GOC SEEKS ASSISTANCE TO REINFORCE SECURITY AFTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009566

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR EAID ASEC SNAR CO OAS AUC FARC
SUBJECT: GOC SEEKS ASSISTANCE TO REINFORCE SECURITY AFTER
PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GOC is seeking USG assistance to strengthen
security in areas formerly occupied by demobilized
paramilitaries. Thus far, there have only been isolated
incidents of FARC incursions into former paramilitary
territory, but the FARC could become emboldened as the
demobilization process advances. Peace Commissioner Restrepo
provided the Embassy with an analysis and budget request for
USG financial assistance to place an additional 10,000
National Police forces in areas left by paramilitary fighters
(copy e-mailed to WHA/AND). The updated proposal warns that
recent demobilizations in disputed areas could lead to more
guerrilla control unless the Colombian public forces move to
defend them. In particular, the GOC is concerned that Norte
de Santander, Valle Del Cauca, and Antioquia Departments, all
with significant guerrilla populations, could be at risk.
The Police and Army forces have stressed that redistributing
forces will tax other missions, including the operation
against the FARC, Plan Patriota. End Summary.

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SECURITY A POTENTIAL ACHILLES HEEL
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2. (C) High Commissioner for Peace Restrepo submitted an
updated proposal to the Embassy on September 27 that requests
financial assistance to place 10,000 police in zones where
paramilitaries have demobilized. GOC officials, NGOs, and
international interlocutors like the OAS, argue that
demobilization successes could be undermined if the GOC fails
to strengthen its forces in areas of former paramilitary
influence. In mid-September, paramilitary leaders in the
Atlantic region warned that they would probably not
demobilize before the GOC's December 31 deadline because they
feared the government would fail to secure the area in time
-- approximately 6,000 are expected to demobilize in this
region.


3. (C) The GOC is concerned that Norte de Santander, Valle
Del Cauca, and Antioquia Departments, all with significant
guerrilla populations, could face further FARC incursions.
For example, during a demobilization that took place in Santa
Fe de Ralito in late August, the FARC kidnapped four
individuals in a municipality close to Ralito area. News of
the kidnapping set off the mass displacement of at least 400
peasants, some declaring that the FARC had warned them to
leave. Government authorities expressed concern at the time
that the FARC would seek to move into the Ralito area as
police forces were assuming control.

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GOC SEEKS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY PRESENCE
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4. (C) The Restrepo proposal stresses that the greatest
challenge faced by the peace process is the consolidation of
state presence in areas where the paramilitaries formerly
operated. It also identifies problems, defines objectives,
and proposes solutions to prevent guerrilla incursion:

-- Problems: 1) the National Police currently lack the
personnel and resources to guarantee a permanent presence in
demobilization areas; 2) drug cartels could return to
demobilization areas; 3) communities fear armed groups
returning; and 4) citizens lack confidence in the GOC's
ability to respond to security threats against their
communities.

-- Specific Objectives: 1) reinforce police stations in
areas that previously had a significant paramilitary
presence; 2) create new police stations in areas designated
by the National Police; 3) strengthen the Counternarcotics
Police to eradicate more drug crops and dismantle drug
infrastructures; 4) implement the &Safe Departments and
Municipalities Programs" led by the National Police and the
Ministries of the Interior and Justice; and 5) identify
financing alternatives at departmental and municipal levels.

-- Proposal: The GOC proposes to create a permanent presence
in demobilization areas by: 1) Increasing the size of the
National Police force by 10,000 trained personnel that can
guarantee security in urban and rural demobilization areas.
The GOC proposes a gradual increase in police strength of
10,000 spread equally over three years; and 2) training
officers during a period of six months on Community,
Antidrug, Judicial, Intelligence, and Urban and Rural
Vigilance policing techniques.

-- Costs: The GOC's request solicits international assistance
for approximately 1.07 trillion pesos (roughly USD 465
million) over three years to train 10,000 new police and
build 150 new police outposts. The GOC estimates the amount
could increase by 5 percent over the second and third years,
making the potential total USD 479 million. The GOC is
expected to pay for the salaries and benefits for the new
police, but it is not clear if it has yet identified the
funds.

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SECURITY FORCES REQUIRE COORDINATION TO RESPOND
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5. (C) Army officials indicate they would be able to place up
to 3,800 soldiers in demobilized areas by the end of 2005 if
directed. The new forces would be made up of Mobile Brigade
14, Mobile Brigade 15, the new 30th Brigade, and other units.
If the National Police moved all new police school graduates
to the area and received new resources, it would be able to
have 6,000 new police in the areas by December 2006.


6. (C) The Police and Army could establish a prioritized
order and staffing plan to cover the former para-controlled
areas, but neither has yet been advised when or how to begin
a buildup. Moreover, the Army's mission is to defend the
nation rather than to maintain public order, making it
unclear when the Army forces would leave those areas and turn
over operations to the Police.
WOOD