Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA1466
2005-05-31 18:17:00
SECRET
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ'S ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE - BRAZIL

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER BR VZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001466 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER BR VZ
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ'S ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE - BRAZIL

REF: A. STATE 43965

B. BRASILIA 1207

C. BRASILIA 1035

D. BRASILIA 1017

E. BRASILIA 660

F. BRASILIA 415

G. BRASILIA 223

H. USDEL SECRETARY TELEGRAMS 000005/000007/00004

I. (S/NF) TD-314/21795-05 11 APRIL 2005

J. (S/NF) TD-314/21753-05 11 APRIL2005.

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001466

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER BR VZ
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ'S ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE - BRAZIL

REF: A. STATE 43965

B. BRASILIA 1207

C. BRASILIA 1035

D. BRASILIA 1017

E. BRASILIA 660

F. BRASILIA 415

G. BRASILIA 223

H. USDEL SECRETARY TELEGRAMS 000005/000007/00004

I. (S/NF) TD-314/21795-05 11 APRIL 2005

J. (S/NF) TD-314/21753-05 11 APRIL2005.

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D)


1. (S) Ref A requested Mission's assessment of the extent
and nature of possible Venezuelan Goverment (GOV) and/or
"Bolivarian" activities in Brazil, GOB views of same and of
Chavez's regime in general. Refs B-H provided extensive
information on GOB political views on Chavez, with reporting
on various meetings between President Lula da Silva, FM
Amorim, Presidential Chief of Staff Dirceu and others in the
GOB with senior U.S. officials, including Secretary Rice
during her recent visit here. Ref I-J provide additional
insights on GOB assessments of Chavez. Those reports taken
together constitute our current response to reftel A's
question number four regarding Brazilian government attitudes
toward Chavez and the Bolivarian revolution. Below we
provide responses to other specific questions posed to post
by ref A regarding Venezuela and Brazil. We have omitted
responses to ref a questions for which we have no significant
data to offer.

WHAT ARE GOV TIES TO RADICAL GROUPS, ANTI-SYSTEMIC PARTIES,
EXTREME LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND/OR TERRORISTS, ETC?


2. (S/NF) According to sensitive reporting in late 2001, a
group of state-level officials from the Brazilian Workers,
Party (PT) formally organized the &Simon Bolivar Action
Group8. According to the charter, one of the goals of the
group was to unite efforts of the masses within Brazil and
the initiatives of the PT with other class struggles on the
continent. The charter mentioned the Cuban revolution and
Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution. At this time, no further
information is available on this initiative.


3. (S/NF) According to sensitive reporting from October 2003,
members of Brazil's main landless movement organization, the
MST, traveled to Venezuela, allegedly without the knowledge

of the Brazilian government, where they reportedly met with
Venezuelan President Chavez and also with indigenous groups
and farmers. In addition, prior to his departure from Brazil
in November 2003, former Venezuelan Ambassador to Brazil
Vladimir Villegas routinely traveled throughout Brazil and
may have been responsible for coordinating GOV outreach
efforts to the MST. There is also sensitive reporting
indicating that, from May-June 2003, Ambassador Villegas met
with PT and MST officials outside of Brasilia. During these
meetings, Villegas, discussions centered on explaining and
trying to build support for Venezuela's Bolivarian movement.
Villegas replaced General (r) Alberto Esqueda Torres as
ambassador to Brazil reportedly because Esqueda was
&passive8 on defending Chavez,s Bolivarian revolution and
had not worked hard enough to establish better ties with the
PT.

ARE THERE ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL HOSTED BY BOLIVARIAN GROUPS
AND/OR THE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY?


4. (S/NF) In March 2005, the University of Sao Paulo hosted a
conference entitled, &The revolution not seen on
television8; where the featured guest was the Venezuelan
Consul General in Sao Paulo, Jose Luis Duran. The event was
reportedly part of the Venezuelan Cultural and Social
Outreach Program to spread the word of the Bolivarian
revolution. Participating in the conference was a group
calling itself the &Bolivarian Circle of Sao Paulo8. The
goals of the group are not known. Also unknown is the level,
if any, of Venezuelan government support for the group.

WHAT IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THE PRESENCE OF
BOLIVARIAN GROUPS?


5. (SBU) To our knowledge, the GOB has not commented publicly
on the possible presence of such groups within Brazil.
However, senior GOB officials have stated recently and
publicly that "Brazil is not a Bolivarian country." Indeed,
the lack of a major Brazilian historical connection to the
Bolivarian movement and a rather thorough ignorance about and
lack of interest in Bolivar among Brazil's general public
suggest little traction within Brazil for Chavez's efforts to
appropriate the historical figure or contort his principles
to fit Chavez's ends. Brazil's radical movements, including
the MST landless organization and others, are essentially
homegrown. Mainstream media attitudes toward the "Bolivarian
revolution" are often skeptical, per additional information
on media perspectives below.

WHAT ARE BRAZIL'S COMMERCIAL TIES WITH VENEZUELA AND ANY NEW
BUSINESS OR TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE WORKS, ESPECIALLY IN
ENERGY AND MILITARY SECTORS?


