UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS PRESIDENT URIBE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 001751

SIPDIS

FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND. NSC FOR INTER-AMERICAN DIRECTORATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL GOV
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN MEETS PRESIDENT URIBE,
LEGAL ADVISER OSPINA

REF: BOGOTA 1296

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 14, U/S Grossman and President
Uribe discussed the demobilization law, Uribe's preparations
for his meeting with President Chavez the following day,
securing support from neighboring countries in the fight
against narco-terrorism, human rights, and potential GOC
counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan. On
demobilization, the U/S said the drafting and approval of the
law was a matter for Colombians but stressed the importance
the U.S. placed on a strong law that provided for peace with
justice and dismantled the paramilitaries. Uribe expected
negotiations with the Congress to be difficult and would
insist the law be applicable to all illegal armed groups (the
U/S and Ambassador agreed),but was committed to working with
Senator Pardo, who had introduced an alternative draft, to
reach a compromise. He believed compromise could be reached
within three weeks and that a law could be adopted by June.
Grossman and Uribe agreed that the bill's joint introduction
by the GOC and Pardo would be the ideal scenario. Uribe was
not optimistic about his meeting with Chavez. The GOV was
resisting any mention of the word "terrorism" in the
communiqu, and Chavez, busy trying to create a modern
Marxist regime in Venezuela in the image of Castro, was
showing no willingness to fight drugs or terrorism. The U/S
said the U.S. had been trying to raise the consciousness of
the region regarding what was happening in Venezuela and
counseled Uribe to keep the focus on Venezuela's failure to
fight narco-terrorism. The U/S, Ambassador and Uribe agreed
that recently-publicized FARC links to the kidnapping of the
former Paraguayan President's daughter would internationalize
the problem of the narco-terrorist FARC, heretofore only
considered Colombia's concern.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: U/S Grossman met with Presidential
Legal Advisor Camilo Ospina prior to seeing Uribe. Ospina
was also optimistic that consensus could be reached on the
demobilization law within a three-week timeframe. The U/S
underscored that the most important result would be a law
that all concerned could publicly support. Ospina raised the
letter recently sent to Uribe by several major drug
traffickers, indicating a willingness to negotiate surrender.
Ospina said it was not a serious offer and the GOC would not
respond. On the issue of the Supreme Court resuming the
processing of extradition cases frozen last month over
concerns that the U.S. was not living up to its assurances on
sentencing, Ospina said he was delivering a report to the
court on the status of every extradited Colombian which
reflected no irregularities. Ospina suggested that U.S. and
Colombia court officials communicate more to avoid future
misunderstandings. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On February 14, U/S Grossman met President Uribe at
the Casa de Huespedes in Cartagena. The U/S was accompanied
by Ambassador Wood, P special assistant Hunt and polcouns
(notetaker). Uribe, who had remained in Cartagena since
February 3 due to an inner-ear infection, said he was feeling
better but still suffered occasional bouts of dizziness. He
was scheduled to depart for Caracas to meet Hugo Chavez the
following day (septel). Before the meeting began, Uribe
presented Grossman with the Order of San Carlos, the highest
decoration given to foreigners for providing outstanding
assistance to Colombia.


4. (C) U/S Grossman opened the meeting by expressing U.S.
gratitude for GOC efforts to free the three U.S. hostages,
whose second anniversary in captivity had just passed. The
U.S. Embassy had held a ceremony marking the anniversary and
the U/S hoped ongoing efforts by the U.S. and Colombia would
lead to their early release. He also expressed U.S.
condolences for COLMIL losses caused by recent FARC attacks,
and for the emergency situation caused by recent flooding and
loss of life in the Santander and Norte de Santander
departments. The USG planned to show its solidarity by
making a contribution to the relief effort. U/S Grossman
underscored U.S. support for Uribe's fight against
narco-terrorism, noting the recent budget submission to the
Congress for Colombia, which remained consistent with current
levels of assistance. He also thanked Uribe for Colombia's
excellent cooperation on extraditions, and called for
continued focus on human rights. Referring to the recent
donors conference in Cartagena (reftel),Grossman said the
U.S. was pleased with the results and that the resulting
Cartagena Declaration was more positive for the GOC. Uribe
agreed and declared USAID Administrator Natsios' speech at
the event as "splendid and extraordinary."

