OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PARAMILITARY INFLUENCE OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005619

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2020
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM CO AUC
SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PARAMILITARY INFLUENCE OVER
CONGRESS

REF: BOGOTA 4467

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.


1. (C) Summary: During the week of June 6, the press
focused on the long-standing rumor that 30-35 percent of
Congress is beholden to the paramilitaries. Our best and, in
our estimation, "cleanest" Congressional interlocutors
believe that figure is roughly on the mark. Overt support
for the AUC is expressed by only a handful of members of
Congress (MOCs). However, a larger number take the line that
the AUC played a major role in filling the public security
void left by the GOC for nearly two decades. Larger still is
the group of MOCs from AUC-dominated areas motivated by fear
and intimidation. While there is widespread support in the
Congress for the bilateral extradition relationship, some
members continue to believe that a genuine peace process with
the AUC cannot be attained without the GOC (and, clearly, the
USG) ceding some ground on extradition. End Summary.


2. (U) Vicente Castano, brother of the disappeared Carlos
Castano, rekindled national debate the week of June 6 by
stating in a press interview that the AUC controlled roughly
35 percent of the Colombian Congress. Fellow AUC member
Salvatorre Mancuso had started a similar rumor in late 2002.
President Uribe immediately challenged Castano's assertion,
and called on the AUC to reveal names and the Prosecutor
General (Fiscal) to charge the implicated.


3. (C) The issue is complicated and nuanced and it is
difficult to provide a numerical breakdown. We estimate the
House to be more problematic than the Senate. Overall, three
general "categories" of MOCs can be identified and described.
A first group is a handful of MOCs who openly and repeatedly
support the AUC, and are willing to expose themselves on the
floor of either house of Congress and in the media. The most
prominent of this group are Senator Carlos Moreno de Caro and
Representatives Rocio Arias Hoyos and Eleonora Pineda Arcia.
They greeted and escorted AUC leaders when they addressed the
Congress in July 2004. They are believed to receive funding
from the AUC and reportedly meet with AUC members often.


4. (C) A second group is larger, and can be described as
those sympathetic to the AUC on the grounds that the
paramilitaries "did a service to the nation" by battling the
FARC and/or ELN in the absence of GOC public security forces.
Emboffs have been repeatedly fed such a line by numerous
MOCs. Often the comments are along the lines of "you gringos
don't understand - the AUC will never fully dismantle and
respect the peace process unless extradition is negotiated in
its favor." While we have detected widespread support for
the bilateral extradition relationship in the Congress as it
applies to obvious drug traffickers, the issue is more
divisive when applied to paramilitaries (who in general also
traffic in illicit narcotics).


5. (C) A final group, probably the largest of the three,
includes MOCs from AUC-dominated areas in which fear and
intimidation are motivating factors. MOCs from the
departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Magdalena, Bolivar,
and La Guajira are found in this group. Even prominent MOCs
from Bogota, like Reps. Armando Benedetti, Gina Parody, and
Telesforo Pedraza -- all outspoken on the Justice and Peace
bill and GOC dealings with the AUC -- have told us privately
that it is fairly easy for them to speak out against the AUC
from the relative safety of Bogota. It is not the same, they
continue, for MOCs from AUC-controlled areas, where the level
of intimidation and permeation of department and municipal
entities is considerable. There are indications, for
example, the AUC had a role in the March 2005 assassination
of a member of the House from Caldas Department, and AUC
leader "Don Berna" is accused of having a local legislator
killed in Cordoba Department weeks ago.


6. (C) A near-term area of concern is upcoming elections
for Congress in March 2006. Many incumbent MOCs believe
their reelection in the March 2006 elections depends on how
much patronage and/or benefits they obtained for districts or
persons that support them or financial backing from a major
benefactor. The GOC under Uribe has fought against providing
such benefits or patronage in many cases, and strongly
resists supporting MOCs on both grounds. Uribe's refusal to
supply benefits to MOCs who have supported him leaves them
vulnerable to competitors with better funded political
campaigns. Given the AUC's ability to fund campaigns or
encourage others to do so, AUC support may be important for
many MOCs.


7. (C) The Uribe Administration's failure to do more to
support friendly MOCs may now be painful. The implications
for Congressional action on legislation are obvious and
cannot be ignored as Uribe considers how to get support for
bills he desires. And since legislators are now elected from
well-defined constituencies (see reftel),the need for
campaign funding is relatively large and the sources diffuse.
"AUC legislators" with good funding may come out of the
March 2006 elections even stronger.
DRUCKER