BRAZIL: A/S DESUTTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 002282

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015
TAGS: AORC KNNP PARM PREL BR CWC
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: A/S DESUTTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MINISTRY TO DISCUSS COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY

REF: A. STATE 141086

B. BRASILIA 002066

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4
(B)(D)


1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Assistant Secretary for Verification and
Compliance Paula A. DeSutter met on 15 August with Foreign
Ministry Officials for compliance diplomacy discussions, led
on the Brazilian side by Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro,
Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs (in
the MRE structure this includes UN and arms
control/non-proliferation issues). A/S DeSutter was
accompanied by Embassy POL Counselor Dennis Hearne, Thomas
Yehl, VC Director for Technology and Assessment, Astrid
Lewis, VC Foreign Affairs Officer, and other Embassy POL
staff. A working lunch with GOB officials and a media event
on compliance diplomacy followed. The delegation concluded
the visit with a meeting with Nilson Mourao, Vice President
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of the Brazilian Congress'
Chamber of Deputies. Principal themes are reported below.
END INTRODUCTION.

COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY
--------------

2. (C) On August 15, A/S DeSutter, along with her team, met
with Foreign Ministry officials. In attendance were:
Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary of
International Organization Affairs; Santiago Mourao, Division
Director for Disarmament (DD); Manuel Montenegro da Cruz,
General Coordinator of Sensitive Items to the Ministry of
Science and Technology; Everton Frask Lucero, First
Secretary, International Advisor to the Ministry of Science

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and Technology; Jandyr dos Santos Jr., Third Secretary, DD;
Claudio Leopoldino, Third Secretary, DD; and Igor Germano,
Third Secretary, DD. A/S DeSutter had previously met with
Ambassador Guerreiro in November 2004 to discuss the
Verification and Compliance Bureau's approach to compliance
diplomacy. Several issues were covered, starting with
compliance diplomacy. The A/S explained that verification
and compliance is an evolving concept. While the building
blocks and tools of the past still exist, it is necessary to
be creative in addressing these problems by adapting these
tools and creating new ones. It is especially important that
the international community grapple with challenge of
enforcement, which is a key element of verification and
compliance policy. The international community is challenged
in a very clear way )perhaps for the first time in
multilateral fora such as the NPT ) with the problem of how
to persuade international violators to come back into
compliance. This, she argued, is not just a U.S. problem but
one with respect to which all parties to agreements share the
responsibility ) and share a real security interest in
achieving. The purpose of our compliance diplomacy effort is
to explain to other countries how and why we assess
compliance, and why we place such emphasis on verification,
compliance, and enforcement. DeSutter walked through the
Libya WMD elimination and verification process and some of
the key elements we hope to adapt. The importance of
obtaining a clear strategic commitment can't be understated.
Once this was achieved from the Libyans, we worked with
international organizations like the IAEA and OPCW, but also
worked trilaterally with the Libyans and United Kingdom.
This gave us much more agility, rapidity, and proven results
than would have been possible working solely through
multilateral fora. The A/S contrasted the case of North
Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program with that of Iran, and noted
that the former country may not be as susceptible to
international pressure. Iran, however, is a different case,
specifically regarding their nuclear program. The question
was raised as to how we can reach out to other countries to
get their help in this regard. The A/S pointed to Brazil's
ideal position ) with its credentials ) to serve as an
example for other countries and reach out to them to help the
U.S. in the effort to enforce compliance.


3. (U) Brazil explained their National Program for
Public-Private Sector Collaboration on Sensitive Items
(PRONABENS),which conducts outreach activities involving
industries that develop activities related to production of
sensitive goods and/or dual use technologies. The program,
which began in 2004, has thus far worked with the public
sector on export controls in dual use biological and chemical
address equipment and items. Plans are in place for a
nuclear workshop to address United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540.

