BRAZIL: OLMERT VISIT A SUCCESS, BUT SUMMIT STILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000718

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KSUM ETRD XF XM IS BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: OLMERT VISIT A SUCCESS, BUT SUMMIT STILL
DOMINATES ISRAELI CONCERNS

REF: A. BRASILIA 564

B. BRASILIA 574

C. BRASILIA 658

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH, Reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Israeli Deputy Prime
Minister Olmert reportedly enjoyed a successful visit to
Brazil last week, however, he was apparently unable to
convince the GOB to take a tougher approach -- from the
Israeli perspective -- with Arab interlocutors in preparation
for the Arab-South America Summit in Brasilia in May. In a
meeting between President Lula and Olmert, the Brazilians
studiously avoided any discussion of the Summit. After
polling South American colleagues and officials in the
Ministry of External Relations (MRE),an Israeli diplomat
told Poloff he sensed Brazilian nervousness that, while most
if not all South American presidents will be in Brasilia,
Arab heads of state may stay away. He surmised that this is
a not-so-subtle pressure tactic by Arab states to sway
Brazil, the lead South American negotiator, on Summit
declaration language. While the South Americans claim they
are standing firm vis-a-vis the Arabs on the themes of
terrorism and Middle East peace, the diplomat noted that
Israel takes little comfort from the direction the
declaration seems to be heading. End Summary

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLMERT "BREAKS BARRIERS" WITH LULA
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2. (C) In follow-up discussions with Poloff March 14 (see
ref A),Embassy of Israel Minister Counselor Eitan Surkis
said that Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Olmert had "succeeded
in breaking barriers" in a one hour March 7 meeting with
President Lula and in meetings with other key GOB ministers,
including Minister for Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues;
Minister for Mines and Energy Dilma Rousseff; Minister for
Development, Industry, and Trade Luis Furlan; and Secretary
for Economic and Social Development Jaques Wagner. In an
indirect reference to the upcoming Arab-South American
Summit, Olmert gave Lula his overview of Middle East politics
and described Israel's unending "sacrifices" on the road to
peace. Surkis sensed that President Lula was impressed by
Olmert's description of Israel's expansion of ties with
Jordan and a recent press photo showing Prime Minister Sharon
hugging Egyptian President Mubarak. Although given the
opportunity to discuss the upcoming Summit with Olmert, the
Brazilian President did not take the bait, Surkis said.


3. (C) The Deputy Prime Minister invited Lula to visit
Israel, and the Brazilian President responded that he would
like to do so "during his first mandate," i.e. before the
2006 presidential electoral campaign season. Lula noted,
however, that it might be easier if perhaps either Israeli
President Katzir or Prime Minister Sharon visited Brazil.
(Note: Because the Prime Minister was specifically invited,
Surkis considered this a major concession by the Brazilians.
End Note) Surkis pointed out that the Ministry of External
Relations (MRE) had been almost a non-player in the
preparations for Olmert's visit; the GOI had coordinated the
visit directly with the GOB Presidency. (Foreign Minister
Amorim himself was traveling in Africa when Olmert was in
Brazil.) In any case, Lula reiterated that the Foreign
Minister intended to visit Israel in June/July 2005.


4. (C) The expansion of commercial ties was a key theme for
Olmert's visit to Brazil, Surkis said. Regarding Mercosul,
President Lula told Olmert that Brazil "would not put up any
obstacles" for Israel to have an agreement with the trading
group. The Israelis, Surkis commented, had heard this
message before. Olmert reminded Lula that Israel had first
sought a trade pact with Mercosul in 1997. Yet Egypt, which
had first broached the idea of a Mercosul agreement in 2004,
had already been rewarded with an agreement. Surkis added
that the two sides also discussed the possibility of creating
a binational commission.

COULD THE SUMMIT BECOME A BUST?
--------------


5. (C) Surkis and Poloff then compared notes on the lead-up
to the Arab-South America Summit. In addition to meeting
with key MRE officials, Surkis had already met with diplomats
from most of Brasilia's South American embassies. Based on
his conversations, Surkis believes almost all South American
presidents would attend the Summit. However, as of last
week, he understood that no Arab head of state had yet
confirmed his attendance. This was probably a not-too-subtle
ploy by the Arabs to play hardball on the declaration
language, Surkis opined. While there is little doubt that
participating Arab countries would be represented by foreign
ministers, if Arab heads of state were not in attendance,
Surkis felt the event could turn into an embarrassment for
President Lula. Surkis sensed that regardless of the
declaration talks, the King of Morocco is an almost certain
Summit attendee. In addition, he believed Abu Mazen from the
Palestinian Authority would like to come, if there is no
immediate crisis in the territories. The big question mark,
he believed, is Mubarak. The Israeli Embassy in Cairo had
reported "contradictory indications" in the press as to the
Egyptian President's attendance at the Summit. Egypt has
been the lead for the Arab League in negotiations over the
Summit declaration.


6. (C) Based on his consultations with South American
diplomats, Surkis believes South American concurrence has
been achieved on "95%" of the Summit declaration. During the
recent South America group meeting in Rio, three political
themes were discussed: (1) land-locked countries, (2)
terrorism, and (3) the Arab-Israeli peace process. Regarding
terrorism, Colombia reportedly insisted, successfully, that
declaration language refer to terrorism "in all its forms and
manifestations." This tact, Surkis felt, could perhaps
negate any Arab attempt to differentiate between state and
non-state terrorism or "legitimate" types of activities that,
of course, were clearly terrorism. While the South Americans
agreed they would not allow the declaration to contain
"tough" language against Israel, Surkis said it would be
small comfort to Israel if the final Summit declaration, in
addition to referring to acceptable UNSC Resolutions such as
242 and 338, referred also to other UN resolutions that
Israel finds onerous. It was also Surkis' understanding that
the South Americans may agree to language calling on Israel
to withdraw to the frontiers of June 4, 1967. "What does
this Summit have to do with this (issue)?" Surkis asked.



7. (C) Surkis again emphasized that the South Americans,
including the Brazilians, are evidently unaware of all the
sensitivities surrounding the Mideast peace process. "They
are believers in UN resolutions," he added, "and do not want
to invent anything new." Given the various stages of
negotiation of the declaration, the last chance to make
changes to it would be in Brasilia just before the opening of
the Summit itself.


8. (C) COMMENT: The Israeli Embassy has pulled out all the
stops to gauge the Summit preparatory process, and their
perspective about Brazilian diplomacy leading to the Summit
coincides closely with our own. As with us, MRE is being
very cautious in what they tell the Israelis. We sense that,
from the Brazilian perspective, if after tedious negotiations
with the Arabs the Summit declaration refers only to classic
(i.e., approved) UN resolutions, withdrawal to 1967 borders,
etc., and does not blatantly blame Israel, this would be
evidence of successful Brazilian diplomacy. The other South
Americans, themselves amateurs to the vagaries and nuances of
the peace process, will likely follow Brazil's lead.

Danilovich