Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA4360
2005-05-10 14:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

UNDER SECRETARY FEITH MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Tags:  PTER PHUM PREL MOPS ASEC SNAR CO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004360 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015
TAGS: PTER PHUM PREL MOPS ASEC SNAR CO
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY FEITH MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004360

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015
TAGS: PTER PHUM PREL MOPS ASEC SNAR CO
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY FEITH MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On May 3, 2005 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith discussed Colombia's democratic security
strategy and concerns about Venezuela with President Alvaro
Uribe. Uribe described U.S. assistance as critical to
counterterror and counterdrug successes. Feith assured Uribe
that the U.S. was committed to continued support. Uribe
expressed concern about President Chavez's ties to Colombian
guerrilla groups, his efforts to spread unrest in nearby
countries, including Bolivia and Nicaragua, and close
relationship to Fidel Castro. Uribe acknowledged he had no
proof for a public case to denounce Chavez and that, until
there is proof, public criticism of Chavez would lack
credibility. Uribe said the OAS Secretary General election
had been swayed by Chavez and that this had to be seen as a
defeat for us, meaning the U.S. and Colombia. Feith agreed
Chavez was a threat to regional stability and noted that
Central Europeans, businessmen, journalists, and local
opposition were the best vehicles to expose Chavez's
violations of democratic freedoms. End summary.

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Uribe Eager to Stay the Course
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2. (C) On May 3, 2005, President Uribe told Under Secretary
Feith that U.S. support was key to the progress Colombia was
making against narcoterrorists. He emphasized that there was
a still a long way to go and that U.S. assistance beyond Plan
Colombia was critical to staying the course and consolidating
success. Feith assured Uribe the U.S. was committed to
supporting Colombia and was proud to be associated with
Colombia's counterdrug and counterterror accomplishments. He
welcomed the opportunity to discuss objectives for the
U.S.-Colombia relationship and for the hemisphere during the
May 4 to 6 Bilateral Working Group in Cartagena.

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Venezuela a Growing Concern
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3. (C) Uribe expressed concern about Venezuela's threat to
regional stability. He said Chavez has ties to Colombian
guerrilla groups, is interfering in neighboring countries,
especially Bolivia and Nicaragua, to create political unrest,
and maintains close relations with Fidel Castro, whom he
subsidizes with inexpensive oil. Uribe said he had just met
with former Bolivian President Jaime Quiroga, who stated
these concerns (Quiroga, Uribe added, plans to run against
Evo Morales for the Presidency). In a recent meeting with
Uribe, Chavez swore he did not support the FARC, but admitted
that some members of his political party are FARC supporters.
In response to the Ambassador's inquiry if Chavez would try
to influence the Colombian elections, Uribe said he had heard
rumors that Chavez is giving support to the leftist Polo
Democratico (PDI),but had no proof. Uribe expressed
frustration with Chavez's use of trade for coercion.
Colombia depends on trade with Venezuela and Chavez makes
trade difficult or denies foreign exchange rights to
Colombian firms whenever political relations become tense.
Uribe said Colombia exports USD 1.7 billion to Venezuela and
imports USD 1.2 billion.


4. (C) Uribe said he had rumors and surmises of Chavez's
destabilizing and illegal activities, and noted the GOC was
committed to finding evidence to prove the point. He said we
need to make public our intelligence on Chavez's subversive
activities and undermining of democratic institutions in
order for our criticism to be credible.


5. (C) Uribe emphasized that NGO orangizations such as the
OAS should monitor Venezuela's democracy and pressure Chavez
to stop suppressing democratic freedoms. U/S Feith agreed
that Venezuela was a threat to regional stability and to U.S.
and Colombian interests. He also agreed that NGOs,
journalists, businessmen, and Venezuelan opposition figures
could be effective vehicles to speak out against Chavez's
violations of democracy, with Colombians, Americans, and
others supporting them. Central Europeans newly liberated
from communism are the most clear-headed on this subject.


6. (C) Uribe praised the efforts of Secretary Rice during the
campaign to elect the new OAS Secretary General, but
expressed concern that newly elected Secretary General
Insulza would not criticize Chavez. Uribe said Chavez
persuaded 11 Caribbean countries to back Insulza. The OAS
Secretary General election was a defeat for us, meaning the

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U.S. and Colombia, he said. "We can put the best face on it,
but no amount of make-up can disguise that it was a defeat."



7. (U) USDP Feith has reviewed and cleared this cable.
WOOD