Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA1252
2005-05-11 16:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

ARAB-SOUTH AMERICA SUMMIT: BRAZIL LOSES CONTROL

Tags:  PREL ETRD PGOV XR XF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001252 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD PGOV XR XF
SUBJECT: ARAB-SOUTH AMERICA SUMMIT: BRAZIL LOSES CONTROL

REF: A. BRASILIA 1229

B. BRASILIA 1230

C. BRASILIA 1231

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PHILLIP CHICOLA, REASONS 1.4 (b
& d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001252

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD PGOV XR XF
SUBJECT: ARAB-SOUTH AMERICA SUMMIT: BRAZIL LOSES CONTROL

REF: A. BRASILIA 1229

B. BRASILIA 1230

C. BRASILIA 1231

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PHILLIP CHICOLA, REASONS 1.4 (b
& d)


1. (C) SUMMARY and INTRODUCTION: Despite its confident
demeanor going into the Arab-South America Summit, the GOB
has stumbled in its handling, trying to manage an event
involving heads of state when national interests are
incongruent. It is proving to be beyond Itamaraty's ability.
Perhaps the most embarrassing moment for President Lula was
the sudden departure May 10 from Brasilia of President
Kirchner who appeared to have reached his limit with
Brazilian insensitivity to Argentine interests. Close behind
was Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim's inability to keep
problematic political language out of the Summit Declaration
which radical Arab participants had sought. The USG had
earlier pointed out to the GOB the possible consequences of
such language. While Itamaraty, desirous to be all things to
all people, tried to reassure the USG that our concerns would
be addressed, nonetheless, Amorim and company, as part of the
effort to please their Arab guests, felt obliged to accept
the Arab-drafted language. We also note that the only
visible South American leader, besides Lula and Kirchner, is
that master scene stealer, Hugo Chavez.


2. (C) The GOB has clearly lost control of the Summit which
concludes Wednesday, and many pundits here are already
questioning the value of the entire endeavor. While it is too
early to determine the consequences of the chaotic Summit on
Brazil's global leadership aspirations, Brazil's reputation
has not been enhanced by it. End Comment

Kirchner Walks
--------------


3. (C) During the first day of the Arab-South America
Summit May 10, President Lula and the Government of Brazil
appear to have lost control of events. Most serious for
Brazil was the abrupt May 10 departure of Argentine President
Nestor Kirchner from Brasilia, standing up President Lula for
a scheduled dinner and leaving a trail of recriminations in
his wake. According to press reports, Kirchner felt the
political purpose of the Summit had become "exhausted,"

although the final Summit Declaration issued Tuesday did
contain language calling on both Argentina and Great Britain
to reopen negotiations over the Falkland Islands. While
Kirchner's anger with the politicized nature of the Summit
and the attacks on non-attending countries may have been
real, his keenest frustration was bilateral -- with Brazil.
Weeks of controversy led by Argentine Foreign Minister Rafael
Bielsa over Brazil's soaring trade surplus with Argentina,
and Argentina's own efforts to remedy the commercial
imbalance, boiled over during a "neuralgic" May 9 dinner with
Kirchner, Lula, and Hugo Chavez, according to press reports.
Reportedly, the straw that broke the camel's back was
Brazil's decision not to assist Argentina in its negotiations
with the IMF, as requested by the GOA.


4. (C) Kirchner's abandonment of the Summit could not have
come at a worse time for President Lula, as the GOB's own
ability to retaliate, in the midst of the highest profile
international event ever held in the Brazilian capital, was
severely constrained. While some senior Brazilian officials
hinted at a "hardening" of Brazil's relations to its southern
neighbor, an irritated Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and
President Lula's Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia
sought, unconvincingly, to minimize the damage.

