BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON ARAB SUMMIT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000574

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KSUM XF XM BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON ARAB SUMMIT AND
IMPROVING USG-GOB COORDINATION

REF: A. STATE 35934

B. STATE 18160

C. BRASILIA 432

D. BRASILIA 564

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.4 (B)(D)


1. (C) Ambassador delivered ref A demarche late on 2 March to
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, chief of staff to
Foreign Minister Amorim. (Note: Ambassador had planned to
demarche Acting FM Guimaraes, but the meeting was postponed
by Guimaraes until 8 March; Ambassador will reiterate key
reftel points in that meeting as well. End note.)


2. (C) Patriota was clearly prepared for the content of the
demarche, having received reports from Ambassador Abdenur of
his meeting at the NSC on 25 February with DNSA Abrams and
Senior WHA Director Shannon, and Patriota appeared tense and
defensive. Indeed, Ambassador had progressed through only a
few of the demarche points when Patriota interrupted and said
there was no need to go further, that the GOB knew the sense
of the USG position and the GOB's response remained the same
as that provided earlier by Abdenur: i.e., Brazil is an
independent country that has "no need to ask permission" of
the United States in carrying out foreign policy initiatives,
and it will not start now. He added that the GOB believes
Brazil plays a constructive role in global affairs, including
in the Middle East. Patriota said the purpose of Amorim's
Middle East trip was delivery of Lula's invitations to Arab
capitals for the planned South America-Arab summit, Patriota
said, adding that Amorim will visit Israel in June, that
Brazil had heard no complaints from the their Ambassador in
Israel, and that the GOB was not aware of offical protests
from the Israeli Government, although he acknowledged there
had been reports in Brazil's media of Israeli discontent.


3. (C) Patriota said that the USG should be prepared for
additional GOB statements about the Middle East, and referred
specifically to a May meeting in Capetown between Brazil,
India and South Africa at which those governments (the IPSA
group) may announce their intention to form a "support group"
for the Quartet in the peace process. Patriota insisted
Brazil is playing a "balanced role" and offered to brief the
Ambassador on private conversations between Amorim and Arab
leaders, including his meeting in Damascas where he "urged
the Syrians to comply with UNSC resolution 1559." Ambassador
rejoined that Brazil had not supported 1559, but perhaps
would next try to claim credit for Syria's decision to
withdraw. Patriota said that, despite Amorim's private
counsel to the Syrians to withdraw, the GOB would not
publicly join the U.S.-French statement calling for Syrian
withdrawal because the GOB has concerns that France, as the
former colonial power, intends to fill any void left by Syria.


4. (C) Ambassador told Patriota that the USG is not trying to
impose terms or tell the GOB to seek U.S. permission for
initiatives. However, he stated clearly that the peace
process is at a delicate pass, with a window for possible
success that is unprecedented in recent years. The USG is
taking a leading role, Secretary Rice is engaging directly,
and therefore the GOB needs to coordinate with the U.S. more
effectively. Amorim's trip had created confusion and sent
mixed signals, and it pointed up the danger that a "rear
guard support group" such as Brazil wants to establish could
inadvertently become "a rear guard sabotage group."
Returning to the summit question, Ambassador stressed that
there is concern about both the timing and apparent lack of
precise focus, with a risk that the meeting could become a
broad brush affair, with a rambling agenda of items on UN
reform, non-proliferation, Iraq, terrorism, none of which
mesh with the GOB's stated intention of addressing social and
economic issues, and some of which could prove detrimental to
Middle East peace discussions. On that point, Ambassador
asked Patriota whether there had been progress in meetings in
Cairo between Brazil and Arab representatives in revising the
draft summit statement.


5. (C) Patriota would not be drawn out on the issue of the
Cairo discussions, saying only that "progress was being
made." Patriota reiterated Brazil's intent to seek balance,
but said the GOB ultimately could not control what
delegations say. He noted that Arab delegations had told the
GOB that they welcome the summit as an opportunity to express
themselves in a "alternative forum," since they feel they are
being "demonized" in other international meetings. Patriota
confirmed that Iraq and Somalia will be invited to the
summit, but that the Arab League, not the GOB will issue
those invitations. Ambassador also asked about the
possibility of invitations for observers (i.e., meaning for
himself),and Patriota said that is being considered.


6. (C) In closing, Ambassador reiterated the importance of
enhanced coordination. As an apparent result of Ambassador's
comments, Patriota spoke immediately following the meeting by
phone with FM Amorim, and then relayed the following points
from Amorim back to Ambassador the same evening:

-- Amorim had nothing to add with reference to his trip or
the summit, but said he wants to demonstrate GOB willingness
to be cooperative and consultative;

-- In that regard, Amorim passed on that, per a request made
by the NSC's Abrams and Shannon to Ambassador Abdenur,
President Lula had told Venezuelan President Chavez during
meetings this week in Uruguay that Chavez needs to tone down
his rhetoric;

-- Brazil is planning to organize a meeting on Brazilian
territory between Chavez, Colombian President Uribe and
Spanish representatives (NFI). That meeting's timing could
conflict with FM Amorim's planned visit to Washington on 31
March, for which he has sought a meeting with Secretary Rice.

-- On that question, Amorim -- apparently in response to
Ambassador's appeal for better coordination -- said he seeks
a longer and more substantive discussion with the Secretary
than would be possible in the half-hour meeting currently
scheduled for 31 March. For that reason, and because of the
possible conflict with the Chavez-Uribe-GOS meeting noted
above, Amorim said he may seek a meeting with the Secretary
on a different date, possibly in early April, and he
requested that Mission keep him apprised of the possibilities
of a stopover by the Secretary in Brazil en route to the
Community of Democracies summit.


7. (C) Comment. The candid and direct conversations seen in
both this demarche and the earlier NSC meeting with Abdenur
seem to have registered with the GOB both our continuing,
intense concern about the South America-Arab summit and our
frustration that our communication with the GOB on key issues
has been, too often, reactive and driven by events. A more
deliberate and strategic approach could produce benefits for
both sides, move the ball forward on shared goals, and limit
damage on issues where we may have to agree to disagree.
Indeed, Amorim seems to have taken our concern to heart, and
he is now going us one better by seeking a very substantial
first meeting with the Secretary.

DANILOVICH