PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV CO ELN
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION
AND IS SURPRISED BY SUPPORT FOR ELN TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on September
22 told the Ambassador that the GOC is inclined not to
extradite Diego Murillo AKA "Don Berna" at the moment because
it would endanger future demobilizations and Don Berna
remains an important player in ensuring these demobilizations
happen. The Ambassador responded that not extraditing Don
Berna would feed domestic and international critics of the
peace process. Restrepo agreed to delay any public
announcement on Don Berna until the Ambassador has had the
opportunity to consult with Washington and speak again to
President Uribe. Restrepo also updated the Ambassador on the
public and private support the GOC has received for its
preliminary peace talks with the National Liberation Army of
Colombia (ELN). He contrasted this with the unenthusiastic
response to the GOC's decision to allow 38 jailed
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members to
benefit from Justice and Peace (J&P) law sentence reductions.
End summary.

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GOC LEANING IN FAVOR OF KEEPING DON BERNA IN COLOMBIA
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2. (C) Restrepo expressed ambivalence about Don Berna's
extradition. On the one hand, he is aware of the political
implications, in particular with the USG and NGOs, of
refusing to extradite him given ongoing criticism the GOC's
negotiations with the AUC. Nevertheless, his primary goal is
to demobilize the remaining paramilitary structures during
the next three months and Don Berna remains an important
player in ensuring this happens.


3. (C) Restrepo explained that if the GOC were to announce
Don Berna's extradition now it could generate "panic," freeze
future demobilizations, and lead those leaders imprisoned in
Santa Fe de Ralito to try to escape. There is already fear
and resistance after meetings last week with AUC leaders when
he made clear that demobilized paramilitary leaders would
serve time in prison. He was told that his announcement had
angered many AUC members, especially those in the middle
ranks, and that his statement threatened the current peace
talks with the remaining paramilitary blocks.


4. (C) Restrepo insisted that his hesitation to extradite Don
Berna did not extend to the other 10 to 12 key AUC leaders.
If Don Berna is extradited, however, Restrepo foresees a
significant change in the atmosphere, which could affect
ongoing peace talks and spark paramilitary violence. He
emphasized that the GOC would need significant USG security
assistance if this occurred. He drew on his experience as a
psychologist to express particular concern for the state of
mind of the paramilitaries, whom he described as "bandits
willing and able to do harm." His preference was not to
scare them, but instead to encourage them to continue to
"enter the corral" and participate in the process. Meanwhile,
he said that AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso wanted to speak to
the USG because he is willing to consider serving some time
in the United States and could convince others to do the
same. Other AUC leaders have suggested that after being
convicted in Colombia, they would like to serve their time in
another country. The rational for this is that they have no
opportunities here and their lives would be in danger from
fellow AUC and FARC members.

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AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED USG POSITION ON EXTRADITION
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5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG wants Don Berna's
extradition for judicial and political reasons. Judicially,
the USG has been able to support the Justice and Peace (J&P)
law because the GOC promised it would not negotiate
extradition. The J&P law denies benefits for illegal
activities conducted for personal gain before membership. The
law permits the serving of sentences abroad. Therefore,
there should be no obstacle for Don Berna or others to be
extradited to the United States. Don Berna personally
benefited from illicit activities before and during his
membership in the AUC. Don Berna has also been accused of
complicity in the killing of a government official while
negotiating, thus violating the ceasefire, and his subsequent
denial of responsibility for this crime makes him eligible
for trial in the regular criminal justice system.


6. (C) From the political perspective, the Ambassador said he
understood Uribe's concern about the political cost of
extradition while trying to demobilize paramilitaries.
Nevertheless, showing a firm hand with respect to the rule of
law would help to further legitimize the process. The
Ambassador said that in his meetings on September 23 with
Governor Gaviria of Antioquia, Mayor of Medellin Fajardo and
General Carillo, both Gaviria and Carillo favored Don Berna's
extradition, and the Mayor did not oppose the idea. (Berna
had an extensive network in Medellin.)


7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the intense focus in the U.S.
and elsewhere on Colombia's demobilization and reinsertion
efforts. An announcement like that for Salvatore Mancuso,
that the GOC was suspending Don Berna's extradition "while he
assisted the peace process" would undercut support for the
demobilization process and the J&P law. It would also
undermine Uribe's credibility shortly after his conversations
with members of the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador asked that
there be no public statement until he again discussed it with
President Uribe.

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POTENTIAL TALKS WITH ELN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT...
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8. (C) Restrepo said that in the past days he has received
more local and international support on potential peace talks
with the ELN than he has had during his three years trying to
promote peace with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC). Politicians, former Presidents, the Catholic Church,
and the Swedish and Norwegian governments have expressed
their willingness to help in the process. With the AUC, he
struggled to "fill a van of supporters," while with the ELN
he has already had to "hire three large buses and turn people
back." He was appreciative of the reiteration of USG support
for the process and emphasized his hope that the ELN would
take advantage of it.


9. (C) Restrepo speculated that the talks might succeed
because of tensions between the ELN and the FARC. In recent
weeks, the FARC has intensified its threats against the ELN
leadership and warned them to withdraw from negotiations or
expect a war. Restrepo said the FARC's tactic of
discouraging the ELN from negotiating may benefit the
government. Specifically, he thought the threats could
backfire by convincing the ELN to negotiate now before
fighting with the FARC weakens them further.

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...BUT SUPPORT FOR FARC'S 38 J&P PETITION IS WEAK
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10. (C) Restrepo understood the political cost of allowing
the petition of the 38 jailed FARC members to participate
under the Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but underscored the
overall value of this and similar future requests. He
explained that accepting these requests weakens FARC morale
and helps the GOC collect intelligence against the
guerrillas. He hoped to put the FARC members interested in
participating in the J&P law through a rigorous interrogation
process, which could confirm their identification and extract
relevant intelligence. He added that he has a list of an
additional 150 FARC members waiting for a response from the
GOC regarding their petitions to participate under the J&P
law.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) We believe that we can persuade the Uribe
Administration not to suspend Don Berna's extradition on an
open-ended basis like they did for Mancuso. But we doubt we
can get a decision for immediate extradition by the September
29 deadline.
WOOD