Arab Hardliners and Chavez Have Their Way
--------------


5. (C) Meanwhile, inside the Convention Center, Brazilian
diplomacy appears to have taken a backseat to the Arab States
and Venezuelan President Chavez. Frontpage headlines in
Brazilian newspapers May 11 stated boldly that Israel and the
United States were the Summit's targets, and numerous
national statements made mention of both countries.
Interrupting Iraqi President Jalal Talabani during his
speech, Chavez shouted a rejection of the (U.S.-led) invasion
of Iraq. His words, reportedly, were met by a "choking
silence" from the other leaders. Summit Co-chair Algerian
President Bouteflika retorted that friends of Iraq were
friends of the Arab countries. However, he then sought to
conciliate Chavez: "We do not accept state occupations in any
part of the world. Nevertheless, I do not believe there is a
difference between the ideals of Presidents Chavez and
Talabani." Later, according to reports, "with a smile on his
face" Talabani rebuffed Chavez by saying (he) "needs to know
more about the history" of Iraq.


6. (C) The GOB appears to have given way in every important
instance. That there was something for almost every Arab
state in the final Summit Declaration is well borne out. All
evidence to the contrary, the Government of Sudan is praised
for "facilitating international assistance to the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur." Despite repeated Brazilian
promises over many months that the Summit Declaration would
not contain language inimical to Middle East peace efforts,
the final text contains problematic paragraphs that existed
in earlier declaration drafts. In addition to the demand
that Israel withdraw to its June 4, 1967 frontiers, the
declaration also calls on Israel to comply with the
International Court of Justice July 2004 decision on
dismantling the security wall. In its only specific mention
of the United States, the Summit Declaration "Expresses
profound concern with the unilateral sanctions imposed on
Syria by the Government of the United States and considers
the so-called 'Syria Accountability Act' a violation of the
principles of international law and constitutes a
transgression against the objectives and principles of the
United Nations..."


7. (C) As contained in earlier drafts, the Summit
Declaration calls for combating terrorism "in all its forms
and manifestations" and calls for a United Nations conference
"to study this phenomenon and to define terrorism as a
crime." However, as the USG had feared the text also
"Reaffirms the non-acceptance of foreign occupation and
recognize the right of states and peoples to resist foreign
occupation in accordance with the principles of international
legality and in compliance with international humanitarian
law."


8. (C) Comment: It appears the Summit has become exactly
what the GOB assured the USG it wanted to avoid: an
opportunity for the Arab states to criticize the U.S. and
Israel. It has also been a disappointing effort towards
achieving stronger economic and commercial ties between the
two regions, the ostensive purpose of the Summit in the first
place. Even while the Summit is in progress, at least three
Arab delegations interested in purchasing Brazilian defense
equipment reportedly were unable to get substantive audiences
with Brazil Defense Minister/Vice President Jose Alencar who
appears to have lost interest in his defense portfolio. An
international spotlight -- if one were needed -- on
intra-South American squabbles lays open Brazil's own 'tin
ear' for the concerns of its smaller neighbors. Although the
final Summit declaration calls for reform of the United
Nations -- codewords for Brazil's blind ambition to obtain a
permanent Security Council seat -- the inability of President
Lula and the GOB to keep the cats herded while in Brasilia
calls into question Brazil's ability as a leader of the
"South" in the international community. Indeed, the overall
tone of Brazilian media coverage ranges from reserved
skepticism to strong criticism of the GOB's handling of the
event, and questions the value of the initiative for Brazil
in real terms


9. (C) Comment cont.: While it is too soon to say the
Summit will backfire on Brazil's own global leadership and UN
Security Council aspirations, at this stage it is certain
that Brazil's cause was not enhanced. Emotions within GOB
leadership will no doubt rise to the surface after the Summit
(mercifully) ends May 11. We expect that when Brazilian
commentators pronounce on the GOB's poor performance,
Itamaraty will seek to blame the poor turnout of Arab leaders
and the Summit's disappointing outcome on the United States.
Never mind that Iraqi President Talabani was one of the few
Arab leaders to show up in Brasilia.

Chicola