Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA9593
2005-10-07 21:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KCRM CO AUC FARC 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009593 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KCRM CO AUC FARC
SUBJECT: NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC
STATEMENT, GOC HAS 10 DAYS TO RESTORE PEACE PROCESS MOMENTUM

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009593

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KCRM CO AUC FARC
SUBJECT: NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC
STATEMENT, GOC HAS 10 DAYS TO RESTORE PEACE PROCESS MOMENTUM

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Wood on
October 7, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo described
paramilitary leaders as distrustful of President Uribe and
scared of extradition, but confirmed GOC extradition policy
would remain unchanged following the October 6 AUC statement
suspending demobilizations. Restrepo said the GOC calculates
it has about 10 days to ensure that the peace process regains
its momentum before pending demobilizations, and the December
31 deadline, are threatened. He noted that more than 1,000
members of the Bloque Central Bolivar had left the
concentration zone for demobilization and returned to the
field. Restrepo expressed great concern that the GOC would
struggle to secure the security corridors left exposed by the
pending demobilizations of the Bloque Central Bolivar, and
said Colombians are insufficiently attentive to the FARC
retaking control of the areas. End summary.

--------------
Restrepo: Paras Distrustful, Scared
--------------


2. (C) Restrepo said the paramilitary leaders with whom he
met in Santa Fe de Ralito October 6 distrust President Uribe
and are scared that they could be extradited to the U.S.
Their behavior and statements were not "radical"; rather,
they appeared to lack confidence in the president and the
peace process. The leaders told him they are the stronger
"third generation" of paramilitary leaders and they fear
being accused by their followers of selling out if they do
not ensure that Don Berna is safe from extradition, for they
could be next (Colima prison is the "antechamber to
extradition," they believe). The leaders say Uribe takes
decisions over their heads and makes it difficult for them to
defend the peace process to their subordinates. Restrepo
described the behavior of demobilized leader Salvatore
Mancuso as especially revealing: he had his head in his hands

frequently, and appeared scared at times and dumbfounded
("tonto") at others. He asked for forgiveness for his deeds
and told Restrepo he did not even want to be at Ralito for
the meeting. Similarly, Vicente Castano sent a letter to
Restrepo saying he would not participate in the meeting.
Restrepo said demobilized commanders (like Mancuso and
Castano) are in the worst of all positions, in that they have
no troops to command and rely on the GOC for their security.


3. (C) The leaders told Restrepo they feared "judicial
uncertainty" and requested legal guarantees that they would
not be extradited. As stated in an October 7 presidential
press release (see para 10),Restrepo said "judicial
certainty" does not depend on legal norms but rather on the
political credibility of the peace process. In turn, such
credibility is intimately linked to the seriousness with
which the paramilitaries approach their obligations under the
Justice and Peace law. Restrepo told the paramilitaries
Uribe had to take the decision to transfer Don Berna to
Colima to maintain the integrity of the peace process.
Restrepo emphasized that Uribe made the decision some time
before Ambassador Wood characterized as "disappointing"
Uribe's decision to suspend Don Berna's extradition. In the
GOC's view, sending Don Berna to Combita does not violate any
GOC undertaking; the Justice and Peace law requires
paramilitary leaders such as Don Berna to be incarcerated in
"serious prisons."


4. (C) According to Restrepo, the leaders at Ralito
requested that the GOC issue a joint declaration saying that
demobilizations were suspended; dialogue would restart; and
Don Berna would have the same "probation" (i.e., freedom to
move around and meet with people) as ELN leader Francisco
Galan. The GOC declined the suggestions. Restrepo said the
GOC offered the paramilitaries two options: first, that the
GOC would seek their suggestions on how the "Casas de
Justicia y Paz" (justice centers) would operate (Restrepo did
not elaborate); and second, that the GOC would reaffirm its
recognition of Don Berna as a paramilitary leader. According
to Restrepo, it is "practically impossible" to go beyond
these offers.

-------------- --------------
Ambassador: GOC Has Made Great Progess, Should Stay Course
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Noting he was reading from instructions, the
Ambassador told Restrepo the GOC should remember it was
negotiating from a position of strength. Don Berna is in a
serious prison, thousands have demobilized, and remaining
leaders feel vulnerable. The behavior of paramilitary
leaders is a test for the peace process. The Ambassador said
the U.S. was not looking for a public confirmation of the
GOC's continued commitment to extradition; rather, the U.S.
wants to know privately that doors have not closed, and that
the GOC's firm policy on extradition remains intact. He
expressed concern at the AUC's statement about "redefining"
the "rules of the game," a position the Ambassador suggested
was a codeword for reexamining extradition. In the
Ambassador's view, this is not the time for punishments or
vengeance. The GOC should, however, insist on the December
31 date by which paramilitaries must demobilize to receive
benefits under the Justice and Peace law.

