Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA6056
2005-06-24 22:04:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

JUSTICE AND PEACE BECOMES LAW

Tags:  PGOV KJUS PHUM SNAR PTER CO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006056 

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM SNAR PTER CO
SUBJECT: JUSTICE AND PEACE BECOMES LAW

REF: A. BOGOTA 3555

B. BOGOTA 3223

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006056

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM SNAR PTER CO
SUBJECT: JUSTICE AND PEACE BECOMES LAW

REF: A. BOGOTA 3555

B. BOGOTA 3223


1. (U) Summary: More than a year after the government
introduced its first draft and after six months of intensive
debate, the demobilization legislation commonly known as the
"Justice and Peace" law was passed by the Senate and House
plenaries on June 20 and 21, respectively, and the conference
committee version was completed on June 22. The law calls
for a five to eight year period in confinement for confessed
serious crimes, six to nine or more years of confinement for
unconfessed serious crimes, a probation period of half the
time in confinement, investigations of criminal activity, and
reparations to victims. The final text includes some
suggestions from the international community and rival draft
bills. It opens the door to future demobilizations and puts
in place a structure to dismantle demobilized illegal armed
groups, but effective implementation will be key to success.
End summary.

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Goal: Peace With Justice
--------------


2. (U) The Law for Justice and Peace's objective is to reduce
violence by inducing members of the illegal armed groups
(IAGs) to renounce terrorism in exchange for reduced
punishment. Without this legislation, only demobilized
persons guilty of minor crimes (membership in an IAG,
rebellion, etc.) have been eligible for pardon.


3. (U) Since late 2003, the GOC grappled with the difficult
issues of balancing peace and justice and dismantling the
criminal structures of demobilized IAGs. The final text was
the result of an extensive debate in Congress and wider
society and passed by ample majorities in both Houses of
Congress. The law went through numerous changes and
incorporated elements from alternate drafts and the views of
the international community and civil society. Prior to the
committee debate, the GOC and the principle opposition group
led by Senator Rafael Pardo tried to reach consensus on their
two competing drafts. The GOC adopted entire sections of the
Pardo version, including on victims' rights and on the
definitions of truth, justice, and reparation.

--------------
Key Steps
--------------


4. (U) Confession: Each beneficiary will give an open

declaration ("version libre") to the Prosecutor General's
Office (Fiscalia) about his criminal activity. Any crimes
intentionally concealed will be prosecuted under the normal
criminal code and are not eligible for an alternative
sentence. The beneficiary is free to choose which crimes he
confesses, but the government retains the right to try him
under ordinary law for any crimes he conceals. This provides
a strong incentive for an ex-terrorist to admit all his
crimes. As a further incentive, unintentionally omitted
crimes could receive a 20 percent longer alternative sentence
(six to nine and a half years).


5. (U) Eligibility requirements: No crimes committed before
membership in the IAG can be included in the benefits. No
one who associated himself with a terrorist organization to
cover his previous crimes will be protected from punishments
for those crimes. A beneficiary or the IAG to which he
belonged must have (1) demobilized, (2) turned over all
illicit assets, (3) turned over all minors who were with the
IAG, (4) ceased all interference in public and political
liberties and all other illicit activity, (5) not been
principally devoted to drug trafficking or illicit
enrichment, and (6) freed all kidnap victims.


6. (U) Extradition: By design, the law does not mention
extradition. The GOC has repeatedly stated that the law will
not impede extradition and that the issue is non-negotiable.
Through reference to Colombian Law 67, the law rejects a
juridical connection between political crimes and drug
trafficking, so that the constitutional prohibition against
extradition for political crimes does not come into play.
Others who have committed political crimes, such as FARC
commander Simon Trinidad, have been extradited for their
non-political crimes. The Justice and Peace Law is designed
so that these same regulations will apply. As an additional
safeguard, the law states that alternative sentences can be
served abroad, so even in cases where an ex-terrorist has
benefited under the law, extradition remains a possibility.


7. (U) Investigation: A special Fiscalia unit will have 60
days to investigate and report findings to the Superior
District Court. The Court will decide the length of the
alternative sentence (five to eight years) and auxiliary
punishments, including reparations and parole.


8. (U) Confinement: Each beneficiary will be held in
confinement for five to eight years. Confinement zones will
be under full government control and must meet standards
issued by the National Prisons Institute. The jail terms are
close to those advanced in one of the principle alternative
draft laws, which enjoyed wide international support.

9. (U) Parole: Each beneficiary will be on parole for half of
his alternative sentence (two and a half to four years).


10. (U) Revocation of benefits: The law clearly states that
any return to criminal activity after demobilization or
failure to obey the law's requirements will result in
revocation of all benefits and prosecution under the normal
criminal code. The individual in question will be subject to
arrest for the crimes he already committed and the new ones.


11. (U) Reparations: All beneficiaries are required to give
material and symbolic reparations to victims. The law
establishes a detailed structure to identify and distribute
the assets of the demobilized terrorists to victims. A
National Reconciliation and Reparations Committee will
oversee the process. Taken together with the asset
forfeiture law, the government now has two powerful tools to
divest ex-terrorists of their wealth, and the influence their
wealth can purchase.


12. (U) Legal framework: The law establishes a framework for
demobilization, disarmament, separation of leaders from their
followers, identification of ex-terrorists, renunciation by
them of terrorism, training and assistance for reinsertion
into society, and monitoring of their activities following
demobilization.

--------------
Implementation Crucial
--------------


13. (U) The law opens the door for future collective and
individual demobilizations of paramilitaries and guerrillas.
Much will depend on careful implementation and strict
adherence to the law's principles of truth, justice, and
reparation. The GOC will need to designate enough personnel
and equipment to investigate, monitor, and provide
reinsertion services to the demobilized and to seize and
distribute assets in reparation to victims. Implementation
of a law this complex will undoubtedly create unintended
consequences and ambiguities, but for now, it is a viable
draft and a step in the right direction.

WOOD