6. (SBU) Per refs B-H, the GOB views commercial relations,
political engagement and pursuit of integration projects with
Venezuela as useful in pressing Chavez to moderate his
rhetoric and behave more constructively. There has been
discussion at several levels of various regional
infrastructure projects, in civil construction,
transportation, mining, and in the energy sector. The GOV is
also reportedly considering purchase of Brazilian Embraer AMX
attack jets and Super Tucano turboprop attack/training
aircraft, but it is not clear that contracts have been signed
as of this date.


7. (SBU) During President Lula,s trip to Venezuela in
February, Brazil,s parastatal oil company Petrobras signed
14 accords with PDVSA to increase joint cooperation in the
areas of exploration, refining, petrochemicals, ethanol and
biodiesel. The highlight was a joint venture to construct a
new USD 2.5 billion refinery in the Northeast of Brazil.
While the refinery may be the crown jewel of the Lula visit,
some question its strategic value to Petrobras. The refinery
deal appears to be a trade off; Petrobras would expand its
exploration and production activities in Venezuela
(particularly in the Orinoco area) in return for allowing
PDVSA entry into the Brazilian market. PDVSA and Petrobras
also reportedly intend to construct a USD 20 million
lubricant factory in Cuba, and Brazilian petrochemical
conglomerate &Braskem8 and PDVSA subsidiary Pequiven are
evaluating opportunities in thermoplastic resins.

HOW DOES THE MAINTSTREAM MEDIA -- MAJOR DAILIES ON BOTH LEFT
AND RIGHT -- VIEW CHAVEZ AND HIS ROLE IN THE REGION?


8. (SBU) The Brazilian media,s take on President Chavez
depends largely on the political inclination of the
publications and of the individual pundits. Conservative
newspapers such as "O Estado de Sao Paulo" have repeatedly
issued warnings about the danger Chavez represents to
democratic institutions and to economic prospects in
Venezuela and throughout the region. In an op-ed dated March
27, published just after Chavez implemented yet another set
of laws curtailing civil liberties, "O Estado" wrote that:
&Hugo Chavez has once more demonstrated what the so-called
progressive, leaders are capable of when it comes to
asphyxiating fundamental liberties. The new laws punish those
who stage marches and public protests, and restrict the right
of opinion and freedom of the press by threatening whoever
criticizes the government along with the newspapers that
publish such criticism. Chavez is keeping up with an old
tradition of Latin America's dictators. If (President) Lula
wants to enter into history and honor his oath of protecting
the constitution, he must not allow any parallelism between
his administration and Venezuela's.8


9. (SBU) Commentators with leftist tendencies are usually
more accepting of Chavez, who some see as a counterweight to
alleged U.S. attempts at regional dominance, but most
left-leaning mainstream pundits do not condone his checks on
civil liberties. Writer and columnist Carlos Heitor Cony
opined in liberal "Folha de Sao Paulo" on May 5:
&Venezuela's case has all the elements to repeat what
happened in Iraq, unless the State Department succeeds in
deposing Chavez without resorting to bombing Caracas on
behalf of democracy..... Supporting Chavez in his resistance
against the U.S. drive to control one of the largest oil
reserves in the world does not mean supporting a president
accused of so much wrongdoing...." Coverage of Chavez in
Brazil is limited by the fact that Buenos Aires is the only
Latin American capital where Brazilian newspapers maintain
correspondents. Chavez gets more attention from the Brazilian
media either when he travels to Brazil, or when President
Lula goes to Venezuela.


10. (SBU) During a working lunch with PA officers, Claudia
Dianni, a reporter with leading circulation daily, "Folha de
Sao Paulo" and Andre Soliani, a deputy editor with political
and economic analysis magazine "Primeira Leiture," both
remarked that Chavez might have inherited some of the
&romantic8 imagery usually associated by the Latin American
left with Fidel Castro as a champion of Latin America against
the oppression from capitalism and the United States. This
perception coexists with the understanding that Chavez,s
efforts to limit civil liberties are highly objectionable.

WHAT ARE BRAZIL'S VISA AND IMMIGRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
VENEZUELAN PASSPORT HOLDERS?


11. (U) Brazil does not require visas for Venezuelans
visiting Brazil.

ARE THERE BORDER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE OR PLANNED
FOR THE VENEZUELAN BORDER?


12. (SBU) At present, there is no comprehensive system or
plan for border security posts on the frontier with
Venezuela. Brazilian military and Federal Police units are
stationed throughout the Amazon frontier areas with Venezuela
and Colombia, but they are relatively few in number
considering the vast size of the territory, much of it
covered by triple-canopy jungle that makes patrol and
surveillance extremely difficult. Brazil's Amazon
Surveillance System (SIVAM),a USD 1.6 billion dollar network
of radars, electronic sensors and airborne surveillance
platforms provides a sophisticated degree of aerial coverage,
at least at high altitudes, but ground and riverine coverage
is much sparser and more sporadic. The GOB and GOV have had
numerous discussions on enhanced border security cooperation,
both bilaterally and in conjunction with Colombia and Peru
(NFI).

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF EXISTING OR PLANNED MILITARY-MILITARY
COOPERATION WITH THE GOV?


13. (SBU) The Brazilian and Venezuelan navies normally
conduct an annual joint exercise, VENEBRAS, but DAO Brasilia
has not been able to confirm whether this will proceed in

2005. We have no other information at this time on joint
exercises.


DANILOVICH