COLOMBIA: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 000382

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2004

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Although the Uribe Administration can boast
important victories in 2004, including Congressional approval
of presidential reelection legislation and the introduction
of an accusatory criminal justice system, President Uribe's
popularity -- which never fell below 65 percent all year --
did not translate into proportionate influence in the
Congress or with the political parties. Uribe's failure in
October 2003 to translate personal popularity into approval
of his political reform referendum, or victories for
pro-Uribe candidates in departmental and local elections,
cost him partisan political influence. His focus on
governance over consensus-building and politics made him
appear insensitive to political pressures on others, leading
to extreme partisan squabbling and distracting campaigns of
political assassination-by-rumor. The partisan environment
inhibited passage of key legislation on fiscal reform, the
distribution of confiscated narcotrafficking assets, and the
peace process. At the institutional level, however, GOC
entities made significant progress on human rights. The
political dynamic in 2005 will be set by the Constitutional
Court's ruling on the validity of legislation authorizing
presidential reelection, the initiation of unofficial
campaigning for the 2006 Congressional and Presidential
elections, and whether Uribe himself jumps into the fray of
partisan politics. Other key issues such as demobilization,
Plan Patriota, and FTA negotiations, will continue on the
agenda. End Summary.


2. (U) The Uribe Administration scored major victories in
2004, including Congressional passage of Constitutional
reform to permit presidential reelection, adoption of a new
anti-terrorism law (subsequently struck down by the
Constitutional Court),and final approval of a new criminal
procedure code that introduced an oral, accusatory criminal
justice system.

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DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CONGRESS
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3. (SBU) Despite impressive popularity numbers, Uribe's
standing with the public did not translate -- with the
notable exceptions already mentioned -- into passage of
important reforms by the Congress. Even among the so-called
"Uribistas," there were losses on such crucial matters as tax
reform and the nomination of a new Constitutional Court
justice. One clear reason for these failures is that, by
both historical precedent and institutional structure,
Congressional leaders are largely insulated from voter
pressures: a strong "list" system makes them more responsive
to party leaders, who determine their places on national or
local lists, than to voter preferences. And the party
leadership, whose positions do not depend on any popular
vote, are even more isolated from popular pressure.


4. (C) Another reason is the perception that Uribe seeks to
jump the traditional political structures and go straight to
the people, a prospect that the political parties found
profoundly disturbing. In this sense, traditional political
elites view Uribe's popularity as threatening.


5. (C) In 2004, this produced the worst kind of partisan
squabbling, centered on the reelection issue, but extending
throughout the political environment. Ironically, although
the criticism in the run-up to the October 2003 elections was
that Uribe had failed to "play politics" sufficiently,
criticism surrounding the reelection reform was that he was
sacrificing the Administration's substantive agenda by
"playing too much politics." It also produced a year of "red
herrings." For instance, there was a major controversy,
leading some members of Congress to recuse themselves
temporarily from the reelection debate, over accusations that
the Administration had appointed their friends and relatives
to cushy diplomatic and other government posts. And the
government's rock-bottom deal to purchase an almost-new
presidential jet sparked marathon Senate hearings and
inquiries to the Embassy (although when the facts were known,
the "scandal" withered).


6. (SBU) More importantly, the rank partisanship on display
in 2004 inhibited the ability of the Colombian polity to come
to consensus on sensitive matters. No major tax reform, no
major pension reform, and no reform of constitutionally
mandated resource transfers to the rural departments could be
passed, in spite of a growing budget deficit. (Three
questions that were all part of the 2003 referendum.) No
decision on the management, use, or distribution of assets
confiscated from narco-terrorists, after last year's law
facilitating confiscation itself was adopted; so the assets
are left to rot. No decision on spraying in national parks.
The Congress issued a shocking invitation to paramilitary
leaders to address a joint session of the legislature (the
Administration chose not to formally oppose it because of
respect for the separation of powers). The legal framework
for paramilitary demobilization went unaddressed.


7. (C) At an institutional level, however, government
entities made significant progress on human rights issues.
The GOC increased its dialogue with NGOs, the UN, and foreign
governments; senior-level meetings with local and
international human rights organizations included over 40
hours of discussions on the UNHCHR's 27 human rights
recommendations. The Ministry of Interior and Justice's
protection program assisted 667 individuals in 2004 including
members of NGOs, labor unionists, mayors and other vulnerable
populations. The Prosecutor General created an internal
anti-corruption unit, requiring polygraphing for those in
sensitive narcotics and internal affairs units and dismissal
for those suspected of corruption. The start of a transition
to an accusatory justice system modeled on the U.S. system
should increase the speed and transparency of judicial
proceedings. Improvement in the military justice system will
also be a priority in 2005.


8. (C) Although less than two percent of human rights
violations were attributable to government security forces,
most Colombian NGOs -- which generally lean to the left --
remained critical of GOC efforts. And recent instances of
presumed human rights violations by members of the armed
forces, such as the August murders of three trade unionists
in Arauca, show that there is still a need for further
improvement in their protection of human rights. Yet, public
approval ratings for the armed forces and police remained
higher than of any other major national institution,
including the Roman Catholic Church.


9. (C) Failure of political consensus behind Uribe also made
the Administration vulnerable to political
assassination-by-rumor. Uribe's so-called "Minister of the
Presidency" (his closest advisor),the Secretary General of
the Presidency, the Deputy Prosecutor General, and a Vice
Minister of Defense were all hounded from office by reports
-- all trivial -- of conflict of interest. Elite special
interests exercised enormous influence on more narrow
questions: humanitarian exchange of hostages and extradition
were two key examples.

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LOOKING TO 2005
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10. (C) It is difficult to know how this dynamic will play
out in 2005. One key variable will be a decision by the
Constitutional Court on reelection, presumably in the spring.
(It may turn out that the failure of Uribe's Congressional
supporters to promote the Administration candidate for the
Court, potentially creating a 5-4 majority against the
constitutional amendment to allow Uribe a second term, will
be the single most important decision of 2004.) Another key
variable will be the beginnings of the presidential and
congressional campaigns for elections in 2006 (congressional
elections in March; first-round presidential elections in
May). If Uribe can run, he may also try to influence local
and congressional elections. The reelection reform would
allow the sitting president, for the first time in over fifty
years, to actually engage in political campaign activities,
albeit for a limited period prior to election day. If the
Constitutional Court prevents his running, Uribe has told us
that election of the right successor will be a high priority.
A third variable will be whether Uribe is seen as descending
into partisan politics, or continues to focus on governance;
the temptation will be for the former but his popularity is
based on the latter, especially regarding security.


11. (C) Finally, there are the specifics: 2005 will be a big
year for the GOC, to include the demobilization of perhaps
10,000 more paramilitaries; the continuation of "Plan
Patriota" and other operations against terrorist leadership;
busting more narcos and eradicating/seizing their drugs;
confronting persistently high unemployment rates; possibly
initiating an ELN peace process and, perhaps, beginning
meaningful overtures to the FARC; concluding negotiations of
an FTA with the U.S.; dealing with the issue of U.S. and
Colombian hostages; implementing the new accusatory justice
system and improving the military justice system; and
managing prickly relations with Venezuela.
WOOD