Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA212
2005-01-24 16:37:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL'S 2005 TRADE AGENDA: MORE OF THE SAME

Tags:  ETRD BR WTRO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000212 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR SCRONIN, KLEZNY
NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/DDEVITO/DANDERSON/EOLSON
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDA FOR JB PENN, U/S, FFAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD BR WTRO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S 2005 TRADE AGENDA: MORE OF THE SAME

REF: A) BRASILIA 94 B) SAO PAULO 89 C) 04 BRASILIA

3100 D) 04 BRASILIA 2882 E) 04 SAO PAULO 1659

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000212

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR SCRONIN, KLEZNY
NSC FOR MIKE DEMPSEY
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/DDEVITO/DANDERSON/EOLSON
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDA FOR JB PENN, U/S, FFAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD BR WTRO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S 2005 TRADE AGENDA: MORE OF THE SAME

REF: A) BRASILIA 94 B) SAO PAULO 89 C) 04 BRASILIA

3100 D) 04 BRASILIA 2882 E) 04 SAO PAULO 1659


1. (U) This cable has been coordinated with AmConsulate
Sao Paulo.


2. (SBU) Summary and Introduction. Changing the "geography
of trade" has become a Lula administration hallmark. Over
the past two years, the GoB has aggressively used Brazilian
and Mercosul trade policy to strengthen economic and
political ties with other developing countries, in part to
diversify Brazil's export markets, but more pointedly to
develop strategic partnerships with countries that can help
Brazil realize various geopolitical objectives. Private
sector critics claim the GoB's focus on developing country
partners has diverted its attention from securing more
lucrative economic opportunities through trade agreements
with the EU or with the United States (See Ref A).
Dissension within the government over trade policy is also
still evident with Ministers Furlan (Development and Trade)
and Rodrigues (Agriculture),who support the private sector
perspective, at odds with the Foreign Ministry, whose trade
strategy continues to enjoy the backing of President Lula.
Recent criticism of GoB trade policy by Minister Furlan
prompted a rebuttal by President Lula on January 18 in which
he justified a continuation of current policy in order to
further reduce the "dependence" of Brazil on the EU and the
United States. While there is widespread domestic support
for the priority the GoB has assigned to the global WTO trade
negotiations, substantial benefits from the Doha Round are
only expected over the long-term. A brief overview of
Brazil's trade agenda for 2005 is presented below. End
Summary and Introduction.

WTO - Doha Development Agenda


3. (SBU) In public comments laying out GoB trade priorities
for the coming year, Foreign Minister Amorim has stated
explicitly that the WTO Doha Round is Brazil's top priority.
In Amorim's view, the Doha Round represents an opportunity
for Brazil to press for elimination or reduction of the worst
trade distorting practices affecting global agricultural
trade -- the key demand for Brazil given that agriculture

accounted for about 42 percent of its exports, 34 percent of
its GDP, and 37 percent of its employment in 2004.


4. (SBU) In the WTO, the GoB will continue to actively
utilize its strategic partnerships with other developing
countries. The GoB is expected to maintain an assertive
stance in Geneva on agriculture reform; Brazil's sometimes
strident leadership of the G-20, even the failure of the
Cancun Ministerial in 2003, are seen here as having paid off
in Brazil's inclusion in the Five Interested Parties (FIPs)
process and in the eventual substance of the July negotiating
framework package.


5. (SBU) Amorim has acknowledged that negotiations on
market access for industrial products and services must also
proceed for a final package to emerge, suggesting that Brazil
may negotiate on these issues as part of strategic coalitions
formed around specific issues. He has also warned that
Brazil's posture in these and other areas may not always be
defensive, pointing to GoB formulation of proposals relating
to export credits and investment (local content
requirements). According to Ambassador Clodoaldo Hugueney,
Brazil's top WTO negotiator, the GoB hopes the Doha
negotiations can be wrapped up before the 2007 expiration of
an extended TPA either undermines an ambitious outcome or
causes an indeterminate delay in concluding the Round (Ref
C). (Note: Hugueney will soon be leaving his current post
to replace Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa as Ambassador to the
WTO.) While the nomination of Seixas Correa as WTO Director
General may have been largely prompted by Brazil's interest
in spoiling the candidacy of Uruguayan Carlos Perez del
Castillo, the GoB would relish having a Brazilian diplomat in
this key position during the final phase of the negotiations.

Mercosul-EU

6. (SBU) Amorim continues to list free trade talks with the
European Union as a GoB priority. The EU is Brazil's largest
export market, absorbing $24 billion worth of its goods in
2004, 25 percent of Brazil's total exports. While Amorim
conveys confidence that progress in the negotiations can be
made in 2005, he has also suggested that the talks may
proceed in tandem with the Doha negotiations. Bilateral
technical-level meetings were held December 2 last year in
Rio de Janeiro and are expected again in February. A meeting
between Minister Amorim and UE Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson in Davos at the end of January is meant to give
impulse to a Ministerial slated for March that will set a
work program for future discussions.


