Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA4167
2005-05-02 21:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

MEDELLIN'S REINSERTION PROGRAM

Tags:  PTER PHUM SNAR KJUS CO AUC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004167 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015
TAGS: PTER PHUM SNAR KJUS CO AUC
SUBJECT: MEDELLIN'S REINSERTION PROGRAM


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004167

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015
TAGS: PTER PHUM SNAR KJUS CO AUC
SUBJECT: MEDELLIN'S REINSERTION PROGRAM


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


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Summary
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1. (C) In December 2003, 874 members of the Cacique Nutibara
Bloc (BCN) demobilized in Medellin. Since that time, the
Mayor of Medellin's office has been implementing a
reinsertion program that has provided education and unpaid
employment for almost the entire bloc. Community outreach
and psychological counseling are integral parts of the
program. Murder in Medellin has dropped by about two thirds
since 2002. Although concerns about behind-the-scenes
paramilitary influence over the city and slow judicial
processing remain, Medellin's program is tracking and
re-socializing the participants. With significant
adjustments, the basic structure could be applied to the
national government's reinsertion program, which is
responsible for 4,000 ex-paramilitaries and should receive
several thousand more. End Summary.

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Medellin's Program
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2. (C) In December 2003, 874 members of BCN demobilized in
Medellin. Mayor Sergio Fajardo's office designed and funded
its own reinsertion program rather than rely on the national
government's program. Unpaid public works projects and
education courses are required to receive a monthly stipend
of approximately USD 260. An additional USD 80 per
participant each month is used for social services and
education. In contrast, the GOC's program provides a stipend
of USD 150 per month and is trying to budget an additional
USD 160 per participant each month for reinsertion services.



3. (C) The Medellin program focuses on work, education, and
psychological assistance to re-socialize the former
paramilitaries to civilian life.

-- Employment: As of April 2005, 807 were involved in unpaid
public works projects. Twenty are exempt from the work
requirement because they are disabled or deemed to be too
high a security risk. Of the 807, 32 of the highest
performers were hired as paid employees. The reinsertion
program tries to expose participants to a wide array of
employment opportunities and the importance of education. To
track this, reinsertion officers ask the beneficiaries on a

monthly basis what careers interest them. In December 2003,
655 did not answer the survey, none were interested in higher
education, and only 94 wanted to finish high school. By
February 2005, 350 were interested in the arts, 78 in social
work, 127 in higher education, and 382 in finishing high
school.

-- Education: 488 are in primary or secondary school classes
and 106 are in post-high school vocational training (sales,
cooking, woodworking, construction, and auto mechanics) or
college preparation with the National Apprenticeship Agency.
Twenty-nine are studying at a university.

-- Psychological Assistance: The Mayor's office contracted
ten psychologists, who have conducted one-on-one interviews
with 811 former BCN members. For more serious problems,
psychological attention is available in local clinics to
former BCN members, their families, and community members.
At least 311 have used these services.

-- Tracking: 855 BCN members are being closely tracked by the
electronic tracking and monitoring system (designed by IOM,
the International Organization for Migration, a USAID
grantee). There are 10 tracking officers, each with a case
load of about 85 members. They conduct periodic personal
interviews, home visits, and serve as the main point of
contact with the local government.

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Community Outreach
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4. (C) The program is also designed to help local communities
adjust. Many neighborhoods had been under de-facto
paramilitary control before the demobilization. In areas
where the ex-BCN members live, over 9,000 residents have
participated in "human development" workshops, over 4,600 in
community integration activities, and 2,400 in forums on
preventing domestic violence. On behalf of the Mayor's
office, IOM conducted a poll among residents living in
neighborhoods with the demobilized. According to the
results, 76 percent think the presence of ex-BCN members is
beneficial to their neighborhood and 84 percent think the
Mayor's office is effectively facilitating reinsertion.
However, 46 percent believe some demobilized will, or already
have, returned to illicit activity.


5. (U) Violence and crime are at all time lows in Medellin, a
city of about 3.5 million people. In 2001, there were 3,479
murders compared to 3,721 in 2002, 2,013 in 2003, and 1,177
in 2004. Murder rates for the first three months of 2005 are
about half of what they were the year before. These murder
rates would leave Medellin on par with U.S. cities such as
Baltimore or Memphis.

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Those Not Participating
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6. (U) Of the original 874, 58 are not receiving benefits: 30
are in jail for crimes committed before or after they
demobilized, 20 have died violently or accidentally, one was
ineligible because he had demobilized and received
reinsertion benefits prior to 2003, and the bloc's seven
commanders are ineligible on the grounds of being BCN
"representative leaders."

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The Challenges
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7. (C) Some problems remain:

-- Insufficient Time: Fajardo decided the original 18-month
program was too short and extended it until the end of his
term in 2007. He told poloffs that many former
paramilitaries need intensive re-socialization to teach them
to live under state control and not take the law into their
own hands. Until this re-socialization is complete, placing
them in private sector jobs would be a liability. The
extension will help ensure that the demobilized are trained
and monitored for an additional two years, but will be a
large expense.

-- Slow Judicial Processing: At least 630 members have been
issued clearance from the Department of Administrative
Security (DAS) certifying there are no warrants for their
arrest. Upon demobilizing, 388 had open cases against them.
Of these, 205 still have pending charges. None of the BCN
members have been officially pardoned under Law 782. Local
officials from the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) and
judges have complained about a lack of guidance in
determining which crimes are pardonable. According to Law
782, demobilized members of an illegal armed group can be
pardoned for the political crimes of rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit a crime, and other connected, minor
crimes. The local prosecutor is responsible for determining
which crimes are connected based on general guidance from the
criminal code. Another point of confusion is that, according
to the criminal code, paramilitarism is a common, rather than
political, crime, and cannot be pardoned.

-- AUC Presence: AUC commander Diego Murrillo continues to
dominate parts of the city despite being in the concentration
zone in Santa Fe de Ralito. Fajardo told poloffs that he is
aware that drug traffickers, especially Murrillo, have
maintained a presence, but that the security forces are
committed to driving them out of the region.

-- Other Demobilized: There are several hundred
paramilitaries, who demobilized from other blocs, living in
Medellin and participating in the GOC's reinsertion program.
The national program is less organized and does not offer as
many services as the Mayor's program. Fajardo said the
inconsistency has not caused problems thus far, but that he
was watching it carefully.

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Lessons Learned
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8. (C) The Medellin reinsertion program is well-structured
and facilitates close monitoring of participants by requiring
work and study in exchange for the stipend. The model would
need to be adjusted to function in other areas with large
concentrations of former paramilitaries. Medellin is a
cosmopolitan metropolitan area with a relatively high per
capita income (almost 20 percent higher than the national
average) and a vigorous local economy. Medellin also has a
localized group of demobilized, a relatively wealthy
municipal government, and extensive institutional
infrastructure. Most of the other areas in which the
demobilized would be rehabilitated are in relatively poor
rural areas producing bananas or traditional crops for local
production. They do not have sufficient local funds or
infrastructure to provide the same reinsertion services.
Finding qualified professionals to help integrate the
demobilized or deserters will be a challenge. Resources and
personnel would have to be brought in from national
government agencies or other sources. Given the national
priority placed on this effort, the human resources could be
found, but the financial drain on the federal budget will be
enormous and the Medellin experience implies that it will be
a multi-year effort.

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Comment
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9. (C) Medellin's program has advantages the national program
does not, especially a higher level of literacy and a more
homogenous sample. Even so, it took more than a year for the
program to really take hold.
WOOD