NUCLEAR ISSUES
--------------

4. (C) The Brazilians then turned the discussion to Iran's
nuclear program. A/S DeSutter underscored the importance of
referring Iran to the Security Council now, lest the
international community send the wrong message that
compliance with international obligations is both optional
and does not much matter. She noted that Libya was referred
to the Security Council for its IAEA safeguards violations,
even after agreeing to give up its program, while Iran has
yet to be. Ambassador Guerreiro stated that they had been
encouraging Iran to cooperate with the UN and to clean their
record. He expressed skepticism regarding what the
international community can do and how to deal with issues of
non-compliance in general. Guerreiro also expressed concern
about: whether UNSC referral would end IAEA activity in Iran;
whether the U.S. had considered the possibility that Iran
might respond to referral by withdrawing from the NPT; and
whether Russia and China would preclude any action on Iran as
China had with the DPRK. DeSutter answered that while she
couldn't predict whether Iran would kick the IAEA out, there
is a danger that it is dangerous to allow a violator such as
Iran to use the threat of withdrawal to put all the pressure
on the international community ) instead of itself facing
pressure to live up to its obligations. With regard to the
UNSC, she said that Ambassador Bolton would work the issue
for the U.S. in New York, and furthermore that: a) the Six
Party process came in response to referral of the DRPK to the
UNSC; b) referral is mandated in the IAEA statute (although
the European Union (EU-3) process had deferred this); and c)
the U.S. grappled with whether there should be automatic,
pre-set responses to noncompliance and decided to leave it to
decision makers that would confront the issues at the time.
This would be the diplomatic enforcement challenge facing the
UNSC on which Brazil sits. Iran is learning how to evade the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

DPRK
--------------

5. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro asked the A/S her thoughts as to
whether there was cause for optimism in the Six Party Talks
with the DPRK. The A/S responded by giving the example of
Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)* which shows that a country that has had a difficult
relationship with the U.S. can still work together with us at
some point, based on mutual cooperation, by making a genuine
strategic commitment to eliminate WMD. The DPRK is a much
more difficult case than Libya, she said, but nevertheless,
the Libya case can be used as a model approach.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
--------------

6. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro stated that Brazil is committed
to the NPT and hopes by early next year to resolve the
signing of the Additional Protocol (AP). He further stated
that Brazil was in ongoing discussions with the IAEA on this
issue. (Note: The political situation in Brazil, with the
Lula administration facing corruption charges, was viewed by
Embassy staff as a distraction from these matters at best.)

CHEMICAL ISSUES
--------------

7. (U) The discussion then turned to chemical weapons,
specifically Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs).
A/S DeSutter brought up points previously made in the
December 2004 meeting with Fabio Antibas, Brazil's Second
Secretary to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

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Weapons (OPCW) about the need to increase OCPF inspections.
She reiterated her concern about under-inspection of OCPFs
and for the Technical Secretariat (TS) to develop a site
selection methodology to inspect these facilities to ensure
proliferation deterrence. Brazil responded that they have
not objected to the increase of OCPFs inspections. Their
concern remained on the strengthening of the OPCFs selection
methodology, and further pointed that not all OCPFs threaten
the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC). Brazil feels that
the focus of inspections should be directed toward scheduled
facilities. Both parties agreed to continue working on this
issue so that all parties are satisfied on the selection
methodology.


8. (U) The A/S expressed the USG's appreciation to Brazil to
ensure the readiness of the OPCW TS to carry out a challenge
inspection, but said that the OPCW may not be quite ready to
conduct investigations of alleged use. A/S DeSutter noted
that the VC Bureau is putting together its own "cookbook" on
how it will pursue such investigations, and that we are
working closely with the OPCW on how it would conduct such
inspections, if that option is viewed as needed and useful.
She cited the example of press allegations of CW use in
Darfur, Sudan, and Burma. She reiterated that effective
tools are necessary to address this issue.