--------------
GOC Extradition Policy Will Not Change
--------------


6. (C) Restrepo was clear that the GOC would not change its
extradition policy in response to paramilitary demands
("definitely no extradition on the table"). He agreed with
the Ambassador that the policy is somewhat ambiguous with
regard to paramilitary leaders: a subjective GOC assessment
of leaders' compliance with Justice and Peace obligations
would be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to
decide an extradition case. Paramilitary leaders know the
GOC will assess their behavior carefully before making a
judgment to extradite. Even if the leaders comply in full
(which the Ambassador said he doubted in cases such as Don
Berna),the GOC still had the option of extraditing.
Restrepo agreed that this was the nub of the paramilitaries'
concern: they want to shut the legal door on the possibility
of extradition and the GOC cannot agree. The Ambassador and
Restrepo agreed that extradition would not be the subject of
a GOC-paramilitary negotiation.

-------------- ---
GOC Considers it has 10 Days to Restore Momentum
-------------- ---


7. (C) About 10 days remain for the GOC to restore the peace
process and demobilization momentum, in Restrepo's view. Any
delay beyond that date risks the process unraveling. The GOC
must retake control of the peace process but should avoid
issuing an "ultimatum," he said. (Text of the GOC's
preliminary response to the October 6 AUC statement is at
para 10.)


8. (C) Restrepo expressed concern at the recent dispersal of
1,000 of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB) paramilitaries from
their initial demobilization concentration zones. (The
3,500-strong BCB is the backbone of the paramilitary
movement.) He said the availability of cheap weapons and the
ease with which paramilitaries could return to their previous
zones of influence worried the GOC. Restrepo will not meet
with Don Berna October 7 to avoid the impression he is
negotiating with him in the wake of the October 6 AUC
statement. Rather, Restrepo plans to call Don Berna next
week and offer to reaffirm his role as a paramilitary leader
and peace process negotiator, and suggest communication
options from Colima so Don Berna can continue to persuade his
followers to disarm. (Restrepo has heard from two sources
that Don Berna is not in agreement with paramilitary leader
Ernesto Baez's October 6 AUC statement. Don Berna apparently
fears being "too radical," a position that could push Uribe
to authorize his extradition.) The GOC will hold out the
possibility of additional jail visits for Don Berna.
Restrepo said the GOC will also try to convince Don Berna and
his supporters that the GOC has not locked the cell door and
thrown away the key. It is in his interest, and that of his
followers, to fulfill his Justice and Peace commitments to
the letter, Restrepo said.

--------------
Restrepo Fears FARC Incursions
--------------


9. (C) In Restrepo's view, Colombians do not sufficiently
appreciate the dangers of the FARC (and to some extent the
ELN) retaking control of stategic territory when the BCB
demobilizes. BCB demobilizations would open up key corridors
to FARC incursions, such as a corridor to Uraba (the site of
the San Jose de Apartado massacre). The GOC cannot get more
out of its police and military forces, who are stretched to
the limit. Restrepo said he was pleased when Uribe told him
he had recently removed General Cabellos from command;
Restrepo said Ceballos always offered excuses and analyses
rather than action when asked to deliver security.

--------------
Text of October 7 Presidential Press Release
--------------


10. (U) Begin unofficial Embassy translation of October 7
presidential press release:

Judicial security for those that will benefit from Justice
and Peace Law will depend on their seriousness in complying
with the Law, in order to generate national and international
credibility.

No norms will guarantee security of the process; lack of
seriousness does not generate credibility. Despite the
perceived inflexibility of a norm that has been adopted to
guarantee judicial security, if there is no credibility, it
becomes absolete.
In public opinion and in the contemporary world,
characterized by interrelations between people, judicial
norms and the decisions that have to do with justice and
peace processes can only be stable if the compliance is
serious and it meets expectations, dispel doubts, and
finally, generates the necessary legitimacy that corresponds
to credibility from all beneficiaries.

Only if there is seriousness is there credibility. Only if
there is credibility is there seriousness.

End text of October 7 presidential press release.
WOOD