BRAZIL: REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING FOR AIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000318

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015
TAGS: SNAR MARR MOPS PINR BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING FOR AIR
BRIDGE DENIAL

REF: WHA/BSC (MALHEIRO) - EMBASSY (HEARNE) CLASSIFIED
E-MAIL 2 FEB 05

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4
(B)(D)


1. (C) Summary: Ref query requested Embassy views on the
potential for sharing U.S. information (particularly ROTHR
data) with the GOB as part of cooperative regional effort at
air bridge denial (ABD) that may also include Colombia. In
summary form below are our observations, based on the history
of this issue and consideration of the current shootdown
program in Brazil. We believe that it is worthwhile and an
opportune moment, given Brazil's success to date with its ABD
program, to approach the Brazilians about expanded
cooperation. Options for moving ahead include an offer of
direct assistance, perhaps taking advantage of the visit of
Secretary Rumsfeld, or an indirect approach in which

SIPDIS
U.S.-origin information (including ROTHR data) is provided to
Brazil via Colombia in the context of their bilateral
cooperation in aerial surveillance and interdiction. We are
prepared to make preliminary inquiries on these issues with
the GOB if instructed. End summary.

History


2. (C) Since circa 1999-2000, the USG has periodically made
inquires to the Brazilian Goverment (GOB) and air force
(BRAF) regarding information sharing with Brazil for aerial
surveillance and ABD efforts. Mission personnel, as well as
senior visitors from State, DOD and SOUTHCOM, have all
registered with Brazil, formally and informally, our
willingness to explore cooperation ranging from limited
bilateral information sharing to larger-scale regional
programs to develop a common operating picture (COP).


3. (C) The centerpiece of the USG discussion has usually been
our interest in providing low-altitude tracking data from the
USG's Puerto Rico Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR)
installation to Brazil, as a complement to the data generated
by Brazil's own assets (especially the SIVAM Amazon
surveillance system),which are focused primarily on
higher-altitude coverage. We have been willing to discuss
different operational modalities, including enhancing
Brazil's liaison program at JIATF-South in Key West and/or
installing real-time ROTHR terminals in Brazil's SIVAM center
in Manaus.

Mixed Reactions, No Progress


4. (C) Brazilian reactions to these queries have been mixed,
and there has been no progress on the issue. On a technical
level, some of the BRAF's best officers -- e.g., former SIVAM
Commission President Brigadier Orlando Bellon -- have a keen
understanding of the advantages of integrating ROTHR data
into the SIVAM spread, and over the years have informally
expressed enthusiasm for the options outlined in para 3 and
even beyond (i.e., BRAF officers a few years ago informally
discussed with USAF and Raytheon officials the idea of
installing a ROTHR in Brazil). As recently as August 2004,
during a visit to JIATF South, Brazilian air defense chief
Brigadier Azambuja indicated his desire to assign a BRAF
representative in Key West (the current Brazilian liaison
officer is from the civilian intelligence service) to
facilitate ROTHR data feed to BRAF air defense operations
centers.


5. (C) However, other BRAF officers -- notably current Chief
of Air Staff Brigadier Astor -- have been hesitant, and the
following factors appear to be impediments:

-- Dissing SIVAM: Astor said directly to Mission officers one
year ago, as Brazil's multi-million dollar SIVAM system was
becoming fully operational, that incorporating ROTHR into
Brazil's surveillance program could appear to some -- notably
in Brazil's prickly congress and media -- as an admission
that SIVAM is inadequate. That this view is short-sighted and
parochial seems obvious to us, but Astor is not necessarily
wrong to fear the worst from Brazil's politicians and press
when it comes to money issues, the military and virtually
anything to do with the U.S. However, now that SIVAM is up
and running, Astor's concerns (and a related BRAF technical
concern that incorporating ROTHR terminals could delay
getting SIVAM installations on line) may have lessened.
-- Sovereignty: On a related theme, and is often the case in
Brazil, sovereignty concerns and suspicions about U.S.
motives (ranging from mild reluctance about appearances of
needing outside help to outright conspiracy theories about
U.S. designs on the Amazon) sometimes color GOB and BRAF
attitudes toward closer cooperation. In the past, concerns
have been heard from the fever swamps of the nationalist
fringes of both left and right that SIVAM, which was largely
built by Raytheon, is perhaps secretly wired for penetration
by U.S. intelligence. Hence real cooperation in
surveillance, including ROTHR, could be potentially
controversial in the BRAF's view.