9. (U) A/S DeSutter also encouraged Brazil to continue
developing a leadership role in the region by continuing to
assist other States Party on CWC Article VII implementation
matters. She also urged them to continue to support
universal adherence to the CWC. And finally, her staff
provided Brazil with a brief status update of the U.S.
Destruction Program.

US/INDIA CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE
-------------- ---

10. (C) During lunch, Ambassador Guerreiro expressed
disappointment regarding the US/India Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation Initiative. He stated that the announcement came
as a shock to Brazil. In 1998, Brazil terminated its Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement with India in the wake of Indian
nuclear tests. He further noted that Brazil's history of
adhering late to the NPT, following much domestic political
debate, made any recognition of new weapons states
problematic for the GOB both in terms of Brazilian politics
and Brazil's commitment to the NPT. He said that at present,
Brazil is evaluating the impact of the US/India initiative to
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expressed concern about
the impact to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). DeSutter
responded by first noting that detailed discussions would
need to be deferred to her colleague A/S Rademaker and his
staff, but that the U.S. was not, by this policy, bringing
India into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state, but rather was
addressing the challenge of a nation that had remained
outside the NPT by moving to bring them into the IAEA and AP,
and that this could be viewed positively. She further stated
that the U.S. Congress would review the approach since legal
changes would be necessary. NSG issues would also be
addressed by her colleagues in the Nonproliferation Bureau,
which the Department is merging with the Arms Control Bureau
to form a new Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation.


11. (C) Guerreiro reiterated Brazil's commitment, along with
international efforts, to close supply loopholes that permit
proliferators to operate as defined under UN Resolution 1540.
Plans are in place for a nuclear workshop to address United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 through PRONABENS.
The Foreign Ministry presented its 1540 report to Congress
and is awaiting a response.

MEDIA EVENT
--------------

12. (U) A brief media event was held in the afternoon. In
attendance were reporters from three top Brazilian daily
newspapers. Questions covered various topics including
Brazil's nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the additional
protocol, and the IAEA. The A/S briefly discussed the
morning's meeting with Ambassador Guerreiro and explained the
USG's approach to compliance diplomacy.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE VICE CHAIR NILSON
-------------- --------------

13. (U) Concluding the visit was a meeting with Nilson
Mourao, Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Committee. A/S
DeSutter explained VC's legislative mandate and method of
operations, using Libya as an example of how VC coordinated
U.S. assistance to eliminate the country's WMD. The A/S
further explained about the reorganization of the arms
control and nonproliferation bureaus to address new areas
with emphasis on counter-proliferation and addressing the
nexus between terrorism and WMD. The A/S stressed Brazil's
role as a leader in bringing other countries in to
compliance. When asked about the bureau's opinion of the
IAEA's questions about the Rezende Nuclear Power Plant in Rio
de Janeiro, the A/S responded that they were comfortable with
the additional protocols laid out by the IAEA and Brazil.
The Brazil program is a peaceful program, in contrast to the
Iran program where evidence indicates that their government
has undertaken covert activities for a number of years. When
Mourao suggested that perhaps the U.S. should be more
cautious in examining Iran given that no nuclear weapons were
ever found in Iraq, A/S DeSutter first clarified that it was
not the USG's determination that Iraq had nuclear weapons but
that they had a program which was not very far along. Part
of the concern was the unaccounted materials in the ten years
following the end of the Gulf War. In the case of Iran, we
are not in a situation where other countries need to take the
USG's word regarding their weapons program. Rather, they can
refer to the IAEA Director General's reports to the Board of
Governors which detailed Iran's noncompliance actions during
the past two decades. Mourao concluded the meeting by
reassuring the A/S that though the Lula administration is
going through a delicate situation (scandals, etc.),Brazil's
democracy has succeeded in building its institutions, and
that the government is committed to disarmament. Mourao
promised to draft a brief report of the meeting to be sent to
the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the National
Defense for Security Committee.

A/S DeSutter approved this cable.

DANILOVICH