DEMOBILIZATION LAW
--------------


5. (c) Noting widespread U.S. interest in the demobilization
law on which deliberations in the Colombian Congress were set
to begin February 15, U/S Grossman asked how the GOC planned
to move it forward. The U/S made clear that the drafting and
approval of the law was a matter for the Colombians. But, as
a friend of Colombia, he also stressed the importance the
U.S. placed on a strong law that provides for peace with
justice and effectively puts the paramilitaries out of
business. He hoped certain things would occur as a result of
the law, such as disclosure of past criminal or terrorist
activities, punishment for serious crimes, reparations, and a
transparent process. He referred to a recent letter from
several Members of Congress on the demobilization process.
He characterized it as a letter of support for
demobilizations, assuming the GOC and the Congress could
agree on a legal framework. We want to be able to tell our
Congress that the GOC has managed this well, he said. With a
good law, resources would likely accompany political support.


6. (C) Uribe acknowledged that discussions with the Congress
would be difficult. Although members would likely introduce
changes, he could not compromise on several points. First,
there had to be a minimum sentence of five years. Second,
the law had to apply to all illegal armed groups, not just
the paramilitaries. Uribe was convinced that many members of
Congress wanted a softer law for the FARC and ELN. The U/S
and the Ambassador agreed with Uribe on these points and said
he could rely on public U.S. support for them.


7. (C) U/S Grossman informed Uribe that he would be seeing
Senator Pardo (who has led a group drafting an alternative to
the government bill) later in the day (septel) and sought
advice to ensure the meeting would be constructive. Uribe
explained that he had a high regard for Pardo, whom he
described as intelligent and honest, but had been surprised
by some of the Senator's recent action. Uribe said Minister
of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt thought he had reached
a deal with Pardo a few days earlier but Pardo later reneged
citing disagreements within his own group. The GOC had
solicited comments from Pardo on a potential law over a year
ago but Pardo later charged that the GOC was not serious
about consulting with him. Uribe stressed that, for the
first time, the concept of justice was being incorporated
into the law. With previous peace processes, including those
in which Pardo had been involved as Defense Minister, only
peace and amnesty were considered. The GOC wanted a
constructive balance between peace and justice but Pardo had
become the principal proponent of justice and members of his
group were advocating softer treatment for the guerrillas.
Nonetheless, Uribe said he was committed to achieving a
workable consensus on the balance of peace and justice and
had instructed Sabas Pretelt and others to work with Pardo to
agree on the right text. Uribe predicted it would take a
couple of weeks to rectify the bills and agree on a joint
position.


8. (C) U/S Grossman said a text introduced by the GOC and
Pardo would be good step forward. The sooner the GOC reached
agreement with the Pardo group the better. We have people
trying to divide you and us through Pardo, said Grossman.
Uribe said he was committed to making all efforts to "get a
decent law."


9. (C) U/S Grossman and Ambassador reiterated that the law
needed to provide: (1) disclosure of past criminal or
terrorist activities, a key step toward national
reconciliation; (2) punishment for all those responsible for
serious crimes; (3) dismantlement of the narco-terrorist
organizations through seizure of property, and individual and
collective reparations; (4) transparency; and (5) government
monitoring and control to ensure that those demobilized do
not return to crime.

VENEZUELA
--------------


10. (C) Uribe said that he expected the next day's meeting
with Chavez to be difficult and solicited the U/S's advice on
how to proceed. Foreign Minister Carolina Barco had remained
behind in Bogota to hear from the Spanish Cooperation
Minister how the agreement between Spain and France to
cooperate against terrorism along their border was working,
and whether this was something to pursue with Venezuela.


11. (C) U/S Grossman said GOC efforts to keep the focus on
Venezuela and what it failed to do should be continued.
Granda was a FARC operative living on a false passport in
Caracas. The issue was the fight against terrorism.
Chavez had to deal with Colombia in a serious way; protecting
Granda and the FARC was not the way. The U/S noted the
Secretary's recent remarks that Venezuela was not playing a

SIPDIS
positive role in the region. The USG had hoped earlier that
it could identify issues with which to constructively engage
Venezuela, but this had failed. It was important for Uribe
to go to Venezuela, underline his philosophy to Chavez that
terrorism is a struggle, and that every nation in the
neighborhood, including Venezuela, needed to be a part of it.


