EMBASSY DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO GOC ON DON BERNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005753

SIPDIS

FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CO KJUS AUC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO GOC ON DON BERNA

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary. Charge delivered message to President Uribe
on June 13 and Uribe advisers on June 14 that AUC commander
Diego Murillo ("Don Berba") should not be released into the
concentration zone for demobilized AUC leaders (as press
reports were suggesting),should no longer participate in the
peace process, and ought to be tried for his alleged
involvement in the murder of a Cordoba Department official.
Anything short of that would damage the credibility of the
peace process and jeopardize U.S. support for demobilization.
Charge also insisted that the GOC do a better and more
thorough job of processing the demobilized than it had done
in earlier rounds. Uribe assured Charge that Don Berna would
not go free. Advisers Juan Lozano and Jaime Bermudez said
the GOC's arrangement with Don Berna, made public on June 13
(septel),assured his detention, his submission to Colombian
justice, and the demobilization of his troops. They also
asserted the President's toughness going after Don Berna put
other paras on notice. Director of Communications for the
Presidency Bermudez also reported that the total number of
those to be demobilized from Don Berna blocs was less than
the 4000 reported. The GOC would publish the correct number
when it was confirmed. End Summary.


2. (C) Following news reports over the weekend suggesting
that AUC commander Diego Murillo ("Don Berna") could be
released back into the concentration zone of demobilized AUC
leaders in Santa Fe de Ralito, Charge spoke to President
Uribe during a June 13 Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce
luncheon about the need to ensure Don Berna was no longer a
part of the peace process nor would he be allowed to leave
his "finca of detention." Uribe noted that Don Berna had
promised to demobilize 4000 men. Charge responded that Don
Berna was accused of murdering a local Cordoba Department
official and countless other crimes, and had to face justice.
At the end of the lunch, Uribe approached Charge to assure
him that Don Berna would not go free. Charge said he would
be meeting the following day with the President's chief of
staff, Juan Lozano, to emphasize in more detail U.S.
concerns.


3. (C) Several hours later, the Prosecutor General issued a
custodial measure against Don Berna formally detaining him,
and the High Peace Commissioner announced that Don Berna's
status as a demobilized combatant would be maintained to
conclude the demobilization of his blocs.


4. (C) On July 14, Charge and polcouns met with Juan Lozano
to clarify Don Berna's status. Presidential Communications
Director Jaime Bermudez joined the meeting. Charge stressed
that the credibility of the entire process was at stake. If
Don Berna could murder a deputy and return to Santa Fe de
Ralito unsanctioned, the peace process was doomed and U.S.
efforts to support demobilization would be jeopardized. Don
Berna needed to be tried, and tried in a fair court
expeditiously. And while this was happening, he could not be
part of the peace process. Also, the executive branch had to
do what it could to ensure this did not become another
endless, multi-year, court case. The GOC's credibility would
be damaged beyond repair abroad with respect to the peace
process if it did not ensure Don Berna's treatment was
consistent with the rule of law.


5. (C) Lozano said he took the point but stressed that it had
been Uribe who made the tough call to go after Don Berna in
the first place, to make him subject to a legal process
regarding the incident in Cordoba. Now, Don Berna was in the
custody of the GOC (albeit in a house instead of a jail),
under the control of GOC public forces, and at the
disposition of the judicial branch. The legal process would
go forward and he could not avoid it. And, said Lozano, Don
Berna is still going to demobilize his troops. Charge
underscored how important it was to signal to the Colombian
public, the political opposition and the other paramilitaries
that things had changed in Colombia and Don Berna would have
to pay for his crime if he ordered the deputy killed.


6. (C) Charge also insisted that the GOC had to do a better
job of processing the demobilized than earlier rounds. The
process had to be credible and the GOC was not ready.
Without additional effort and resources, the demobilization
of 4000 men would overwhelm the system. Then Senator Pardo's
charge that the demobilizations were not dismantling the
networks would stick, he said. In addition, the Fiscalia had
to be more engaged in greater numbers to move the
ex-combatants through the process. Both Lozano and Bermudez
agreed that ought to happen and said they would work on it.


7. (C) Bermudez admitted that the President had taken a big
risk in leaving Don Berna where he was. In GOC internal
deliberations, two choices emerged: either keep Don Berna
under GOC control and confront charges of special treatment
while significant demobilizations proceeded, or put him in
jail and risk derailing the demobilization of his blocs.
They decided on the former, believing it not only salvaged
additional demobilizations, but also sent the right message
to other paramilitaries. According to Bermudez, High Peace
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo visited with demobilized
AUC leaders in Ralito to discuss Don Berna's case, and found
them acknowledging the President's "guts" in going after him,
and making it clear that they did not want the same thing
happening to them.


8. (C) Bermudez said Don Berna would be brought to Medellin
later in the week to attend a public hearing related to his
case. We understand that the process will be scrutinized
carefully both here and abroad, he stressed, and intend to
make sure it comes out right. He also said the GOC intended
to be as transparent about the process as possible. For
example, the number of those demobilizing from Don Berna's
blocs turns out to be lower than 4,000. He intended to
release the new figure as soon as he could confirm it.


9. (C) Comment: Lozano and Bermudez understood that they were
in a high stakes game and the political space for this sort
of maneuver was closing fast. A failure with Don Berna would
leave the President exposed in domestic politics as never
before in his presidency.
DRUCKER