PEACE COMMISSIONER DISCUSSES AUC DEMOBILIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004541

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015
TAGS: PTER KJUS PHUM PREL SNAR CO AUC
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DISCUSSES AUC DEMOBILIZATION
PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On May 10, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo
discussed with the Ambassador his plans to adopt a divide and
conquer strategy to demobilize the rest of the AUC. He
explained that the GOC would push for two key points in the
Justice and Peace law being considered in Congress: (1) that
paramilitarism be an act of sedition and (2) that persons who
were drug traffickers before joining the AUC would not be
prohibited from benefiting, although the crimes they
committed before joining would be. He expressed concern that
some of the changes the bill's sponsors and the Minster of
Interior and Justice had made without his knowledge had
softened the draft law. End summary.

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Divide and Conquer
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2. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo told the Ambassador that
the AUC leadership was disorganized and did not have a
unified negotiating strategy. In order to take advantage of
this, Restrepo had begun holding meetings with individual
commanders outside of the concentration zone to isolate those
who were against the peace process. In early May, he met
with Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) military commander "Javier
Montanez," who is heavily involved in the drug trade and has
been skeptical of peace talks. During the one-on-one
meeting, Montanez said he would demobilize his 5,000 men if
given sufficient legal guarantees. In the coming week,
Restrepo planned to hold a meeting with senior AUC commander
Vicente Castano, who controls several thousand men. Restrepo
explained that once a commander demobilized with his troops,
he would be too vulnerable to reject the peace process and
return to the conflict. AUC commander Salvatore Mancuso was
a case in point. AUC spokesman Ernesto Baez had asked
Mancuso to threaten to return to the conflict if the Justice
and Peace law passed. Mancuso refused and instead said
publicly he would not return to the battlefield and asked the
GOC to increase his security.

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Justice and Peace Law
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3. (C) Restrepo explained that he would insist that two
principle changes be made to the Justice and Peace law.
First, article 64 making paramilitarism an act of sedition
needed to be reinserted. Restrepo explained that the GOC
needed this article for procedural reasons so that the
paramilitaries could be pardoned for having belonged to an
illegal armed group (IAG). He assured the Ambassador the GOC
would not permit human rights violations, drug trafficking,
or other serious crimes to be considered pardonable,
political crimes. Ambassador replied that, in our reading,
inclusion of article 64 did not present a problem.


4. (C) Second, Restrepo explained that the clause Senator
German Vargas Lleras had inserted into article ten to prevent
persons who were drug traffickers before joining the illegal
armed group from benefiting from the law needed to be
removed. Otherwise, at least half of the AUC commanders
would not be eligible and would have no reason to demobilize.
He said the text needed to be changed to specify that crimes
committed before membership in the group would not be
covered. Restrepo admitted that the GOC would be criticized
for removing the clause, but that he had persuaded President
Uribe it was necessary. Ambassador emphasized the importance
that there be no benefits for activities before membership in
an IAG.

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Concern About Pretelt's Changes
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5. (C) Restrepo expressed concern about changes the sponsors
of the bill and Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas
Pretelt had made to the latest draft they presented to
Congress, without notifying Restrepo. The sponsors (who
include Uribista Senators Mario Uribe, Claudia Blum, and Luis
Gomez Gallo) proposed making the eligibility requirements for
individual and collective demobilization the same, removing
the requirement that individual deserters provide
intelligence on their illegal armed group. Restrepo asserted
that individual deserters needed to provide information, but
that collective demobilized did not. Second, Restrepo said
he did not understand why the sponsors had shortened the
investigation time frames (in the sponsors' draft, a
prosecutor is required to report the results of the
benefiary's open statement to the Prosecutor General's Office
within 12 hours and the Prosecutor General's Office is
required to investigate the beneficiary in 30 days).
Restrepo said an investigation period of at least 90 days
seemed more reasonable. Ambassador strongly agreed.
Restrepo also disagreed with how the sponsors had taken away
the Reparations and Reconciliation Committee's responsibility
to oversee the reparations process.


6. (C) Restrepo thought a proposal to allow the President to
extend the time frame for which crimes could be covered would
be a disincentive for illegal armed groups to demobilize.
The draft passed in committee stated that the bill would only
cover crimes committed before the law had gone into effect.
A congresswoman had proposed that the President be given
permission to extend this time limit to facilitate a peace
process with guerrilla groups. Restrepo agreed that, in
theory, the idea was good, but warned that doing so would
discourage illegal armed groups from ceasing their illicit
activities immediately if they knew they could still benefit
from the law later on.

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Subsequent Information
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7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that the draft
law allows persons to receive an alternative sentence for
crimes they did not initially admit if they subsequently
accept guilt, Restrepo explained the reasoning was to require
each beneficiary to collaborate with authorities in an
on-going manner. Many paramilitaries could not necessarily
be expected to remember all of their crimes. He told the
Ambassador that he would look into the possibility of adding
more explicit language that, if a beneficiary could not prove
he did not intentionally conceal an un-confessed crime, then
he would not be eligible for an alternative sentence.
Restrepo emphasized, however, that the language could not be
overly ambiguous because a subsequent administration could
use the law to block large numbers of paramilitaries from
benefiting.


8. (C) Restrepo agreed that the law needed to find an
adequate balance between peace and justice. He warned,
however, that making the law overly harsh would unify the AUC
leadership against the law and the peace process, and allow
the most militant commanders to dominate. He said the GOC
had to re-take control of the Congressional debate because it
would responsible for implementing the final version.
WOOD