-- Neighbors first: BRAF and MOD officials have also
indicated to USG officials at different times that their
priority interest is pursuing bilateral information sharing
agreements with neighboring countries, and hence possible
Brazil-U.S. cooperation or a unified regional effort toward a
COP appear to be well down the road. We are aware that, in
the past several months, Brazil has signed information
sharing agreements with both Colombia and Peru, but the GOB
has not provided us details of the accords. We believe
Brazil is also in discussions with Venezuela and Bolivia, but
have not confirmed this yet with the GOB.

A Way Ahead -- Two Options


6. (C) Bilateral: Despite the history and challenges noted
above, we believe it is worth pursuing enhanced cooperation
in air surveillance and ABD, and now may be an opportune
time. The GOB has trumpeted its October 2004 implementation
of its national ABD program (shootdown) as a success. BRAF
and MOD statements to the media have claimed a substantial
decrease in suspicious air traffic, and the Federal Police
have reported through the press that traffickers are now
resorting to landing aircraft over the frontier in Paraguay
and transporting cocaine by land into Brazil. BRAF data
supplied to us confidentially for a U.S. congressional
reporting requirement is less dramatic than media reports,
but still encouraging: i.e., an approximately one quarter
drop in suspect flights from October through the end of 2004,
one force down event (in which no drugs were seized),and no
necessity for use of either warning shots or lethal force to
secure compliance from intercepted aircraft. Brazilians are
deeply worried about the drug-related organized criminal
violence ravaging Rio and other cities, and good news is
welcomed by the public and GOB. Increased cooperation with us
in enhancing Brazil's capabilities against illegal aerial
trafficking may be more attractive now, as Brazil seeks to
build on success. The possible visit of Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld would offer an ideal opportunity to reiterate to the
Brazilians at the minister level that we want to do more to
help and have technical assets that can complement SIVAM. We
see little to lose in making another overture for direct
bilateral cooperation.


7. (C) Via Colombia: Another option would be an indirect
approach via Colombia. Brazil is already committed to
greater cooperation with Colombia, witness their signing of a
cooperation accord last year. That presents a potential
building block for regional cooperation that includes
providing U.S. information to both governments (Colombia
directly, Brazil via Colombia). We defer to experts on the
question of whether there would be any U.S. legal impediment
to Colombia's sharing U.S.-origin information (including
ROTHR tracks) with Brazil for ABD operations, since both
countries have Presidential Determinations to address
liability under U.S. statutes. But we anticipate the
Brazilians would definitely want our legal judgment on that
question before moving ahead. (Note: The terms of annexes to
the U.S.-Brazil exchange of diplomatic notes indicate the GOB
will not share U.S.-origin information or intelligence with
another country without express permission from the USG. End
note.). Receiving U.S. information via Colombia could
ameliorate some of the Brazilian concerns outlined in para 5
above, as it can be couched within the context of
Brazil-Colombia cooperation.


8. (C) Comment. There is appreciation in the GOB for the
USG's efforts to secure a Presidential Determination for
Brazil's ABD program, especially in light of its success to
date. That fact and the visit of our defense secretary may
create a favorable environment for momentum on ABD and
surveillance cooperation. That said, the Brazilians
repeatedly emphasized during our negotiations on the PD last
year that their ABD program is truly and exclusively national
in its operational scope and technical assets. In that
regard, we would need to determine early on whether receiving
U.S.-origin information -- directly from us or via Colombia
-- is simply unattractive to the GOB for political or other
reasons that go beyond the known reservations noted above.
On that key point and other questions, we are prepared to
engage informally with the GOB (MOD, BRAF and perhaps foreign
ministry),if instructed.