Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA2526
2005-03-16 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

A CLOSER LOOK AT DEMOBILIZED AUC DEATHS

Tags:  PHUM PTER SNAR CO OAS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002526 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015
TAGS: PHUM PTER SNAR CO OAS
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT DEMOBILIZED AUC DEATHS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002526

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015
TAGS: PHUM PTER SNAR CO OAS
SUBJECT: A CLOSER LOOK AT DEMOBILIZED AUC DEATHS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Thirty-two out of 3,784 demobilized paramilitaries
have been killed since the United Self Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC) began demobilizing in 2004. This figure does
not include the nineteen members of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc
(BCN) killed in Medellin, whose demobilization was not held
to the same monitoring standards as the other
demobilizations. According to the OAS verification mission,
there is no evidence that the deaths are a result of a
concerted effort by guerrillas to systematically kill
demobilized paramilitaries. Instead, the majority of deaths
appear to have been caused by common crime or personal
vendettas. The GOC has established programs, including
psychological counseling and information sessions with the
police, to inform demobilizing paramilitaries about civilian
life and the importance of respecting state authorities.
According to the OAS, past peace processes show that an
average of one percent of demobilized combatants die
violently after demobilization. End Summary.

--------------
Roughly One Percent Killed
--------------


2. (C) Excluding the BCN and the minor demobilization of the
independent self-defense forces of Ortega, 32 out of 3,784
demobilized paramilitaries have been killed since
demobilization began in 2004, or just under one percent.
Thirteen were from the Catatumbo Bloc, 16 from the Calima
Bloc, and three from the Cordoba Bloc. Almost all of the
deaths were violent except for two accidents and one
illness-related death. For example, in Valle del Cauca
Department, where the Calima Bloc demobilized, most of the
former paramilitaries have been killed by drug traffickers,
apparently to settle old scores. In Norte de Santander,
where the Catatumbo Bloc demobilized, seven members were
killed in a brawl with private security guards. One former
Cordoba Bloc member was murdered after he provided evidence
to authorities against one of his former fellow
paramilitaries. The Department of Administrative Security
(DAS, rough FBI equivalent) provides security for demobilized
commanders when they are outside of the concentration zone in
Cordoba but not to the rank and file.


3. (C) Nineteen BCN members have been killed. The BCN
demobilization was not as closely monitored as subsequent
demobilizations. The Medellin Mayor's Office largely took
over the reinsertion process, and there have been many
complaints that BCN members continue to intimidate and exert
control over their communities. For this reason, the
unusually large number of BCN deaths cannot be considered as
representative of the AUC demobilization process.

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OAS Not Overly Concerned
--------------


4. (C) The OAS verification mission has investigated the
deaths and determined that there is no evidence of a
concerted effort by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) or other illegal groups to systematically
kill former paramilitaries. OAS verification mission chief
Sergio Caramagna told us the vast majority of the deaths were
a result of common crime or personal vendettas.


5. (C) Caramagna does not find the deaths surprising, given
that former paramilitaries tend to live in poor, dangerous
neighborhoods and are accustomed to being the de-facto
authorities in many areas. According to Caramagna, in most
demobilizations world wide, an average of one percent of
ex-combatants are killed after demobilization. In contrast,
the armed forces have killed over 1,000 active paramilitaries
since the peace process began, which is roughly ten percent
of the estimated 20,000 paramilitaries in Colombia. We do
not have data on what percentage of paramilitaries are killed
each year by guerrillas and other causes, but it is clear
that chances of survival are better after demobilization.
Caramagna emphasized, however, that the deaths demonstrate
the importance of increasing security and social programs in
former AUC areas. He is concerned the GOC does not have the
resources to do so.

--------------
GOC Taking Steps
--------------


6. (U) The GOC is working to inform former paramilitaries
about civilian life and convince them to rely on state
authorities to settle security problems. During the
demobilization and reinsertion process, a psychologist from
the Peace Commissioner's Office holds group counseling
sessions. Individual counseling is available at the Centers
for Reference and Orientation (CRO),where former
paramilitaries report periodically to receive reinsertion
benefits. The Peace Commissioner's Office also organizes
information sessions between former paramilitaries and
Community Police. The police instruct the former
paramilitaries on the importance of not taking security
matters into their own hands.




WOOD