12. (C) Uribe was not optimistic about the Chavez meeting.
Negotiations over a draft communiqu were not going well.
Venezuela had refused to accept mention of the word
"terrorism." The Venezuelans instead were pushing for a text
that highlighted "neutrality," which the GOC had rejected.
We cannot accept the primacy of "neutrality" when dealing
with terrorist groups, said Uribe. The Venezuelans had then
come back offering language expressing a willingness to
cooperate against "specific crimes" or "delinquents." Uribe
said the text remained in brackets and he instructed FM Barco
to halt further negotiations and let him sort it out with
Chavez directly.


13. (C) Uribe noted that, when Fidel Castro had sent his
personal representative to discuss the situation with
Venezuela, the Cuban asked for Uribe's proof that Granda had
committed a crime. Uribe responded that he had no evidence
that linked Granda to a specific case of kidnapping or other
serious crimes. However, he was an open member of the FARC,
a terrorist organization, and therefore complicit in crimes
committed by it and had certainly helped cover them up. To
strengthen his position in Caracas, Uribe was hopeful that
the Attorney General of Paraguay would later in the day hold
a press conference on links between the FARC and the
Paraguayan kidnappers of the daughter of former President
Cubas. He said GOC investigators were uncovering evidence
suggesting others from the FARC in addition to Granda were in
contact with Paraguayan guerrillas, instructing them on how
to carry out kidnappings and other crimes, and finance
operations.


14. (C) The Ambassador underscored the importance of
revealing the FARC connection to Paraguay. Identifying the
international aspects of FARC activities added a new
dimension. Most see the FARC as a Colombian problem, he
said, but this makes it an international one, subject to
international agreements, including Security Council
resolution 1373 and others, that bound nations to fight
international terrorism.


15. (C) According to Uribe, it was becoming clear that Chavez
was committed to a Marxist ideology and wanted to establish a
modern Marxist regime. A prominent Cuban academician was
editing his speeches. Castro had told Uribe that he had a
"sincere, deep friendship" with Chavez, that he was selling
Chavez $2 billion in services annually, and that Chavez was
repaying him with oil. Uribe said Castro saw in Chavez an
opportunity to expand his revolution to successor generations
in South America. However, despite the close political
connection between the two, Uribe's concern was not Castro
but Chavez because he was awash in oil money. He saw no
commitment from Chavez to fight drugs or terrorism.


16. (C) U/S Grossman said he shared Uribe's concerns.
Castro's vision to pass his revolution to subsequent
generations through Chavez was a challenge to democracy in
the region. The U.S. had been trying to raise consciousness
of what is happening in Venezuela and hoped Colombia would be
helpful in that regard. Recent reports of arms sales from
Russia were also troubling, mostly because some of these
weapons would end up with the FARC.

SECURING SUPPORT IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD TO FIGHT NARCO-TERRORISM
-------------- --------------


17. (C) The Ambassador asked Uribe about support from
Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, in the fight against terrorism,
noting that none had publicly declared the FARC a terrorist
group, as the U.S., EU and Japan had done. Would any of
these countries be willing to use the word terrorism in
relation to illegal armed groups?

Ecuador: Uribe declared President Gutierrez a good friend of
Colombia -- someone he has been able to work with despite
troubling comments before he was elected. Uribe conceded
that Gutierrez did not pro-actively fight the FARC but had
not been an obstacle either. Colombia needs Ecuador's
cooperation, he said. Uribe said Gutierrez is in a weak
position and feared FARC retaliation if he actively
challenged them. Nonetheless, he thought Gutierrez should be
tested on whether he would be willing to make public
statements against the FARC, and agreed to ask FM Barco to
follow up. The Ambassador noted the FARC did not retaliate
against Ecuador when it had cooperated in the capture of
Simon Trinidad.
Peru: Uribe said he had considerable evidence that President
Toledo was personally committed and active in fighting
narco-terrorism. Peru had also played a very positive role
as private mediator in the diplomatic row with Venezuela over
the capture of Granda.

Brazil: Uribe was unsure about President Lula whom he
described as a "great puzzle." Lula appeared constructive,
charismatic at multilateral meetings, and often spoke out
against terrorism. But Uribe saw little evidence Lula was
willing to convert "his words to realities." He referred to
bilateral discussions on how to circumvent drug traffickers
flying into Brazilian airspace but noted the GOB had taken no
action so far.


18. (C) U/S Grossman encouraged Uribe to approach his
Ecuadorian counterpart on public statements about the FARC.
He also mentioned that the U.S. had been working successfully
to support Brazil's new air bridge denial program. The
Brazilians had approached the USG and the two nations were
working together as allowed by U.S. law. The effort was
starting to show results. This was prompting the U.S. to
look at a regional air bridge denial program.

