Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA3130
2005-11-30 12:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT -

Tags:  ETRD ETTC PREL BR CU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 003130 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA AND WHA/BSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL BR CU
SUBJECT: SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT -
BRAZIL

REF: A. STATE 207359

B. BRASILIA 1522

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patrick Linehan, reasons 1.4
(b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 003130

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA AND WHA/BSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL BR CU
SUBJECT: SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT -
BRAZIL

REF: A. STATE 207359

B. BRASILIA 1522

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patrick Linehan, reasons 1.4
(b) and (
d).


1. (C) Brazil enjoys a close relationship with Cuba and the
GoB has refused to criticize directly the Castro regime's
human rights policies. In a rare public statement on Cuba in
April 2005, President Lula implied criticism of Castro when
he told the press that "Brazil can help build a democratic
process in Cuba" and that "we have much to do for democracy
in Cuba." The Lula Administration argues that engagement,
rather than isolation, is more likely to change Cuba's
behavior; it states it has been critical of the Castro
regime's actions behind the scenes. The GoB, however, has a
general aversion to meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries and routinely opposes "single country" resolutions
at the United Nations, including those aimed at Cuba.
Brazilian media and NGOs are much less hesitant to criticize
the Castro regime pointedly.


2. (C) In the past, the Lula Administration has pushed
unsuccessfully to allow Cuba entry into the Rio Group.
Lula's Workers' Party (PT),some key members of which sought
refuge in Cuba from persecution during Brazil's military
dictatorship, allegedly received from the Cuban government a
campaign contribution (ranging from US$1.4 to US$3 million)
during the 2002 presidential elections. Beyond allegations
made in the media by various self-described witnesses to the
transaction, thus far no concrete evidence of such payment
has emerged.


3. (SBU) On the economic front, the GoB has welcomed contacts
between Cuba and the Mercosul common market, of which Brazil
is the largest member. Brazil supports Mercosul's plans to
conclude a trade pact with Cuba, although it appears the
island's relationship with Mercosul would fall short of full
membership. Bilateral Brazilian trade with Cuba grew to
US$177.2 million in 2004, over $91.8 million in 2003.
Brazilian exports of US$131.9 million in 2004 to Cuba
consisted primarily of chicken, shoes, agricultural machinery
and buses. 2004 imports from Cuba of US$22.3 million were
dominated by medicines and vaccines. Over the period
2001-2003, Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES)
provided US$52.3 million in export credits to finance the
export of automobiles and buses to Cuba. Local accounts
suggest that potential BNDES export credits for Cuba are
under-utilized.


4. (SBU) There has been a trickle of Brazilian investment to
Cuba. According to Central Bank data, Brazilian companies
held investments valued at US$19 million in Cuba in 2004.
Petrobras holds rights to an offshore oil exploration block,
the potential of which it is evaluating. Petrobras formed in
2004 a lubricants joint venture in Cuba with Venezuela's
PDVSA and a local partner. (Note: local media accounts
suggest that differences over ownership and controlling
interests have delayed this investment, as Cuban law
reportedly limits foreign ownership to 49% of joint ventures.)

LINEHAN