7. (SBU) Many Brazilian analysts are skeptical that the two
sides' differences can be bridged in 2005. Negotiations
broke down in October 2004 over inadequate offers put forward
by both sides. Mercosul's last offer was a retrenchment,
expanding product coverage to 90 percent, but reducing the
percentage receiving duty-free status from 87.5 percent to 82
percent. Mercosul offerings in government procurement, IPR
(geographic indicators),and investment were also deemed
insufficient by the EU, whose own offer capped certain
Mercosul agricultural exports at a level below current trade
flows. Agricultural products, which account for roughly 70
percent of Brazil's exports to the EU, have figured
prominently in the negotiations. While questioning the EU's
commitment to substantial agricultural trade liberalization,
Brazil's private sector, particularly those represented by
Sao Paulo's FIESP industrial federation (whose companies
generate 70 percent of the country's GDP) also fault Foreign
Ministry inflexibility and Mercosul internal disarray for the
breakdown in negotiations.

Free Trade Area of the Americas


8. (SBU) After FTAA negotiations went into abeyance in June
of last year, the FTAA at times was absent from listings by
Foreign Ministry officials of GoB trade priorities. However,
with the exchange of letters between out-going USTR Zoellick
and Minister Amorim at the end of 2004, the FTAA has again
crept onto the GoB trade agenda. Official GoB remarks state
a willingness to work in good faith with the U.S. as
co-chairs to identify a way forward for the negotiations;
Itamaraty highlights efforts for Amorim and Zoellick as well
as for DUSTR Allgeier and his counterpart Ambassador Bahadian
to meet to chart a course forward.


9. (SBU) However, this is less than a full embrace. In
recent interviews Amorim has again clarified that while an
FTAA is desirable, it is not essential for Brazil.
Describing the current FTAA impasse as caused by the USG's
insistence in negotiating rules for IPR, services and
investment without adequately addressing Brazil's demands on
agricultural subsidies, Amorim has emphasized that improved
access to the U.S. market is key for Brazil, and that a focus
on market access for goods would facilitate the negotiations.
Amorim also has reiterated that from Brazil's perspective,
market access discussions with the U.S. need not be within
the FTAA, but could also be pursued within a Mercosul-U.S.
FTA. The GoB position may have in fact hardened since last
June, if, as top daily Folha suggests, President Lula
believes he can prevail upon President Bush in a
post-election environment to show greater flexibility on
market access for key products, such as orange juice, sugar,
steel and beef, if the U.S. is serious about moving the FTAA
forward.


10. (SBU) Further complicating the public FTAA debate is the
reemergence of a (in our view, flawed) December 2003 Ministry
of Planning study which concludes that under an FTAA the
bilateral U.S.-Brazil trade balance would swing to $1 billion
in the USG's favor (Ref B). Although publicly Amorim claimed
the study supports his reticent stance toward the FTAA,
Antonio Simoes (the ForMin's Economic Advisor) admitted to
Ecouns in a January 12 converstaion, that no study, no matter
how well-designed, could accurately predict the impact of an
FTAA upon trade flows. Simoes, former head of Itamaraty's
FTAA Office, added that sensationalist press reporting of
items such as this only make it more difficult for the two
sides to reach consensus.


11. (SBU) While many economic analysts are not optimistic
about near-term prospects for the FTAA, they argue that the
FTAA is crucial for Brazil to avoid an erosion of 1) its
relative level of competitiveness in the U.S. market
vis-a-vis hemispheric competitors, and in other Latin markets
vis-a-vis U.S. producers, and 2) its attractiveness as an FDI
destination. Export growth to the United States has not kept
pace with the expansion of Brazil's exports overall; in 2004,
Brazil's exports to the world grew by 32 percent to reach
$96.5 billion, compared with a 20 percent increase in exports
headed to the United States to total $20.0 billion. In a
study released November 4, 2004, former ambassador to the
U.S. Rubens Barbosa and researchers from FIESP and the
Institute of Studies of Trade and International Negotiations
(Icone) claim Brazil's competitive position in the U.S.
market vis-a-vis other regional partners is eroding and urge
the GoB to address the issue in resumed FTAA negotiations
(Ref B). Some companies, including Dixie-Toga, whose
president is head of Sao Paulo's AmCham, have made public
their intention to consider investments in countries having
trade agreements with the U.S., rather than expand domestic
production.