HUMAN RIGHTS/MILITARY JUSTICE
--------------


19. (c) U/S Grossman expressed the hope that Uribe would
continue his leadership role in addressing several
outstanding human rights cases, including Mapiripan and
others, and in improving the military justice system. Uribe
said he continued to track the human rights cases closely as
investigations continued, and was working hard to introduce
transparency in the armed forces to break any remaining
connections with the paramilitaries.

GOC ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
--------------


20. (C) Uribe reported that he had recently spoken to
President Karzai of Afghanistan, expressing his willingness
to send police to share GOC experiences on counternarcotics
efforts, and to receive Afghan officials to witness firsthand
what Colombia was doing on the ground. U/S Grossman welcomed
the news, underscoring that it was important for Karzai to
hear directly from Uribe how Colombia has been conducting its
own war on drugs.

PRE-MEETING WITH LEGAL ADVISER OSPINA
--------------


21. (C) Prior to seeing President Uribe, U/S Grossman met
with Presidential Legal Adviser Camilo Ospina. Ospina raised
the letter sent recently to President Uribe by drug
trafficker Diego Montoya and several others indicating a
willingness to negotiate surrender. Ospina said the GOC
would not respond positively. It was not a serious offer.
Montoya was prepared neither to accept a minimum sentence nor
to forego property accumulated by his illegal activities.
Ospina noted one of the signatories of the letter would be
extradited to the U.S. in 15 days. The GOC had no intention
of stopping it.


22. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of extraditions and
whether the Supreme Court would resume the processing of
extradition cases, halted by concerns that the GOC did not
have sufficient controls in place to ensure the U.S. was
respecting its assurances regarding sentencing and other
issues. Ospina said he was delivering a report to the court
on the status of every extradited Colombian which reflected
no irregularities. Only the case of Alex Restrepo, who was
given a life sentence, remained a problem. Ospina suggested
that the U.S. and Colombian courts "talk to each other more"
to avoid future misunderstandings. Ospina insisted that,
although no decisions on extradition had been taken since
January 20, "the process continued to function" (see septel).
He expected approval for the extradition of Omaira Rojas
Cabrera (aka Sonia) in March. (COMMENT: On February 16, the
Supreme Court rejected the status report on extraditables.
The Court asked for more information, which the GOC does not
have.)


23. (C) Turning to the demobilization law, Ospina was
optimistic that consensus could be reached between the formal
GOC draft and that of the Pardo group. Most of the
differences had been resolved. Disagreements over a minimum
sentence and the special tribunal had been resolved. Wording
over the characterization of the internal situation in the
country (internal conflict v. terrorism) had been resolved.
Differences remained over which entity would oversee
reparations and the extent of the state's responsibility for
reparations if funds from illicit activities were not
sufficient. On the latter, Ospina said they had reached
agreement to limit the amount of reparations. Ospina also
confirmed that the issue of extradition remained off the
table in negotiations on the law. The GOC would not accept
any reference to it.


24. (C) Ospina predicted the Congress would be "way down the
road" on the bill by the next week. He conceded that within
the GOC, he still had difficulties with Sabas Pretelt. In
the Congress, he expected blowback from Senator Cordoba and
allies, and work would have to be done to "realign" the draft
that Congressman Benedetti's group presented on February 11.
U/S Grossman stressed that the most important thing for the
U.S. was that whatever passed in the Congress could be
publicly supported by all concerned. This would help the
U.S. and other potential donors move forward with assistance
for the demobilization process. Ospina confirmed the GOC was
working toward having Pardo introduce a joint bill. U/S
Grossman and the Ambassador warmly welcomed this approach.


25. (C) U/S Grossman asked Ospina how he envisioned the
special session of Congress playing out. When would Pardo
get on the record that he favored a joint bill? Ospina said
the process would take three weeks. That week's goal was to
gather support for a joint bill. Next week, the spokesman of
the various drafts would negotiate the substance, and the
following week, arrangements for a joint presentation in the
Congress would be finalized. Uribe, according to Ospina,
had earlier in the day ordered GOC officials to present a
united front, refrain from speaking publicly for themselves,
and work to reach agreement with the Pardo group.

26. (U) U/S Grossman has cleared this message.
DRUCKER