SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003747

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015
TAGS: PREL CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Introduction
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1. (C) President Uribe and the embassy welcome the visit of
Secretary of State Rice with enthusiasm. Current hot topics

SIPDIS
include:

--U.S. support in out years

--Demobilization and reinsertion of almost 5,000 paramilitary
terrorists and several thousand more expected

--Extradition

--Growing concern about Venezuela

--Military progress and Plan Patriota

--Human rights

--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures

--Status of U.S. hostages

--Free Trade Agreement negotiations

--Judicial reform

--Presidential re-election

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U.S. Support
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2. (C) Colombia faces a four front war -- narcos, FARC, ELN,
paramilitaries -- and a growing concern about Venezuela. It
is fighting each of the fronts with a slightly different mix
of political, military, and police measures, all of which are
expensive and at times controversial. The GOC will be
looking for private and public reaffirmations of sustained
U.S. support, including financial support. Requested U.S.
assistance tops $556 million in FY06, plus a number of other
agency operating accounts, continuing the steady decline from
about $602 million in FY03. The Colombian security forces
face serious helicopter shortages for counter-drug and
counter-terrorism operations and struggle to afford
maintenance, pilot training, and other support. President
Uribe and Defense Minister Jorge Uribe (no relation) may ask
for additional Blackhawk helicopters.

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Demobilization and Reinsertion
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3. (C) The GOC may request U.S. aid for the demobilization
and reinsertion process for the paramilitaries. President
Uribe raised the issue with the President and Secretary
Powell more than once. Although you have stated our public
support for the program, after 18 months we are still
awaiting a DOJ decision that would make aid legal under the
Patriot Act. In the meantime, the GOC program reflects the
lack of U.S. input.


4. (C) Since 2003, 5,000 paramilitaries (AUC) have
demobilized and another 7,000 from all groups have deserted.
Several thousand more may demobilize this year. But they
have no place to go. The program is under-funded and the OAS
verification chief has issued an international call for help.
Although some Europeans are providing bilateral assistance,
the EU refuses to help, partly at the behest of NGOs, until
an "acceptable" law of Peace and Justice, which provides
lesser sentences to demobilized persons guilty of major
crimes, is approved. The controversial law has passed in
committee and is awaiting plenary debate. We expect adoption
by the end of June.


5. (C) In a related peace process, the ELN rejected Mexican
facilitation on April 18, ostensibly over the GOM's vote
against Cuba at the UN Commission on Human Rights. We
believe that the FARC influenced the ELN to end the talks and
that the ELN will engage in "forum shopping" to find a more
pliable facilitator. The FARC has steadily refused peace
talks or an acceptable humanitarian prisoner exchange.

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Extradition
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6. (C) President Uribe has approved 214 extraditions to the
U.S. since taking office. He will likely ask for more
coordination to conform our actions to Colombian legal
requirements relating to length of sentence and other
political sensitivities. He has resisted both corrupt and
honestly nationalistic attempts to curtail extraditions,
including in the peace process with the paramilitaries. But
we need to reaffirm our adherence to commitments to Colombia,
and follow through.
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Venezuela
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7. (C) Colombia-Venezuela relations deteriorated further
after FARC international spokesman Rodrigo Granda was
captured in Caracas. You should encourage regional
counter-terror and counter-drug cooperation, a major theme of
last month's summit among Presidents Chavez, Lula, Zapatero,
and Uribe. Colombia remains concerned about Venezuela's arms
build-up, and is tempted to divert needed resources away from
counter-drug and counter-terror priorities. Colombia has
proposed a closer bilateral defense relationship as a partial
solution; Doug Feith leads a team in early May that will
discuss the issue.

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Military Progress and Plan Patriota
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8. (C) Plan Patriota, the campaign to re-take national
territory from illegal armed groups, is in its third year and
focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern
Colombia. Phase One largely restored security to the Bogota
area. The logistical strain of keeping 15,500 troops in
deep, hostile jungle has been a huge challenge; the troops
have suffered casualties from both FARC action and disease.
But they are winning. FARC violence in the first quarter of
2005, although tactically aggressive, remained localized. We
believe it was calculated, at least in part, to divert scarce
Colombian resources away from Plan Patriota.

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Human Rights
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9. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in
human rights, but needs to do more to ensure accountability,
strengthen the military justice system, break military ties
to paramilitary groups, and end corruption. You should
stress in private the crucial need for the GOC to investigate
and prosecute crimes in which the military may have been
directly or indirectly involved. However, the vast majority
of human rights crimes are attributable to the illegal armed
groups; e.g., in the second week of April 300 FARC attacked
an Indian village, killing a number of civilians and local
police. The government has a difficult but active dialogue
with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments.
Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the
military and police. The Embassy vets all units that receive
U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment. In
2004, homicides fell by 16 percent, kidnappings by 42
percent, and forced displacements by 37 percent.

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Drug Eradication/Interdiction
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10. (C) Cooperation with Colombia remains excellent,
complicated at times by the competition for scarce
helicopters between the counter-terror and counter-drug
priorities. Eradication and interdiction are at record
levels. Some 60,500 hectares of coca and 900 hectares of
opium poppy had been sprayed since the beginning of the year
and 1,300 hectares of coca and poppy were manually
eradicated. In 2004, over 136,000 hectares of coca and 3,000
hectares of poppy were sprayed, and almost 200 metric tons of
cocaine and cocaine base were seized inside Colombia. Ground
fire against spray planes is below 2003 levels but remains
problematic.
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U.S. Hostages
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11. (C) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in
February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the
world. Their safe release continues to be one of our top
priorities. The Colombians are providing full assistance.
They have assured us that our hostages will be included in
any humanitarian exchange and have done their best to avoid
military operations that might unnecessarily jeopardize the
hostages.

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Free Trade Agreement/Economy
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12. (U) The ninth round of FTA talks began on April 18 in
Lima, Peru. President Uribe remains a strong proponent. The
Colombians are concerned that their congressional and
national elections in 2006 will block approval if agreement
waits too long. Agriculture continues to be a major issue.
Our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is uncertain.


13. (U) Overall economic growth continues to be strong (about
4 percent),investment is growing, and unemployment is
falling. But Uribe faces fiscal and political pressure from
the competition between defense and social needs.

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Judicial Reform
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14. (C) The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has
been successful. The Colombian military justice system,
however, is unreformed, giving rise to justified accusations
of impunity in selected cases. Last month, the military
submitted a "shock" reform package to Congress as the first
step towards streamlining military justice. You should press
for more rapid, effective progress, especially in a few
critical cases.

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Presidential Reelection
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15. (C) Congressional elections will take place next March;
presidential elections next May. Constitutional reform to
permit Uribe's re-election has been approved by Congress but
faces review by the Constitutional Court; the outcome is
uncertain. Uribe is above 65 percent approval in polls.
Re-election and the Peace and Justice Law are the two big
political issues at present.
WOOD