BRAZIL: SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS DISCUSS HAITI WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001578

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS DISCUSS HAITI WITH
AMBASSADOR AND WHA DAS FISK

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 1543 AND 1497

B. BRASILIA 1479

C. STATE 104247

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D).

1.(C) Summary. In separate meetings with President Lula da
Silva's international affairs advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia on
8 June (Ambassador and PolCouns with Garcia and his deputy,
Marcel Biato) and new foreign ministry (MRE) Under Secretary
for Political Affairs Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Ambassador,
visiting WHA DAS Fisk and PolCouns with Patriota and MRE UN
division chief Glivania Oliveira),mission made ref c
demarche on USG concerns regarding the situation in Haiti.
In the discussions, the GOB officials made clear continued
Brazilian resolve to keep Aristide from returning to the
country or exerting political influence, and reiterated
Brazil's strategy that security, assistance and political
dialogue should move in tandem as priorities in the
international effort. The GOB officials registered USG
points on the need to curb spiraling violence and reinforce
MINUSTAH credibility vice the gangs, but did not clearly
share the same degree of urgency on this point. They noted
that public criticisms of MINUSTAH's performance serve to
further undermine its standing, and said clear signals of
resolve are needed in the form of decisions asap from the UN
on both a mandate extension and the naming of a new MINUSTAH
commander (the Brazilian candidate, General Tella Amaral, is
available, and current Brazilian MINUSTAH commander Heleno
can remain in Haiti through the course of the June technical
rollover.) End summary.

LULA FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA


2. (C) Using ref c guidance, Ambassador and PolCouns
indicated USG appreciation for Brazil's leadership role in
MINUSTAH, but stressed that the USG is increasingly concerned
about a major deterioration in security, especially in Port
au Prince. Referring candidly to information provided in
refs a, Ambassador and PolCouns recounted U.S. concerns about
expansion of gang incursions in the city center and port
area, the wave of kidnappings, and increasingly audacious
attacks that are creating a climate of fear and instability.
They noted the meeting between Secretary Rice and FM Amorim
in Florida on the margins of the OAS General Assembly in
which the Secretary cited the need for firm MINUSTAH action
and the possibility that the U.S. may be asked to send troops
at some point (to which FM Amorim reportedly replied U.S.
forces would be welcome under UN authorities). Ambassador
and PolCouns also stressed continued USG insistence that all
efforts must be made to keep Aristide from returning to Haiti
or influencing the political process, and asked whether the
GOB also remains firm on that point.


3. (C) Garcia visited Haiti for several days in October 2004,
and reiterated some views he had gleaned from that visit:
i.e., that security is a critical component, but must move in
tandem with assistance efforts that create immediate and
visible benefits for Haitians, and with an inclusive
political process. He said that the GOB still believes some
elements of Lavalas are willing to become involved in a
constructive dialogue and should be encouraged, but said the
GOB remains firm in the view that Aristide "does not fit in
with a democratic political future" in Haiti. Garcia seemed
somewhat surprised by USG views on the critical level of
violence, and also seemed cautious on the issue of
introduction of U.S. forces, but would not be drawn into
discussion. However, his deputy, Marcel Biato, followed up
with a number of specific questions regarding USG assessments
of flashpoints and the potential for a broader outbreak of
violence in the next few weeks. PolCouns and Biato undertook
to stay in contact on developments.


4. (C) PolCouns asked Garcia whether the GOB is concerned
that Brazilian casualties could spark popular reaction in
Brazil that would affect the GOB's ability to maintain forces
in Haiti. Garcia replied that Brazil's mission in Haiti "has
no shortage of critics" in Brazil, and "even one Brazilian
casualty" killed in violence (as opposed to accident or
health problems) could cause turbulence. Garcia said that
the situation is not unlike the U.S. in Iraq, and he observed
the USG is not permitting regular release of images of
returning U.S. casualties/KIAs in the media. That said,
Garcia did not indicate any weakening of GOB resolve in
continuing its presence in MINUSTAH. Indeed, he said that
Haiti (along with Bolivia) remains one of Brazil's most
crucial foreign policy priorities, as it is the textbook case
of the need for regional powers to work together in an effort
to stabilize/democratize a potentially failing state.

FOREIGN MINISTRY U/S FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ANTONIO DE AGUIAR
PATRIOTA


5. (C) WHA DAS Dan Fisk,in Brasilia with the U.S. Global
Forum IV delegation (see septels) and accompanied by
Ambassador Danilovich and PolCounselor, called on newly
appointed Under Secretary for Political Affairs Antonio de
Aguiar Patriota on 10 June to discuss Haiti. (Note: Patriota
assumed his new duties on 10 June and was previously chief of
staff to FM Amorim. End note.) Using ref c points, Fisk
emphasized that the USG is grateful for Brazil's leadership
in MINUSTAH, but expressed USG concern about growing
violence, saying that the gangs are "losing their fear" of
international PKO forces, creating violent instability and
conditions for Aristide to exert his influence. He asked for
GOB views on how the international community could keep
Aristide out of Haitian affairs and assist MINUSTAH in
reestablishing credibility.


6. (C) Patriota acknowledged that the situation on the ground
had become less stable in recent weeks, but opined that
violence appears to be "cyclical" in Haiti, with spikes and
lulls. He understood that there are concerns being expressed
that MINUSTAH has not been sufficiently robust, but also
observed -- and repeated -- that such criticisms, when made
publicly, can further undermine the force's credibility.
(Note: Ambassador and DAS Fisk replied that there was little
that could be done about negative media reports on MINUSTAH.
End note.) Patriota also said it is important to send other
clear signals of consistency and resolve, and in this context
the GOB hopes UNSC and UN DPKO can arrive asap on decisions
and announcements on both a 12 month mandate extension and a
new MINUSTAH military commander. On the latter point,
Patriota noted that FM Amorim had spoken by phone with SG
Annan in the past few days. Patriota confirmed Brazil has a
candidate ready, Brazilian Army three-star General Tella
Amaral, who currently heads Brazilian army intelligence.
Current MINUSTAH commander Heleno is available to remain
throughout the technical rollover of the mandate, Patriota
affirmed, adding that Brazil, as the main troop contributor,
would expect to retain overall military command in a new
mandate.


7. (C) On Aristide, Patriota said that the mere fact of
Aristide's existence will always be problematic in terms of
his influence on some elements of Haitian society, however
much the international community works to isolate him. That
said, the GOB had been encouraged by recent South African
Government commitments to Brazil that the GSA would not allow
Aristide to use his exile there to undertake political
efforts (NFI). It always remains important to include in
political dialogue those elements of Lavalas that are willing
to "leave Aristide behind them," Patriota said. Patriota and
Fisk agreed that accelerating and enhancing assistance
projects that have direct impact on Haitians remains a key
priority, and that the GOB and U.S. should work together in
this. Patriota observed that Brazil has 10 assistance
projects underway, in cooperation with IFI's, other countries
or on its own.


8. (C) Comment. Neither Garcia nor Patriota seemed seized
with the same degree of urgency on the security situation in
Haiti as the USG, as reflected in refs a and c. That said,
we believe they will take our points into careful account and
weigh them in the context of the Secretary's conversation
with FM Amorim at the OAS GA and new information being
brought back to Brasilia from Haiti this weekend by MRE envoy
Goncalo Mourao. For now, the GOB seems committed to its
long-stated strategy: pursuing, in tandem, security,
assistance and political dialogue as requisites for elections
and stability, with a Brazilian in command of MINUSTAH.

Danilovich