Andean countries expected to produce substantial trade
gains for Brazil. Brazil's trade with India currently
stands at a mere $1.2 billion, and the Mercosul-India
agreement covers only 902 products, about 450 for each
side. With respect to the SACU (principally South Africa),
total trade is about $1 billion, in comparison with
Brazil's expected $160 billion in overall two-way trade for

2004. The partial, tariff preference agreements with these
countries are only expected to marginally expand access for
Brazilian products (refs c and d). [Note. In a December 28
editorial, former Brazilian Ambassador to the U.S., Rubens
Barbosa, claimed the private sector had not been consulted
and was unaware of which products were covered by these
agreements. During December 13-14 meetings with AUSTR
Broadbent, an array of Brazilian business people leveled
similar complaints about inadequate consultations by the
GoB on international trade negotiations in general.]


7. (U) Likewise, recent trade agreements with Peru,
Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela have generated little
enthusiasm among the private sector as industry has
complained about the complex set of rules of origin, the
large number of exceptions, and the longer tariff phase-out
accorded to the Andean countries. The GoB points to growth
of around 50 percent in trade between Brazil and the Andean
Community in 2004 as indicative of the importance of the
trade relationship, but this is from a base of only $3.7
billion in 2003. Brazil-Andean Community two-way trade
totaled a mere $4.5 billion through October 2004.

Negotiating by Committee
--------------


8. (SBU) Critics also disagree with claims by the GoB that
Brazil's leverage vis-a-vis major trading partners is
enhanced by negotiating as a member of Mercosul, contending
that conflicting national interests within the bloc impede
its ability to conclude negotiations with the United States
and the EU. The Brazilian private sector insists it was
Argentine protectionism that forced Mercosul negotiators to
reduce the level of ambition in the last offer presented to
the EU, in part causing those negotiations to stall before
an October 31, 2004 deadline. Although the business
community acknowledges that in the FTAA negotiations
additional factors are at play, such as Brazil's reluctance
to discuss IPR or new investment rules, many here believe
that unburdened by its less competitive neighbors, Brazil
could more easily find the basis for a mutually
advantageous trade agreement with the United States.

Argentina-Brazil "Refrigerator War"
--------------


9. (SBU) Argentina's persistent efforts to restrict
Brazil's exports in the so-called "refrigerator wars," and
a perceived complacency on the part of the GoB, have also
highlighted the costs of Mercosul integration for the
Brazilian business community. Over the last decade,
Argentina has typically enjoyed a small, but positive trade
surplus with Brazil. Nonetheless, rebounding Brazilian
exports in 2003 prompted Argentine complaints about import
surges in various electrodomestic products. Argentina's
emerging trade deficit with Brazil in 2004 provided
additional fuel for that country's demands that
restrictions be applied to Brazilian exports of
refrigerators, washing machines, ovens, televisions, shoes,
and certain textiles. From January through November 2004,
Brazilian exports to Argentina expanded another 64 percent
reaching $6.7 billion, compared with only 19 percent growth
($5.1 billion total) in trade in the opposite direction.


10. (U) The conciliatory posture the GoB has adopted,
encouraging Brazilian producers to negotiate various
"voluntary" export restrictions, has provoke outrage by the
Brazilian private sector, and at times by Minister of
Development and Trade Furlan. Brazilian refrigerator
producers accepted a monthly quota of 18,160 units, down
from the 26,354 being sold, limiting their market share to
50 percent. Since July, Argentina has assessed a 21.5
percent additional tariff on televisions manufactured in
Brazil's Manaus Free Trade Zone and has been pressing for
voluntary limits to reduce yearly imports from 160,000 to
17,500. The Argentines are also seeking a reduction in
market share for Brazilian washing machines from 49 percent
to 35 percent and subjecting imports to a non-automatic
licensing regime.


11. (SBU) The final straw for some came in the run-up to
the December 17 Ouro Preto Summit, when Argentine
negotiators pressed Brazil to accept adoption of a
safeguard mechanism within Mercosul that would
automatically impose quotas should neighboring countries'
currency values and rates of economic growth vary
substantially. After convening key advisors, on December 8
President Lula flatly rejected the proposal, raising
concern that the trade spat could ruin the upcoming summit.
Although the safeguard proposal was not on the summit
agenda, the presidents of Uruguay and Paraguay publicly
supported Brazil's position. However, the war is far from
over. Brazilian and Argentine negotiators agreed to set
aside the negotiations on export restrictions and on a
potential safeguard for the sake of the summit, but
discussions will resume in January.

For Brazil, Which Road Forward?
--------------

12. (SBU) Given the political importance of Mercosul, few
in Brazil would advocate a complete abandonment of the
bloc. However, two schools of thought are emerging on how
best to cure Mercosul's ills. One group believes that a
looser association that allows for greater flexibility in
accommodating varying national economic interests is the
way to go. This group has proposed that Mercosul devolve
into a free trade area, allowing the free flow of goods
between members, while enabling them to orient their trade
with other partners according to national priorities.
Roberto Gianetti da Fonseca, former Executive Director of
the GoB's trade chamber (CAMEX) during the Cardoso
administration, and currently head of International
Relations at the powerful Sao Paulo FIESP industrial
federation, has been publicly championing this cause. His
proposal has rankled Itamaraty (i.e., Brazil's Foreign
Ministry),but resonates among many business leaders.


13. (SBU) The other group, led by President Lula and
Foreign Minister Amorim, argues that it is more, not less,
integration that is needed and see current Mercosul
problems as mere growing pains. Minister Amorim has
exhorted the business community to keep the bigger picture
in mind -- the long-term goal of transforming Mercosul, and
eventually the South American Community of Nations, into an
EU-type arrangement. Brazilian officials point out that
the EU's own formation has been a lengthy and at times
contentious process. While acknowledging the trade
difficulties and attempting to work through them, the GoB's
answer is also to press ahead with political integration as
quickly as possible to lock-in the integration process.
Recent steps to strengthen Mercosul institutions in
Montevideo, and to install a Mercosul parliament in 2006
are regarded as key steps in that process.


14. (SBU) With Lula lining up with ForMin Amorim, its
pretty clear which road forward the GOB will take. Despite
the increasing assertiveness by the private sector on trade
matters, and in particular on Mercosul, unless Lula
personally changes course it is highly unlikely that the
GOB will abandon or dramatically curtail Mercosul
integration because of industry concerns.

CHICOLA