Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA5510
2005-06-09 15:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

FARC PROOF OF LIFE: MILITARY ATTACKS YIELD

Tags:  MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER CO FARC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005510 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: FARC PROOF OF LIFE: MILITARY ATTACKS YIELD
POLITICAL GAINS

REF: BOGOTA 3233

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)

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Summary
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005510

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: FARC PROOF OF LIFE: MILITARY ATTACKS YIELD
POLITICAL GAINS

REF: BOGOTA 3233

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Violence orchestrated by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues at increased levels in
2005 and aims to chip away at public support for President
Uribe's tough stand against the guerrillas. The FARC's
activities have not affected the COLMIL's military campaigns
against the FARC, but rather form a pre-election tactic to
undermine the Uribe Administration's Democratic Security
Strategy and military Plan Patriota offensive. The FARC
began sporadic low-level attacks in January 2005 (reftel) and
have continued them in April and May against military and
civilian targets of opportunity. In addition, the FARC have
attempted to resuscitate ties to the international community
which were left weakened in 2004, in particular with
Venezuela and Ecuador. Although the strategy has not yet
affected Uribe's public support numbers significantly,
continued attacks are likely to raise doubts about Uribe's
tactics with the guerrillas. End Summary.

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Failures of 2004 Lead to Rebound
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2. (S/NF) The FARC Secretariat, the group in charge of the
guerrilla's long-term strategy, gave orders to their fronts
in early 2004 to avoid engaging the military during the Plan
Patriota offensive. Throughout 2004, the FARC reduced its
domestic attacks and international outreach while maintaining
business at a somewhat reduced tempo both as a result of the
Secretariat's orders and COLMIL efforts to push the FARC to

SIPDIS
the defensive. As a result, President Uribe enjoyed strong
public approval ratings and the Colombian public began to
endorse Uribe's "strong hand, open arms" policy. However, in
December 2004 and January 2005, the FARC leadership
reconsidered its position over the course of several
high-level meetings. Secretariat officials concurred that
FARC passivity and military defeats in 2004 had put it on the

defensive militarily, allowed interruption of its narcotics
business, and led to a loss of influence domestically and
internationally. This strategic reassessment and
congressional passage of legislation allowing Uribe to seek a
second term (currently under review by the Constitutional
Court),prompted the Secretariat to issue new orders to
escalate military offensive attacks. In particular, the FARC
focused on reestablishing itself internationally and
domestically with hopes of reclaiming lost influence and,
ideally, diminishing support for Uribe.


3. (S/NF) To realize the Secretariat's strategic goals for
2005, FARC fronts have taken action to (1) demonstrate FARC
military prowess and undermine Uribe's Democratic Security
Strategy; (2) frighten the Colombian electorate through
terrorist activities against military outposts and Colombian
cities; and (3) redouble international fundraising, image,
and influence activities. If the FARC manages to implement
this three-prong strategy, it hopes to counter Uribe's
successes and press the electorate towards a more
conciliatory candidate.

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Striking Back at the Military
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4. (C) The FARC's first response is against the Colombian
Armed Forces. Plan Patriota Phase 2B, initiated in early
2004, is the largest coordinated military campaign in
Colombian history. Its main target is to attack FARC
strongholds and claim territory that the FARC have controlled
for decades. Plan Patriota enjoyed early successes and
diminished the FARC's military capacity. In response, the
FARC has initiated clashes, ambushes and offensives against
select military targets in 2005. On May 3, for example,
three officers from Colombia's National Police were killed
when they confronted a group of FARC guerrillas from the 50th
Front. The guerrillas were attempting to put up an illegal
roadblock on a stretch of the highway linking Ibague and
Cajamarca, Tolima Department. A civilian was also killed in
the crossfire and three other policemen were injured. The
attack was the first of three attacks against military or
police in May alone. In the Plan Patriota area, the military
has increasingly found booby-trapped FARC camps and more of a
willingness to attack targets than in 2004.
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Counteroffensive to Frighten Population
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5. (S/NF) In addition to an increase in military activity,
the FARC is working to hit media-worthy targets to inspire
fear in the population. Although the attacks pose little
military threat, the political impact and media coverage
reinforces the guerrilla's ability to fight back. For
example, the FARC attacked a town hall during a city council
meeting in Puerto Rico, Caqueta Department on May 24, killing
six municipal councilmen and an official, wounding many
others. In 2003, Puerto Rico went from being a FARC
stronghold to a headquarters for an Army company, and the
attack effectively reasserted the FARC's ability to reach
residents and attack despite the Colombian government
presence. The attackers fled without being arrested.


6. (C) The FARC's attacks also undermine Uribe's highway and
infrastructure security strategies. On May 14, the FARC
established a roadblock in La Quiebra, Antioquia Department
and stopped eight buses and several trucks for eight hours
and told them it was an armed strike. Fourth Brigade troops
regained control of the road, but local transport companies
reported they would not dispatch vehicles to towns in
southeastern Antioquia. In addition, the FARC were suspected
of bombing nine electrical towers in the Atlantic Coast
region over Memorial Day weekend. The bombings caused
widespread power outages in the area and took several days to
repair. Leading daily El Tiempo noted that there had never
been so many towers targeted in such a short span of time,
thus raising fears about the government's ability to protect
infrastructure.

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International Outreach
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7. (S) Despite three high-profile international FARC arrests
since January 2004, the FARC resumed efforts to strengthen
ties to Venezuela and Ecuador. Venezuela's "Bolivarian
Circles" and revolutionary rhetoric continue to be targets of
opportunity for FARC leadership to exploit to
internationalize the conflict. In addition to providing
safe-haven (including official Venezuelan identity cards),
Venezuela has become a major supplier for FARC camps in
southern Colombia, likely with the tacit acceptance of the
Venezuelan government.


8. (S/NF) Intelligence sources also indicate that the FARC
has plans to sway the upcoming Ecuadorian elections and fund
a FARC-friendly candidate. If those attempts prove
successful, Ecuador's occasional extraditions (e.g. Simon
Trinidad) and attempts to prevent additional FARC migration
would be reversed. The FARC also insist that the Ecuadorian
government has an ongoing agreement to protect FARC members
-- an agreement that the current administration rejects.

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Prospects for Success
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9. (S) Comment: The FARC strategy for 2005 aims to affect
political decisions and public opinion. To that end, the
group has been and will probably continue to make an impact.
The public is growing concerned by the seemingly random, high
profile attacks and the government does not have sufficient
resources to be able to defend every potential target against
attacks. Uribe's recent dip in opinion polls may be
attributed in part to recent FARC attacks. Ongoing attacks
could chip away at the public support, currently at 60
percent, for Uribe's policy towards the guerrillas. End
comment.
DRUCKER