Canada


12. (SBU) The substantive scope of soon to be launched
trade talks with Canada, and their relation to the FTAA, are
unclear. A joint communique issued during the visit of
Canada's Prime Minister, Paul Martin, in November last year
stated that he and President Lula "agreed to promote the
expansion of commercial relations between Mercosul and Canada
by means of market access negotiation in the areas of goods,
services and investments, in the context of the configuration
of a future FTAA." In a subsequent conversation with
Econoff, Canada's trade officer in Brasilia said the visit
had caused a stir in Ottawa resulting in conflicting
interpretations of what the "talks" would entail. Despite
Canada's uncertainty, its trade officer said there is no
doubt that Minister Amorim believes Canada and Mercosul will
be moving ahead with market access negotiations in the three
areas. Initial discussions may take place as early as
February.

South-South


13. (SBU) On December 20, Ambassador Regis Arslanian,
Itamaraty's Director of International Negotiations, outlined
prospects for 2005 for other trade negotiations. Although
Arslanian's list was lengthy, Ronaldo Costa Filho, who heads
up the European Union and Extra-Regional Negotiations
division for Arslanian, and Gilberto Goncalves de Siqueira,
deputy in Itamaraty's Regional Integration Division, told
Econoff that Mercosul's current plans include launching
negotiations in 2005 with only three additional countries:
Morocco, Egypt, and Mexico.


14. (SBU) Tariff preference negotiations, covering a
limited number of products, will proceed with Morocco and
Egypt based on relatively standard framework agreements
signed November 26 and December 16, 2004, respectively.
Indicative of Brazil's driving force behind Mercosul trade
policy, according to Costa, the negotiations with Morocco are
the result of intense lobbying by Brazil's Ambassador to
Morocco, former FTAA negotiator Carlos Alberto Simas
Magalhaes, while discussions between Minister Amorim and
Boutros Boutros-Ghali during a G-20 meeting in December 2003
have led to the negotiations with Egypt. Two-way trade
between Brazil and Morocco totaled only $560 million between
January and November 2004; with Egypt only $593 million over
the same period.


15. (SBU) The negotiations with Mexico follow up on the
GoM's stated intention of seeking Mercosul associate
membership, which requires a free trade agreement with the
bloc. The aim is to consolidate the trade agreements Mexico
has with individual Mercosul partners, which vary in terms of
coverage, to form a comprehensive Mercosul-Mexico FTA.
Brazil currently has an Economic Complementary Agreement with
Mexico, which covers only about 790 products, largely auto
parts, chemicals, and some agricultural products, and an
automotive agreement. Two-way Brazil-Mexico trade reached
$4.7 billion in 2004, dominated by Brazilian exports of $3.9
billion. Talk are expected to begin in the first semester of

2005.

Potential Negotiations


16. (SBU) Mercosul has established work programs for
exploratory talks both with countries of the Central American
Integration System (SICA) and with CARICOM. Sessions with
both groups are slated to take place in February and April,

2005. According to Siqueira, only after these sessions will
Mercosul determine if there is an adequate convergence of
interests to proceed with negotiations.


17. (SBU) According to Costa, Mercosul hopes to complete a
feasibility study on negotiations with South Korea by the end
of 2005. Nonetheless, he did not expect trade negotiations
to commence soon thereafter due to Brazilian private sector
concerns with Korean protectionism, particularly in
agriculture. Pakistan and Israel have recently notified
Mercosul of their interest in initiating trade negotiations.
Other countries that have conveyed an interest in developing
closer commercial relations with Brazil/Mercosul include: the
EFTA countries, Australia, New Zealand, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and Japan.

China


18. (SBU) As Brazil's largest market for soybeans and third
largest individual export destination, the GoB views China as
a key trading and geopolitical partner. In 2003, Brazilian
exports to China almost doubled totaling $4.5 billion. With
continued growth, exports reached $5.4 billion, and imports
$3.7 billion in 2004. The importance of the relationship was
evident in the state visits paid by both leaders in 2004.
However, Brazil's industrial sector is terrified of the
competitive giant, particularly following Lula's decision to
grant China "market economy" status (Refs D and E). Despite
an agreement during Lula's trip to China in May 2004 to
conduct a feasibility study on launching Mercosul-China trade
negotiations, Costa admitted to Econoff that work is not
proceeding even on terms of reference for the study. Even
without formal trade negotiations, China will remain one of
Brazil's more important commercial partners for the
foreseeable future, not only as a market for its primary
commodities, but also as source of infrastructure investment
and collaboration in certain technology-related areas,
including satellites and development of open-source software.

Russia


19. (SBU) There are no plans by Mercosul at this time to
negotiate a trade agreement with Russia. References by GoB
officials to trade talks typically refer to discussions on
resolving specific impediments to trade, such as Russia's ban
on imports of Brazilian beef stemming from foot and mouth
disease outbreaks. The two countries are also trying to
stimulate bilateral trade through export promotion activities.
Danilovich