Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA5802
2005-06-17 18:02:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

CLIPPED WINGS: COLOMBIA'S AIR ASSET LIMITS

Tags:  MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO ETRD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 005802 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO ETRD
SUBJECT: CLIPPED WINGS: COLOMBIA'S AIR ASSET LIMITS

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

-------
Summary
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 005802

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO ETRD
SUBJECT: CLIPPED WINGS: COLOMBIA'S AIR ASSET LIMITS

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
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1. (S) Colombia's size and terrain make military air
operations vital to the nation's security. However, the
Colombian Air Force (COLAF) accounts for less than 8 percent
of the 2005 defense budget. The COLAF's primary offensive
aircraft are based in Cundinamarca and Atlantico Departments,
which limits their already marginal international deterrent
value. Most of the COLAF's offensive helicopters -- used in
anti-insurgency operations -- are based in central Antioquia
Department, but their value is limited by an operational
radius of only 150 miles. Maintenance problems mean that
probably less than 70 percent of all COLAF air assets are
operable at any given time. A lack of infrastructure in the
Plan Patriota Phase 2B area of operations would severely
limit the COLAF's ability to quickly reinforce COLMIL ground
troops in the event of a major FARC offensive. Despite
repeated criticism from the USG regarding specifications and
uses being skewed to Brazil's Embraer, the GOC is once again
actively considering the purchase of new light attack
aircraft. The Colombian Congress approved the purchase on
March 15, however the COLAF has not finalized the contract
yet. End Summary.

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Background
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2. (C) Colombia's size and diverse geography make military
air operations essential to the Government's efforts to
provide security to a nation plagued by narco-terrorist
violence. Unfortunately, COLAF lacks the assets to operate
in many parts of the country. Moreover, recent agreements by
the Spanish and Brazilians to sell defense equipment to
Venezuela have raised concerns within the Colombian Ministry
of Defense (MOD) that Colombia is increasingly outgunned by
its neighbor.


3. (U) The COLAF's 2005 budget of roughly 690 billion pesos,
or approximately USD 265 million, is 7.5 percent of the total
defense budget. The COLAF is the smallest of the military

branches, with only 9,000 military and 3,000 civilian
personnel.

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Capabilities
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4. (S) The COLAF possesses four categories of air assets: (1)
offensive "attack" aircraft and helicopters, (2)
transportation aircraft and helicopters, (3) reconnaissance
aircraft, and (4) training aircraft. The total force is
reported to be 172 fixed- and rotary-wing assets. We
suspect, however, that only 60-70 percent are operable at any
given time, with many assets grounded by maintenance problems.


5. (S) The COLAF's primary "attack" aircraft, assets capable
of strafing or bombing a target from the air, are stationed
at Palanquero Air Base in northern Cundinamarca Department
(CACOM-1) and Pauwels Rodriguez Air Base near Barranquilla in
Atlantico Department (CACOM-3). These aircraft, which
include 12 Israeli-manufactured Kfirs, 9 French-manufactured
Mirage M-5s, and 13 US-manufactured A-37 Dragonflies, serve
as deterrents against foreign air attack, support Army and
Marine troops in the field, and participate in Air Bridge
Denial operations to intercept civilian aircraft suspected of
transporting narcotics. Given COLAF base locations, it would
take Colombian jets approximately 45 minutes to reach the
Venezuelan border and at least an hour to reach any of
Colombia's other international borders. None of the local
illegal armed groups have offensive air capabilities.


6. (S) The COLAF possesses additional offensive aircraft
scattered sparingly throughout the country. These include 6
AC-47 Fantasma aerial gunships, 8 AT-27 Tucanos, and 5 OV-10
turboprops, all of which are used to support ground troops in
combat.


7. (S) Most of the COLAF's offensive helicopters -- used in
counter-insurgency operations -- are based at Rio Negro Air
Base, near Medellin in Antioquia Department. Most COLAF
strike helicopters are AH-60 Arpias with an operational
radius of approximately 150 miles, and are used primarily for
ground troop support. These should not be confused with the
141 NAS-supported Police and Army helicopters dedicated to
counternarcotics missions.


8. (S) For transport, the COLAF uses 7 C-130 Hercules
4-engine turboprops, 2 CASA CN-235 twin-engine turboprops,
and one Boeing 707, all of which are based at CATAM Air Base
in Bogota. These fly resupply and transport missions
throughout the country. One of these transport planes is
based part-time in south-central Colombia near the Plan
Patriota Phase 2B area of operations, but usually returns to
a more secure area when not needed for specific operations.
COLAF transport helicopters are based primarily at Rio Negro,
although bases in Bogota, Cali, outside Villavicencio
(Apiay),Barranquilla, northern Cundinamarca (Palanquero),
and Tres Esquinas normally have one transport helicopter at
the base.

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Limited Options in the Air
--------------


9. (C) The COLAF's limited troop transport resources have not
prevented it from evacuating the sick and wounded and
soldiers rotating out of combat zones. In summer 2004,
however, the COLAF asked the Embassy to help it withdraw
troops that had served three consecutive months in combat.
We were only able to fill this gap with contract air for the
most part, but it demonstrates a weakness in the ability to
remove troops without outside resources.


10. (C) Current resource constraints would limit the COLAF to
transporting only about 1,000 COLMIL reinforcements a day.
For the COLAF to permanently base air assets in the region to
more easily conduct air strikes and provide support to COLMIL
ground forces, it would have to establish and secure
refueling locations in largely hostile, inhospitable
territory. Helicopters provide troop transport within the
Phase 2B area of operations, although the heavy jungle canopy
prevents them from landing in most areas, so hoists and other
methods are often used to infiltrate and extract troops.

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Shopping Around
--------------


11. (C) Beginning in the late 1990s, the MOD began
investigating the possibility of purchasing new light attack
aircraft. In 2002, SOUTHCOM Commander General Hill counseled
then-Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez against such a
course at a time when the COLAF's C-130 fleet needed
modernizing. Hill argued that the USD 250 million needed to
buy 20 light attack aircraft could be put to better use
improving force transportation.


12. (C) Last December, Vice-Minister of Defense Jorge Eastman
discussed the proposed purchase with Washington visitors. He
told the group about disagreements within the GOC over
whether to purchase the aircraft, and, if so, which to buy.
For example, the Senate pressed Minister of Defense Uribe to
abandon the solicitation last fall because it had
specifications only open to Brazil's Embraer Tucano aircraft.
The debate ended when the Colombian Congress approved the
budget request purchase of light attack aircraft on March 15
and the Defense Ministry reopened a solicitation with
slightly more flexible requirements.


13. (C) The solicitation for bids reopened on May 10 and was
slated to last four weeks. Some companies, most notably
Lockheed Martin, complained that the "new" specifications
still allowed only Embraer to make a competitive bid.
Although COLAF extended the deadline by two weeks, on June
14, Embraer submitted the only bid, offering to provide
twenty-two planes for USD 234.56 million. While the contract
has not been finalized, the other five interested bidders
dropped out before the solicitation closed. According to
influential daily El Tiempo, Eastman expressed his
disappointment that no other companies submitted bids. He
added that the contract winner would be announced in
September, leaving the door open to a possible reopening of
the bidding process if the Colombian Congress remains
dissatisfied with the non-competitive results. According to
Eastman, the GOC plans to use the new aircraft to mount an
air offensive against the FARC. In addition, he said the GOC
entertains hopes of starting its own indigenous aircraft
industry, following the example of Brazil's Embraer.
DRUCKER