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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA295
2005-02-01 19:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: BRAZIL PERSPECTIVE

Tags:   PARM  KNNP  MNUC  BR  IAEA  NPT 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
						C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000295 

SIPDIS

UNVIE FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2014
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC BR IAEA NPT
SUBJECT: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: BRAZIL PERSPECTIVE

REF: A. (A) STATE 18228


B. (B) STATE 17051

Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, reason 1.4 (b
& d)



1. (C) Poloff discussed ref B non-paper with Ministry of
External Relations' (MRE) Disarmament and Sensitive
Technologies Division Chief, Santiago Mourao, who is
preparing the GOB position for the 2005 NPT Revcon. Mourao
strongly defended the NPT. He agreed that the Treaty
required "strengthening" and noted that it contained
"asymmetries," but did not view the NPT as fundamentally
inefficient or weak. On the contrary, Mourao noted that when
the NPT was ratified, many believed there would be 20-30
nuclear weapons countries by now. Instead, there continue to
be the five weapons states plus "three on the margins,"
thanks to the NPT. He added that the NPT had also helped to
unveil a clandestine illicit nuclear proliferation network
(Khan).



2. (C) Regarding the Additional Protocol, Mourao said that
while the AP strengthens the safeguards system, it would not
help the NPT. (Note: The GOB will not consider its own
possible accession to the AP until after the Revcon. End
note.) Brazil will not seek amendments to the Treaty in May
but would favor a "balanced" document that was
"non-confrontational" and did not provide "selective
advantages" to signatories. Echoing long-standing GOB
policy, Mourao said the GOB supported strengthening the NPT's
disarmament aspects in harmony with the non-proliferation
ones. Brazil will continue its position of not questioning
the right of any country under Article IV to develop its
peaceful nuclear program.



3. (C) Comment. We welcome ref A's proposals for reaching
out to GOB officials for bilateral discussions in the months
before the NPT Revcon. Meeting regularly with the Brazilians
in New York, Vienna, and Geneva prior to the Revcon can clear
the air on any problematic issues before the conference, and
also demonstrate that GOB views are important to us. If
invited, USG officials should be prepared for bilateral
consultations in Brasilia. To be most fruitful, bilateral
engagement with Brazilian interlocutors on NPT objectives
should also include meaningful discussion of disarmament
efforts under Article VI. The Brazilians unfailingly flag
this as a key concern both for the GOB executive branch and
Brazil's congress, which ratified the NPT with significant
hesitation because of perceptions of lack of progress in
disarmament among weapons states, and which will eventually
have to ratify the Additional Protocol if Brazil signs on.



4. (C) Comment continued. Per para 15 of ref a, we believe a
public diplomacy effort here on the NPT would be most
effective if it focuses on high-road themes which are broadly
supported by the USG, GOB and most other NPT states: e.g.,
the centrality of the NPT to the international community's
efforts to deal with an increasingly dangerous proliferation
environment, with perhaps the Khan network and North Korea
noted as examples of new threats. The issue of Brazil's
adherence to the Additional Protocol should be handled deftly
in PD efforts. Brazilian media opinion has tended to favor
Brazilian adherence to the protocol, and GOB statements have
recently pointed toward adherence at some point (though not
before the Revcon). But it remains important that the issue
be seen in an international context (Brazil-IAEA), and not as
a bilateral problem. The approach taken in recent months by
the USG -- including former Secretary Powell during his
October 2004 visit here -- has been a productive one: i.e.,
the USG has no concerns about Brazil in terms of weapons
programs, applauds Brazil's excellent record in
non-proliferation, and hopes Brazil, working with the IAEA,
will sign the AP, as other recognized nuclear supplier states
have done or plan to do. A PD effort here could also
usefully elaborate on the advances in disarmament by the U.S.
and Russia in recent years, including statistics that
illustrate the dramatic scale of both bilateral and U.S.
unilateral programs.

Danilovich